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INTRODUCTION TO REGULATING INNOVATION IN
HEALTHCARE: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC OR STIFLING
PROGRESS?
KATHY L. CERMINARA
MARILYN UZDAVINES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Growing up seeing flames leaping and smoke billowing out of the
smokestacks of steel mills along the river, children of southwestern
Pennsylvania in the 1960s tended to develop one of two attitudes toward
regulation in general. As the 1960s faded into the 1970s, it was regulation
that rid the neighborhood of the rotten-egg stench of sulfurous fumes. It was
regulation that cleared the air so that air quality index warnings receded into
the past, enabling all citizens, including the elderly and young children, to go
outside every day. Along with the clearer skies and non-toxic air, however,
came the decline of the American steel industry. Certainly regulation was
not the sole cause of that decline, and one also can attribute the decrease in
pollution to the decline, but industry blamed increased environmental
regulation in part for high production costs that led to foreign steel
dominance. By 1983, unemployment had hit 13.9% in Allegheny County,
home of Pittsburgh, the industrial center of the area.1 Mills continued to
close up and down the Monongahela River Valley over the next few years,2
and it was easy for millworkers and their families to focus on the negatives
of regulation, holding it responsible for at least part of their economic strife.
The tall, steep hill across the Monongahela River from the Clairton
Works steel mill, however, demonstrates the benefits of regulation. During
the 1960s and 1970s, no plant would grow on that hillside. Poisonous haze
and particulates prevented any greenery from sprouting. Lacking vegetation
anchoring the scant dirt covering its rocks, that hillside gave way
periodically, and drivers had to detour around rockslide after rockslide
closing the road below. Beginning with the onset of environmental
regulation and continuing today, thanks to regulation, the hillside is covered
in greenery holding the soil firmly in place. There are no more rockslides.
The regulation some blamed at least in part for their misfortune was that
1.
Bill Toland, In desperate 1983, there was nowhere for Pittsburgh’s
economy to go but up, PGH. POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 23, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.postgazette.com/business/businessnews/2012/12/23/In-desperate-1983-there-was-nowhere-forPittsburgh-s-economy-to-go-but-up/stories/201212230258.
2.
Id.
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hillside’s savior. Those enjoying clear skies and breathing cleaner air also
were thankful for that greenery, the sight of which still pre-disposes some to
look favorably upon regulation of business in general.
II.

REGULATION OF THE FREE MARKET GUIDED BY ETHICS

This symposium issue of the Nova Law Review addresses regulation
of the healthcare industry, not the environment; but that hillside outside of
Clairton, Pennsylvania, symbolizes the recurring “regulation versus free
market” debate in this country. Steel and associated heavy industries
dominated southwestern Pennsylvania beginning in the late 1870s; by the
1940s, operating virtually free of environmental regulation, they had filled
the sky with smoky haze, rendering Pittsburgh as dark as midnight in late
morning.3 Skies began to clear after smoke control began in that city in
1946, but battles continued over regulatory expansion throughout the region.4
The memory of that hillside as it existed in the 1960s illustrates the effect of
the free market, only recently regulated, on that particular patch of Earth. In
contrast, its condition today, after increasing state and federal regulation,
illustrates the benefits of regulation. Such an illustration can shape overall
attitudes toward regulation regardless of the subject being regulated.
Titled Regulating Innovation in Healthcare: Protecting the Public
or Stifling Progress?, the articles to follow comment on various aspects of
the politically sensitive topic of healthcare regulation. Politicians and
policymakers generally range from those favoring intense regulation, such as
that with which “Americans had a love affair” from the 1880s to the late
1970s, to those advocating the “Age of Deregulation,” marked by some as
beginning around 1978.5 The range of opinions is just as broad in healthcare,
as the 2016 presidential campaign and the debates characterizing the
beginning of the Trump Administration illustrate.6

3.
See STEFAN LORANT, PITTSBURGH: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN CITY 376
(2d ed. 1975) (illustrating downtown Pittsburgh with all lights on at 11 a.m. in 1945). Lorant
describes Pittsburgh as “the hearth of the nation” beginning in the late 1800s. Id. at 177, 324
(picturing a “bleak scene” at 3:00 PM).
4.
See id. at 381, 390 (noting that, despite the passage of a city ordinance in
1941, World War II postponed its operation until 1946 and explaining that state legislation to
expand smoke control beyond the city first was introduced in 1947).
5.
See Stephen G. Wood et al., Regulations Deregulation and ReRegulation: An American Perspective, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 381, 381–384 (1987).
6.
See Andrew Gavil, Trump’s Simplistic Attack on Regulation is Misguided
and
Self-Defeating
FORBES
(Mar.
8,
2017
9:41
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2017/03/08/trumps-simplistic-attack-onregulation-is-misguided-and-self-defeating/#6f074dbf3e54.
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The authors in this symposium issue presented their ideas at Nova
Southeastern University’s Shepard Broad College of Law in the autumn of
2016, marking the 50th anniversary of Henry K. Beecher’s “bombshell” of an
article in The New England Journal of Medicine with the unassuming title
Ethics and Clinical Research.7 In that article, Beecher documented 22
examples of “unethical or questionably ethical [medical research] studies.”8
At the time Beecher wrote the piece, only 21 years after the Nuremberg
trials,9 it was tempting to conclude that only Nazi physicians—not
Americans—required regulation to guard against unethical behavior in
medical research. Beecher’s findings, in many readers’ eyes, revealed
otherwise. He himself, while not wishing to point a finger at particular
researchers, explained:
Evidence is at hand that many of the patients in the examples to
follow never had the risk [of research protocols] satisfactorily
explained to them, and it seems obvious that further hundreds have
not known that they were the subjects of an experience although
grave consequences have been suffered as a direct result of
experiences described here. There is a belief prevalent in some
sophisticated circles that attention to these matters would “block
progress.” But, according to Pope Pius XII, “. . . science is not the
highest value to which all other orders of values . . . should be
10
subordinated.”

Beecher himself did not favor regulation. To him, the solution to the
problem presented by unethical conduct of medical research rested primarily
not on informed consent—the requirement of which is a form of regulation—
but on a “more reliable safeguard provided by the presence of an intelligent,
informed, conscientious, compassionate, responsible investigator.”11 After
all, in medicine, the opposite of regulation is not purely the free market, as it
is in the steel industry. Rather, the opposite of regulation in medicine is the
free market guided by professionalism and ethics of a sort that does not
dominate in the steel industry—or any other heavy industry for that matter.12
7.
See generally Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 N.
ENG. J. MED. 367 (1966); see also David S. Jones et al., “Ethics and Clinical Research” the
50th Anniversary of Beecher’s Bombshell, 374 N. ENG. J. MED. 2393 (2016).
8.
Beecher, supra note 7, at 368.
9.
See Jones at 2293–2294 (describing the Nuremberg Code’s appearance
after World War II and noting that “[n]any U.S. scientists believed that the Code . . . did not
apply to them”).
10.
Beecher, supra note 7, at 367 (footnote omitted).
11.
Id. at 372.
12.
See PETER J. HAMMER ET AL., UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND
THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTHCARE 1–36 (2003) (reprinting Kenneth J. Arrow,
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As bioethicist Robert Veatch writes, Beecher did not believe the researchers
conducting the studies he described were consciously pursuing their selfinterest and ignoring their ethical obligations. Rather, “for Beecher, the
problem [was] well-meaning but thoughtless investigators who fail[ed] to
grasp what they [were] doing,” and “consciousness-raising” was the
solution.13
In contrast, Beecher’s former student, physician and bioethicist Jay
Katz, operated under the conviction “that well-designed legal procedures
could regulate (though not totally supplant) professional standards, which
[Katz] found insufficient in themselves as a check on unethical practices.”14
As Veatch explains, “[b]y 1973, it was becoming more and more obvious
that professional self-regulation was inadequate” in medical research.15 A
whistleblower had revealed details of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, through
which the United States Public Health Service, under the guise of treatment,
had studied untreated syphilis among poor, African-American men in
Macon, Georgia, for the past forty years.16 In hearings thereafter, which led
eventually to creation of the institutional review board (IRB) system of
governmental regulation of research, Beecher testified that he favored “a
massive professional education effort” instead.17 Nevertheless, as bioethicist
Alexander Morgan Capron notes, “there is no question that [both] Beecher
and Katz played pivotal roles in closing the post Nuremberg [ethical] lacuna
that had become glaringly apparent by 1972.”18 Although Beecher favored
reliance on ethics to govern the “free market” of medical research and Katz
believed in research regulation, the development of such regulation in the
United States stemmed at least partially from Katz’s “admiration for
[Beecher’s] courage—Beecher’s willingness to risk his privileged position
by lifting the veil that shielded the activities of his biomedical peers from
public view.”19 For that reason, even research regulation advocates admire

Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) and
thereafter addressing the economics of modern healthcare issues).
13.
Robert M. Veatch, Henry Beecher’s Contributions to the Ethics of
Clinical Research, 59 PERSPS. IN BIOL. & MED. 3, 9 (2016).
14.
Alexander Morgan Capron, Henry Knowles Beecher, Jay Katz, and the
Transformation of Research With Human Beings, 59 PERSPS. IN BIOL. & MED. 55, 67 (2016).
15.
Veatch, supra note 13, at 15.
16.
Capron, supra note 14, at 68. See also JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE
STORY OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY (rev. ed. 1993) (for more about the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study).
17.
Veatch, supra note 13, at 16 (quoting Beecher as saying, “I think it is a
little too soon for this to be frozen into law.”).
18.
Capron, supra note 14, at 75.
19.
Id.
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and honor Beecher to this day, and it seemed fitting to hold a symposium in
his honor on the 50th anniversary of the article by which most know him.
III.

HEALTHCARE REGULATION BEYOND MEDICAL RESEARCH

The topics of innovation and the role that its regulation plays raise
questions in many areas of healthcare, not just clinical research. This
symposium addresses important aspects of healthcare innovation dealing
with delivery, payment, data collection, and technology. In organizing the
symposium at NSU, we brought together experts from across the country in
academia, government, and private practice to address the challenges in the
transformation of healthcare. The result was an explicitly interprofessional
event, during which the legal, medical, public health, and patient
communities learned from each other. These articles provide insight on both
sides of the question of whether regulating innovation is helping or hurting
the future of healthcare.
Jackson Williams, the Director of Government Affairs for Dialysis
Patient Citizens, addresses the need for innovation in healthcare business
models. He argues that a business model change could be a solution to the
current problem of high costs and low quality of healthcare in the United
States. Specifically, Williams “argues that insurance regulators [could]
catalyze cost containment efforts by encouraging, or mandating, insurers to
act vigorously as agents of consumers in obtaining low prices from
providers.”20 He also notes that insurance regulators could police provider
misconduct in healthcare markets, providing extra protection for patients.21
Williams discusses how an insurance commissioner’s regulatory authority
could solve the collective action problem by apportioning costs and thereby
incentivizing provider cooperation.22 Williams’ innovative proposal could
alleviate the skyrocketing cost-sharing obligations that currently exist in the
majority of employer-sponsored health insurance plans.
Another equally important area of innovation is digital health
information technology. As the healthcare industry has shifted from paper to
digital, new legal issues have arisen with how to keep patients and their
privacy interests protected. Cason Schmit, Research Assistant Professor of
Public Health at Texas A&M University, introduces a research project
undertaken by the Centers for Disease Control to examine the regulatory
framework of state statutes dealing with health information technology. The
20.
Jackson Williams, The Persistence of Opportunistic Business Models in
Healthcare and a Stronger Role for Insurance Regulators in Containing Healthcare Costs, 41
NOVA L. REV. 313, 314 (2017).
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
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research reveals that there are literally thousands of state laws addressing
digital health information in healthcare. Schmit notes that as technology has
continued to outpace legislation at an exponential rate, the states have
stepped up to create a patchwork of laws to try and keep up. Schmit argues
that this complicated patchwork of state laws could be impeding
advancements in health information technology because it is difficult to
discern the applicable laws, and, therefore, businesses that want to avoid
exposure to liability may steer clear of innovation for this reason. Schmit
notes, however, that some laws are helpful in enabling entities to engage in
new and innovative health information technology. In these instances,
instead of regulation becoming a barrier to innovation, the regulations
actually encourage and enable innovation. Schmit highlights how the law
has been both a benefit and a burden to innovation in healthcare.
While there are numerous benefits to be gained from the shift from
paper to digital, there are also new vulnerabilities associated with the data
that did not exist before this transition. This cycle of innovation and legal
catch-up is not uncommon in the law. Since its inception, the organization
now known as the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has been charged
with protecting a vulnerable public from the manufacturers and sellers of
medical products. Initially, its purview was over products characterized as
drugs, but as medical devices became more sophisticated, and consequently
more dangerous, the FDA’s scope expanded to cover them as well.23 Despite
its best efforts, however, the FDA and the regulations that govern it have
always lagged behind the pace of technological advances, resulting in a cycle
of inaction, tragedy, and reaction.24
Innovation in health information technology mirrors the last century
of innovation in medical devices in that they both outpace the advancements
in law. They both also carry with them risks to a vulnerable public in
different ways. As advancements in health information technology bring
benefits to healthcare, they bring the potential for damage – not only physical
injury, as with medical devices, but also damage to financial and privacy
interests. Paul R. DeMuro, Associate Professor of Pharmacy at NSU,
examines the cybersecurity risks inherent in health information technology.
Specifically, DeMuro’s article discusses ransomware, a virus cybercriminals
use to bring patient care to a halt while they hold patients’ health information
captive. Ransomware has the potential to destroy privacy and prevent
appropriate care from being delivered to patients because computer systems

23.
1 JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHERINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD
ADMINISTRATION § 12:9 (4th ed. 2016).
24.
See id. at § 12:7.
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are frozen until the ransom is paid to the cybercriminal.25 As innovation
creates new technology, existing security measures and regulations have
proven insufficient to protect against the vulnerabilities. DeMuro analyzes
the existing legal framework governing digital health information in the
healthcare industry and argues that negotiation theory should be applied to
the ransomware context to shed light on whether healthcare organizations
should be permitted to engage in ransom negotiations with cybercriminals.
As discussed above, this same tension between innovation and
regulation arises with the societal desire for advancement in medical devices.
Whether it is an improved implantable cardioverter defibrillator or an insulin
pump, most would agree that innovation in medical devices benefits the
public. However, as technology has increased with medical devices, so has
the ability to capture sensitive patient information through vulnerabilities in
the hardware or software. As Chris Kersbergen, Assistant Professor at
Keiser University, discusses in his article, it is easy hack into such devices.26
Kersbergen examines a recent draft FDA guidance on cybersecurity for
manufacturers of wirelessly connected, implanted medical devices.27 He
discusses why it is so easy to hack into such devices and critiques three
aspects of the draft guidance, suggesting that the FDA should include patient
privacy within the concept of patient safety when regulating in this area.28
Kersbergen argues for additional FDA regulation that focuses heavily on the
financial and other “identity” implications of hacking into medical devices as
a way to obtain patient data.29
Not only is there a risk that patient health information can be
exploited for financial gain, but the patient’s physical safety also could be
jeopardized by these various vulnerabilities. Michael Woods’s article
focuses on the physical safety aspect of cybersecurity of the same devices.
Woods is not as concerned about financial identity theft or patient data; he is
mainly concerned about patient physical safety and about terrorists who
could hack into medical devices to physically hurt patients. He does not
focus on any one agency or any one regulation or guidance document; part of
his point is that too many agencies are responsible for monitoring

25.
Paul R. DeMuro, Keeping Internet Pirates at Bay: Ransomware
Negotiation in the Healthcare Industry, 41 NOVA L. REV. 349, 352–53 (2017).
26.
Christopher Kersbergen, Patient Safety Should Include Patient Privacy:
The Shortcomings of the FDA’s Recent Draft Guidance Regarding Cybersecurity of Medical
Devices, 41 NOVA. L. REV. 397, 397 (2017).
27.
Id. at 417–18.
28.
Id. at 412–14.
29.
Id. at 401.
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cybersecurity of such devices, in various ways.30 Similar to Schmit’s
highlighting of the complicated patchwork of regulations, Woods seeks
clarification among the various government agencies regulating in this area.
This is an area characterized by duplication of laws and overlap of authority,
creating problems in effective enforcement of the law. When the potential
for serious harm is so high, Woods argues, there should be a unified
approach to regulation among agencies.31 Without a unified, proactive
approach to these regulations, the United States could be facing another
cycle of inaction, tragedy, and reaction.
The transformation of healthcare is certain. If and how regulation
will respond to this transformation will have a profound personal impact on
us all. This symposium explores the highly political question of how much
involvement the law should have in the innovation of healthcare. We hope it
adds to the discourse and exposes areas where changes in the law can help
shape the healthcare industry.

30.
Michael Woods, Cardiac Defribrillators Need to Have a Bulletproof Vest:
The National Security Risk Posed by the Lack of Cybersecurity in Implantable Medical
Devices, 41 NOVA. L. REV. 419, 437–39 (2017).
31.
Id. at 440–42.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

While much is heard about new “value-based” payment models for
health care, the reality is that old-fashioned business models emphasizing
higher unit prices and discrete billable services still prevail and succeed in
driving up health care costs.1 Indeed, providers have cited the spread of
*.
Jackson Williams is Director of Government Affairs at Dialysis Patient
Citizens. He received an MPA from Governors State University in 1996, his J.D. from Loyola
University of Chicago School of Law in 1988, and his B.A. from the University of Illinois at
Chicago in 1985. From 2010 to 2013 he worked at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services. Previously he was a health services researcher in the AARP Public Policy Institute
and a lobbyist on health policy issues for three non-profit associations. He is an NAIC
Funded Consumer Representative, and also was in 2003-2004. He has taught courses in
political science and law at the University of Illinois at Chicago, IIT-Kent College of Law,
and Pennsylvania State University, Harrisburg.
1.
See Robert Berenson, Addressing Pricing Power in Integrated Delivery:
The Limits of Antitrust, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 711, 712 (2015); Matthew Rae et al.,
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global payment models as an excuse for continued market consolidation by
providers.2 Even relatively low-cost integrated delivery systems, such as
Kaiser-Permanente, profit from opportunistic behavior by competing
providers, since their premiums can “shadow” those of insurers who must
contract with high-cost providers.3
Ideally, insurers would act as purchasing cooperatives on behalf of
consumers, obtaining the lowest possible unit prices from providers.4 But
the most effective tools that purchasers could deploy—including antitrust
and other litigation against providers who act opportunistically—go unused.5
As the late health economist Warren Greenberg argued,6 this is partly
because of the collective action problem inherent in a multi-payer market.7
In this context, the collective action problem refers to the fact that while
many purchasers share an interest in lower unit prices for health care, it is not
always in the interest of an individual purchaser to expend resources on
measures, such as initiating costly litigation or provoking an acrimonious
impasse that, if successful, would likely benefit competing insurers or
employers as well.8 But, more generally, it has been observed that payers
have not “pushed back” on prices.9
This Article argues that insurance regulators can catalyze cost
containment efforts by encouraging, or mandating, insurers to act vigorously
as agents of consumers in obtaining low prices from providers to include
policing provider misconduct in health care markets.10 The Insurance
Commissioner’s regulatory authority can solve the collective action problem
Snapshots: The Prevalence and Cost of Deductibles in Employer Sponsored Insurance,
KFF.ORG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/snapshots-theprevalence-and-cost-of-deductibles-in-employer-sponsored-insurance.
2.
See CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, WALL STREET COMES TO
WASHINGTON 2 (2004); Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to
Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31
HEALTH AFF. 973, 979 (2012).
3.
Sarah Varney, Could Kaiser Permanente’s Low-Cost Health Care Be
Even Cheaper?, NPR (June 25, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2012/06/26/155726049/could-kaiser-permanentes-low-cost-health-care-be-evencheaper.
4.
See Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 979.
5.
See Berenson, supra note 1, at 714.
6.
Warren Greenberg, Private Antitrust As a Public Good, 8 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REP. 118, 118 (1996).
7.
See id.
8.
See id. at 122–23.
9.
DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., ACCOUNTING FOR THE
COST OF US HEALTH CARE: A NEW LOOK AT WHY AMERICANS SPEND MORE 105 (2008); see
also infra Section IV.B.
10.
See infra Section IV.B.
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The
by apportioning costs and, thereby, incentivize cooperation.11
Commissioner can also serve as a coordinator of, and spokesperson for, joint
efforts to bring down provider prices.12
II.

THE INSURANCE COMPANY AS AN AGENT OF PURCHASERS

Two recent trends have significantly changed the way consumers
interface with health insurance: Rising deductibles and self-funded plans.13
Today, for most consumers, the most important function of a health
insurance company in a given year will not be paying for health utilization,
but negotiating prices with providers.14
In 2003, only about half of employer-sponsored insurance (“ESI”)
that covered workers’ health plans had a deductible at all—by 2013, it was
81%.15 In 2003, the average deductible was $518, a decade later it was
$1273, a 146% increase.16 In about 20% of workplaces, employees have
access to only high-deductible health plans, with a deductible averaging
$2100.17 For about forty-two million Americans with ESI who spend over
$300 on care but do not meet the average deductible in a given year, a 5%
reduction in provider prices would yield an average of $30 in direct and
immediate savings on out-of-pocket costs.18 For this group, the principal
role of the insurance company is that of purchasing cooperative—combining
the buying power of multiple enrollees to obtain the lowest price.19
III.

THE PROBLEM OF EXCESS PRICES

Comparisons of health care costs across the thirty industrialized
countries, for which the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) publishes data, demonstrates “that the United States
spends more on health care than any of the other OECD countries spend,
without providing more services than the other countries do. This suggests

11.
See infra Section IV.B.II.
12.
See infra Section IV.B.II.
13.
CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, supra note 2, at 2.
14.
See Berenson, supra note 1, at 712; Jay Hancock, Should Big Insurance
Become Like Walmart to Lower Health Costs?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 11, 2016),
http://www.khn.org/news/should-big-insurance-become-like-walmart-to-lower-health-costs.
15.
SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, NATIONAL TRENDS IN
THE COST OF EMPLOYER HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 2003–2013 4 (2014).
16.
Id. at 5.
17.
Rae et al., supra note 1.
18.
See id.
19.
See Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 979.
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that the difference in spending is mostly attributable to higher prices of
goods and services.”20
According to the International Federation of Health Plans 2015
Comparative Price Report,21 an annual survey comparing medical prices per
unit in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, and United States, the United States has the highest prices for two
of five diagnostic tests compared, eight of eight surgical procedures
compared, and hospital costs per day.22 In a finding that will amaze any
American who has traveled to Switzerland and paid the equivalent of five
dollars for a bottle of Coke, the survey reported that patients in Geneva,
Illinois or Geneva, New York could expect to pay twice the price for a
colonoscopy or magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) scan paid in those
towns’ European namesake.23
We know that in some local markets, provider unit prices are
exceptionally high.24 A 2005 United States Government Accountability
Office Report found that in 28 of 232 metropolitan areas studied, hospital
prices were 25% or higher than the national average, and in 32 of 319
metropolitan areas—many in Wisconsin, Oregon, Arkansas, Montana, and
Louisiana—physician prices were 16% or higher than the national average.25
Three factors driving higher prices are provider consolidation,
provider “must-have” status, and the refusal of providers to participate in
insurers’ networks.26
A.

Provider Market Concentration

In an analysis of commercial “insurance claims between 2007 and
2011 from three of the five largest U.S. insurers, Aetna, Humana, and United
20.
Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States
is So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 90 (2003).
21.
INT’L FED’N OF HEALTH P LANS, 2015 COMPARATIVE PRICE REPORT:
VARIATION IN MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL PRICES BY COUNTRY (2015).
22.
Id. at 3, 11–24.
23.
See id. at 13–14.
24.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-856, FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM: COMPETITION AND OTHER FACTORS LINKED TO WIDE
VARIATION IN HEALTH CARE PRICES 2 n.6, 11, 18 (2005).
25.
Id.
26.
Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 973–75; see also ZACK COOPER ET AL.,
THE PRICE AIN’T RIGHT? HOSPITAL PRICES AND HEALTH SPENDING ON THE PRIVATELY
INSURED 27 (2015); Jeffrey Gold et al., Reimbursement for Emergency and Non-Emergency
Services Provided by Out-of-Network Physicians: The Issue of Balance Billing, ABA HEALTH
ESOURCE
(Nov.
2011),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/aba_
health_law_esource_1111_gold.html.
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Health care,” reported to the Health Care Cost Institute (“HCCI”), Cooper
and colleagues compared private health spending levels among 306 Hospital
Referral Regions.27 They concluded that “health spending on the privately
insured varies by more than a factor of three across the 306 hospital referral
regions (“HRRs”) in the [United States],” and that “hospital transaction
prices play a large role in driving inpatient spending variation across
HRRs.”28
[W]e find that hospitals’ negotiated transaction prices vary
substantially across the nation. For example, looking at the most
homogeneous of the seven procedures that examine, hospitalbased MRIs of lower-limb joints, the most expensive hospital in
the nation has prices twelve times as high as the least expensive
hospital. What is more, this price variation occurs across and
within geographic areas. The most expensive HRR has average
MRI prices for the privately insured that are five times as high as
average prices in the HRR with the lowest average prices.
Likewise, within HRRs, on average, the most expensive hospital
has MRI negotiated transaction prices twice as large as the least
29
expensive hospital.

Cooper and colleagues concluded that even after controlling for such
variables as “for-profit [status], having more medical technologies,” regional
labor costs and patient mix,
[M]onopoly hospitals have 15.3[%] higher prices than
markets with four or more hospitals. Similarly, hospitals in
duopoly markets have prices that are 6.4[%] higher and hospitals
in triopoly markets have prices that are 4.8[%] higher than
hospitals located in markets with four or more hospitals. While we
cannot make strong causal statements, these estimates do suggest
that hospital market structure is strongly related to hospital
30
prices.

In a study tracking hospital prices in California from 2004 to 2013,31
Melnick and Fonkych found that “[h]ospital prices increased substantially
during a period of slow economic growth, and may have been driven in part
27.
COOPER ET AL., supra note 26, at 1–2.
28.
Id. at 2.
29.
Id. at 3.
30.
Id.
31.
Glenn A. Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Hospital Prices Increase in
California, Especially Among Hospitals in the Largest Multi-Hospital Systems, J. HEALTH
CARE ORG., PROVISION, & FINANCING, June 2016, at 1.
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by increased market power by large, multi-hospital systems—and possibly
other smaller systems—practicing all-or-none contracting.”32
They
concluded that:
[T]he market power effects of large hospital systems do not
necessarily require consolidation between local competitors.
Indeed, many of the hospitals in California’s largest systems do
not have substantial overlapping markets with other system
member hospitals. This suggests that hospitals in large hospital
systems, by tying their hospitals together, are able to achieve
market power over prices beyond any local market advantages. 33
[W]ith large size comes the potential to expand and protect market
power.
Large hospital systems that conduct “all-or-none”
contracting have reportedly added other anti-competitive language
to their contracts to protect and expand their market power
including clauses that prohibit health plans or employers from
developing “tiered” benefit packages that would allow them to . . .
develop new products to stimulate competition through differential
cost sharing across member hospitals. Another example is socalled gag-clauses which prohibit health plans from sharing
detailed hospital specific utilization and pricing data with large
employers which might be used to develop benefit packages that
provide incentives for employees to use lower priced—and/or
34
higher quality—hospitals.

Stanford University researcher Laurence C. Baker has assembled a
database of county-level data on competition among physician practices, as
measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (“HHI”), and average prices
for physician services.35 Baker notes that the “trend toward fewer and larger
[physician practice] groups could increase . . . market concentration,
resulting in fewer practices facing less competition and with greater
economic power. This in turn could lead health plans to pay higher prices
for physician services.”36
An analysis by Baker and colleagues of the relationship between
physician competition and prices paid for common office visits found that:
Less competition among physician practices is
statistically significantly associated with substantially higher
32.
Id. at 6.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. at 5–6.
35.
Laurence C. Baker et al., Physician Practice Competition and Prices Paid
by Private Insurers for Office Visits, 312 JAMA 1653, 1654–55 (2014).
36.
Id. at 1654.
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prices paid by private [Preferred Provider Organizations] to
physicians in [ten] large specialties for office visits. . . . [T]he
level of competition observed at the [ninetieth] percentile of the
HHI distribution was associated with a price for an intermediate
office visit with an established patientCPT code
99213between $5.85 and $11.67 higher than at the [tenth]
percentile of the HHI distribution. Across all [ten] types of office
visits, this difference in HHI was associated with mean prices for
37
office visits 8.3% to 16.1% higher.

A subsequent study by Austin and Baker examining prices for fifteen
common high-cost services, such as knee replacements and arthroscopic
surgery, yielded similar findings.38 In that article, Austin and Baker reported
that they “frequently found market concentration levels that appear high,
relative to the commonly encountered view that HHI levels above 2500 are
concerning. HHIs were 2500 or more in more than half of [the] counties
studied among the chosen procedures and specialties.”39 Indeed, both the
mean and median HHI for the many hundreds of counties in “[f]ourteen of
the fifteen procedure-specialty combinations” they studied exceeded the
Federal Trade Commission’s 2500 HHI benchmark for a highly concentrated
market.40 The scale of price differentials was sobering.41 For urology, where
even the tenth percentile of HHI exceeded 2500, the amount paid for a
vasectomy or kidney stone treatment in counties at the ninetieth percentile of
prices, exceeded the amount in counties at the tenth percentile by two and a
half times.42
B.

Excessive Prices for Must-Have Providers

Certain large and prestigious hospitals and physician groups are
recognized as must-have parties to insurers’ provider networks, and demand
and receive prices disproportionate to their clinical outcomes.43 Insurers find
they cannot exclude these providers from their networks, nor place them in
lower tiers, and pass the costs along in the form of higher premiums.44
37.
Id. at 1659.
38.
Daniel R. Austin & Laurence C. Baker, Less Physician Practice
Competition Is Associated with Higher Prices Paid for Common Procedures, 34 HEALTH AFF.
1753, 1753–54 (2015).
39.
Id. at 1759.
40.
Id. at 1756–57.
41.
See id. at 1759.
42.
Austin & Baker, supra note 38, at 1757.
43.
See Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 973.
44.
Id. at 973–74.
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For this reason, Robert Berenson argues that “antitrust policy and
enforcement can only be one—and not the primary—approach to addressing
provider pricing power.”45 He contends “that the source of hospital and
physician pricing power . . . lies . . . in its leverage negotiating contracts with
health insurers,”46 which is not the same as market concentration.47
An essential element of health plan-provider negotiations
over price and other contractual terms and conditions is the
willingness of consumers to accept narrow or tiered network
products that effectively limit their choice of provider to those
willing to accept the health plan’s pricing. Without a credible
threat of either excluding or disadvantaging high-cost providers by
placing them in a higher consumer cost-sharing tier, health plans
lack an important bargaining chip.
....
Another factor is that it has become common health care
parlance to refer to “must-have” providers—especially hospitals—
that must be included in a plan’s provider network to make the
plan marketable to customers. Must-have hospitals, by definition,
have pricing leverage over insurers because the plans cannot
plausibly threaten to exclude or limit their participation in the
48
insurer’s provider networks.

C.

Out-of-Network Hospital-Based Providers and Surprise Billing

Recent years have seen what Berenson calls an “epidemic of
physicians and hospitals in some cases purposefully remaining out of
network to charge either the insurer or the unsuspecting consumer
outrageously high amounts.”49 The movement toward integration and
accountable care has been met with stubborn resistance from hospital-based
physicians at the many community hospitals that outsource their emergency
rooms and other hospital-based specialties to large physician staffing
corporations.50 With their economy of scale, these companies have the
capacity to bill both insurers and patients, and to pursue collection action
against consumers for unpaid bills.51 By setting up shop in hospitals that are

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
Extremely

Berenson, supra note 1, at 714.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 720.
Id.
See Berenson, supra note 1, at 727.
See Joseph Burns, Health Plans Seek Leverage When Physicians Submit
High
Bills,
MANAGED
CARE
(Aug.
2011),
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in-network, they gain access to a captive clientele of consumers who need
care.52 As such, these companies see little advantage to signing network
contracts with insurers that would discount prices.53 Instead, they bill their
charges, obtaining payments for the “usual, customary, and reasonable”
(“UCR”) amounts from insurers and send surprise bills to consumers for the
difference.54
When physicians refuse to contract, the midpoint of the range of
payments used to determine a UCR amount will shift rightward. Ordinarily,
one would expect the distribution to be dominated by Medicare and
Medicaid prices, and network rates discounted for the volume an insurer can
offer, skewing the distribution to the left, with only a few data points at the
right representing self-pay patients paying the full charges.
A distribution of reimbursements for services delivered by nonparticipating providers will be dominated by amounts representing a UCR
payment tendered by an insurer plus any balance between that amount and
the charge that is paid by the consumer. These data points will be higher
dollar amounts, and as they proliferate within a specialty, such as emergency
medicine, the UCR midpoint will ratchet upward. This means higher overall
costs of care, and in making hospital-based specialties more lucrative,
making those careers more attractive to medical graduates. This, in turn,
could increase the supply and utilization of expensive emergency room care,
at the expense of access to primary care.
In addition to the higher costs, there are two other consequences
when hospital-based physicians decline to join insurer networks. For
consumers, one immediate consequence arises from the fact that out-ofnetwork expenditures may not count toward their deductible and out-ofpocket maximum, thereby undermining the Affordable Care Act’s limitations
on medical debt. But the refusal of hospital-based physicians to participate
in networks also has far-reaching implications for the payment and delivery
system reforms that many policymakers and stakeholders hope will improve
quality and efficiency. This is particularly true of emergency medicine
physicians.
Generally speaking, current payment and delivery system reforms
are aimed at giving a group of providers accountability for the total cost of
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2011/8/health-plans-seek-leverage-whenphysicians-submit-extremely-high-bills; Gold et al., supra note 26.
52.
See Burns, supra note 51.
53.
See id.
54.
Gold et al., supra note 26; see also Burns, supra note 51; Deanna
Dewberry, In-Network Emergency Room, Out-of-Network Doctor Could Equal a Big Bill,
NBCDFW (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/In-Network-EmergencyRoom-Out-of-Network-Doctor-Could-Equal-a-Big-Bill-243590331.html.
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care of a population’s health needs or for the cost of an individual’s episode
of care. In such circumstances, providers will be more mindful of
opportunities to avert a potentially avoidable hospitalization and to use
resources efficiently. In global budget models—whether a staff-model
Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”), an Accountable Care
Organization, or Maryland’s unique Global Budget Revenue program—
providers must deliver care to covered persons within fixed financial
benchmarks.
Providers’ incentives are to manage patients’ chronic
conditions through primary care and care coordination, so they are not
hospitalized and, when patients do appear at a hospital, to avoid unnecessary
resource utilization. Unless a global budget or episode payment system is
imposed by the state—as in Maryland—insurers are the only entity capable
of sponsoring such payment reforms.
The Emergency Department (“ED”) is at the fulcrum of any efforts
to integrate care, so a refusal of emergency medicine physicians to contract
with insurers will undermine reform activities. According to a recent Rand
Corporation study, the ED now accounts for more than one half of hospital
admissions, up from only about one third of admissions in the early 1990s.55
While inpatient admissions overall have declined relative to population
growth in the United States, there has been a 17% increase in admissions
from the ED, offsetting the decrease in admissions from physician offices
and other outpatient settings.56
Meanwhile, a study recently published in the Annals of Internal
Medicine indicates that nearly one in twelve patients who visit an ED return
to an “acute care setting within three days,” with the thirty day re-visit rate
being nearly one in five patients.57
Yet even as there is consensus on the need to reduce avoidable
hospitalizations and ED use, ED physicians increasingly position themselves
outside the insurance system.58 Their only bonds are to the physician
staffing corporations that employ them and the hospital that contracts with

55.
KRISTY GONZALEZ MORGANTI ET AL., RAND CORP.,
OF EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 35, 50 (2013).

THE EVOLVING ROLE

56.
Id. at 24.
57.
Reena Duseja et al., Revisit Rates and Associated Costs After an
Emergency Department Encounter: A Multistate Analysis, 162 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 750,
754 (2015).
58.
See GONZALEZ MORGANTI ET AL., supra note 55, at 3; Elisabeth Rosenthal,
Costs Can Go Up Fast When E.R. Is in Network but the Doctors Are Not, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
28,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/us/costs-can-go-up-fast-when-er-is-innetwork-but-the-doctors-are-not.html?_r=0.
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them—two entities that generally have financial incentives to increase
admissions and increase emergency room traffic.59
IV.
A.

POLICY OPTIONS TO ADDRESS PROVIDER PRICING PROBLEMS
All-Payer Rate Setting for Providers as a Policy Option

A key distinction between America’s pluralistic system of multiple
payers and those of peer nations, according to Anderson and colleagues, is
that “the government-controlled health systems of Canada, Europe, and
Japan allocate considerably more market power to the buy side.”60 In
essence, the health insurance plans overseas are more monopsonistic.61
Anderson argues that while a monopsonistic purchaser
is ultimately constrained by market forces on the supply side—that
is, by the reservation—minimally acceptable—prices of the
providers of health care below which they will not supply their
goods or services. . . . [W]ithin that limit, monopsonistic buyers
enjoy enough market clout to drive down the prices paid for health
care, and health care inputs fairly close to those reservation
62
prices.

For this reason, a number of prominent United States health-policy
thought leaders endorse some type of all-payer rate setting regime.63 In
2012, a who’s who of center/left health policy experts called for:
[A] model of self-regulation, [under which] public and private
payers would negotiate payment rates with providers, and these
rates would be binding on all payers and providers in a state.
Providers could still offer rates below the negotiated rates. The
privately negotiated rates would have to adhere to a global
spending target for both public and private payers in the state.
After a transition, this target should limit growth in health
spending per capita to the average growth in wages, which would
combat wage stagnation and resonate with the public. We
recommend that an independent council composed of providers,

59.
See GONZALEZ MORGANTI ET AL., supra note 55, at 27, 38, 55; Rosenthal,
supra note 74.
60.
Anderson et al., supra note 20, at 102.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
See id.; Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systemic Approach to Containing
Health Care Spending, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949, 950 (2012).
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payers, businesses, consumers, and economists set and enforce the
64
spending target.

Robert Berenson endorses a regulatory approach that would place
price ceilings on negotiated rates that come out of insurer-provider
negotiations and upper limits on billing to consumers, beyond the
negotiated rates insurers agree to pay, set as a percentage above
the Medicare yardstick. Setting upper limits would bound the
prices, while permitting market negotiations to focus on selected
networks with discounting and with new payment models—market
approaches that can be difficult to preserve in a full-fledged all65
payer rate-setting environment.

While many health policy analysts would like to see all-payer rate
setting for providers, there are two major political barriers to this option.66
First, it is contrary to the American preference for a light regulatory touch. 67
As seen in the continuing battles over state certificate-of-need laws,
conservatives remain unconvinced that “health care is different” and merits
restrictions on prices or supply that remain unthinkable in other areas of the
economy.68
Second, providers are vehemently opposed to restrictions on the
prices they can charge, as seen in the opposition to the Massachusetts
proposal for a luxury tax on expensive hospitals,69 and to the proposed
mergers of four large insurers announced in 2015.70

at 975.
at 975.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Emanuel et al., supra note 63, at 950.
Berenson, supra note 1, at 738.
See id. at 725–26, 738; Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 979.
See Berenson, supra note 1, at 712, 729–30; Berenson et al., supra note 2,

68.

See Berenson, supra note 1, at 726–27, 733; Berenson et al., supra note 2,

69.
See H.R. 4070, 187th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2012); Chris Camire,
Reps
Eye
‘Luxury
Tax’
on
Massachusetts
Hospitals,
LOWELL
SUN,
http://www.lowellsun.com/news/ci_20618865/reps-eye-luxury-tax-massachusetts-hospitals
(last updated May 14, 2012, 6:35 AM). The hospital luxury tax proposal was a provision of a
Massachusetts House bill that would have imposed a 10% tax on hospitals charging more than
20% above the state median price for a specific service if they could not “prove they offer[ed]
higher-quality service than [other] facilities.” H.R. 4070; Camire, supra. The funds were to
have been redistributed to hospitals serving poor communities. Camire, supra; see also H.R.
4070. The provision was stripped from the final version of the legislation, but a variation on
the concept has been revived for a current ballot initiative in Massachusetts. S.B. 2260, 187th
Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2012); Camire, supra.
70.
Hancock, supra note 14.
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But while health care provider rates are regulated in only one state,
Maryland, there is a long-standing tradition of regulating insurer rates.71
This Article will argue in the next section that this regulatory structure can be
marshaled to put downward pressure on provider prices.72
B.

Insurance Regulation as an Alternative to Rate-Setting for Providers

Robert Berenson notes that, to date, “the market response to the
increase in prices resulting from growing provider leverage in rate
negotiations has been limited and largely ineffective.”73 McKinsey Global
Institute argues that this is because of a health care supply chain in which
“stakeholders are either unwilling or unable to resist cost increases that are
passed along to them.”74 In its view, cost increases from physicians and
hospitals are “pass[ed] on . . . to the next player in the chain. . . . Unless the
[United States] health system addresses this dynamic, medical inflation
cannot help but continue.”75
The consensus of a 2004 panel discussion on the health care industry
was that employers are “missing in action” on health care prices:
[M]ost employers have not pushed back at providers and insurers
to lower cost and premium trends, relying instead on shifting costs
to workers through higher patient cost sharing—higher deductibles
and co-insurance, for example. The panelists agreed that in the
near term employers will continue to shift costs to workers but that
cost sharing as a long-term cost-containment strategy [will not]
76
work.

“We [have not] seen the employers kick in because their first line of
defense has been cost shifting, which has been an effective strategy in the
short run, but you can only raise the deductible to $1000 one time. So, [there
is] a cliff here that [we are] coming to,”77 said Robert Laszewski, President
of Health Policy and Strategy Associates.78
[The] exception to the lack of purchaser pushback against higher
cost and premium trends is the California Public Employees
Retirement System, or (“CalPERS”), analysts agreed, but they
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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were skeptical that CalPERS’ decision to exclude several dozen
hospitals from its health maintenance organization—HMO—
79
networks would prompt other purchasers to take a harder line.

One of CalPERS’ strategies is described infra.80 Employers and
insurers could have good reason to be reluctant to apply pressure to
providers.81 Purchasers must maintain a good working relationship with the
doctors and hospitals to which they entrust enrollees’ care.82 Further, the
only recourse if a provider’s price is too high is to walk away from
negotiations and accept a narrower network that may be less attractive to
employees and consumers.83
The thesis of this Article is that purchasers might be emboldened if
they are backed up by an insurance regulator who is leading and facilitating a
coordinated pushback campaign. In the Author’s view, many commissioners
have two major legal tools available for deployment, but much of their role
would be hortatory as public figures having a central role in the health care
system oversight.
Insurance laws in at least three states already direct commissioners
to inquire into underlying health care costs, specifically calling attention to
provider prices.84
79.
Id.
80.
See Ann Boynton & James C. Robinson, Appropriate Use of Reference
Pricing
Can
Increase
Value,
HEALTH
AFF.:
BLOG
(July
7,
2015),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/07/07/appropriate-use-of-reference-pricing-canincrease-value/; infra Section IV.B.2.
81.
See CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, supra note 2, at 2–3.
82.
Burns, supra note 51.
83.
See CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, supra note 2, at 2;
Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 974–75.
84.
See e.g., 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-2. With respect to health insurance
as defined in Title 42, Section 14.5-2 of the Rhode Island Health Care Reform Act, “the health
insurance commissioner shall discharge the powers and duties of office to:”
(1) [g]uard the solvency of health insurers; (2) [p]rotect the interests of consumers;
(3) [e]ncourage fair treatment of health care providers; (4) [e]ncourage policies and
developments that improve the quality and efficiency of health care service delivery
and outcomes; and (5) [v]iew the health care system as a comprehensive entity and
encourage and direct insurers towards policies that advance the welfare of the
public through overall efficiency, improved health care quality, and appropriate
access.

42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-2. “Changes in the insurer’s health care cost containment and
quality improvement efforts included, as an appendix to the filing and labeled, ‘Appendix II:
Cost Containment and Quality Improvement Efforts.’” OR. ADMIN. R. 836-053-0473 (2016).
The cost containment and quality improvement efforts must:
(A) [e]xplain any changes the insurer has made in its health care cost containment
efforts and quality improvement efforts since the insurer’s last rate filing for the
same category of health benefit plan; (B) [d]escribe significant new health care cost
containment initiatives and quality improvement efforts; (C) [i]nclude an estimate
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To be sure, a commissioner cannot succeed in this project without
the support of the payer community, including the insurers themselves.
Insurers would have to embrace the role of price-cutter, even though, as
explained infra, their financial incentive to do so can be ambiguous. One
assumption is that industry rhetoric-deploring high prices is sincere and the
regulatory path would be welcomed. Another assumption is that norms
promulgated in the state-regulated insurance sphere would spill over into the
larger employer-sponsored insurance sphere.
This effort would therefore also require the support of self-insured
employers that retain insurance companies on an administrative services only
basis. Employers have perhaps the greatest financial interest in obtaining
lower prices from insurers, although the insurance commissioner’s authority
is at low ebb—if not absent altogether—when an insurer acts solely as a third
party administrator.
Thus, to a great extent, the regime envisioned is one in which the
commissioner is acting as much as a convener and coordinator as he is a
regulator.
An advisory committee of purchaser representatives and
consumer advocates would give the project added heft. A commissioner
who is a gubernatorial appointee—and most are—would also need the
political support of a governor who believes its state is competitively
disadvantaged by high health care costs. Success would also be greatly aided
by the cooperation of the state’s Attorney General. Attorneys General have
traditionally wielded some oversight of health care as enforcers of antitrust
law and as interpreters of laws governing non-profit corporations such as
Blue plans and hospitals.
1.

Use of Rate-Setting Authority to Require Pushback on Prices

According to a Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of state statutory
authority to review health insurance rates, “[thirty-five jurisdictions]
including the District of Columbia—ha[ve] prior approval authority over . . .
[premiums in] some portion of the individual and small group market,” with
“[twenty-two] ha[ving] prior approval authority over all major medical
of the potential savings from the initiatives and efforts described in subsection
(2)(g)(B) of this section together with an estimate of the cost or savings for the
projection period; and (D) [i]nclude information about whether the cost
containment initiatives reduce costs by eliminating waste, improving efficiency, by
improving health outcomes through incentives, by elimination or reduction of
covered services or reduction in the fees paid to providers for services.

Id. Section 1385.03(c)(3) of the California Health and Safety Code requires plans to detail
“significant new health care cost containment and quality improvement efforts and provide an
estimate of potential savings together with an estimated cost or savings for the projection
period.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1385.03(c)(3) (West 2015).
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health insurance products in both the individual and small group markets;”
and in the remaining “states, prior approval authority [is] limited” to
subgroups of products.85 Additionally, the analysis noted “some states with
little to no authority to regulate rates,” including some file and use states,
have negotiated rate reductions.86 The typical statutory grant of regulatory
authority over premiums provides that “[r]ates shall not be excessive,
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”87
Insurance regulators could withhold permission to increase
premiums that reflect provider market power due to inappropriate
consolidation and order insurers to pursue antitrust litigation when prices and
HHI exceed a certain threshold. Rates could be set so that an insurer’s
profits are reduced in proportion to excessive prices that are deemed to be
within the insurer’s power to reduce. In other words, the regulator would
prescribe upper limits on medical expenditures representing quantity times a
target price in line with national averages. The target price could be lowered
in increments annually to give time for insurers to act.
In this scenario, the commissioner would put insurers on notice that
they need to push back on prices and levy a tentative, but avoidable, fine
payable in the event that they do not act. This fine is meant to be borne
collectively, not individually, to reflect provider market power only, and not
any differential market power of insurers of varying size. The fine should be
set to promote cooperation among insurers in preparing antitrust litigation
and to have an in terrorem effect on providers that softens their negotiating
stance. The commissioner, as a state actor with antitrust immunity, could
lawfully coordinate insurers’ actions toward target price levels.
Suppose insurers file rates that assume a medical cost trend of 5%,
based upon current provider prices, and a 3.5% profit margin. The
commissioner could decree a lower cost trend based upon a target price and
set rates so that if the target were not met, the insurer profit margin would be
one or two percentage points lower.
It is worth noting that federal law mandating a minimum medical
loss ratio using a percentage of gross revenues88 may have a perverse effect
making insurers less likely to push back on prices. For instance, a health
plan with 10,000 enrollees, which has annual medical reimbursements at the
United States per-enrollee average in 2009, would spend $33,140,000,
85.
SABRINA CORLETTE & JANET LUNDY, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., RATE REVIEW: SPOTLIGHT ON STATE EFFORTS TO MAKE HEALTH INSURANCE MORE
AFFORDABLE 9 (2010).
86.
Id. at 10.
87.
D.C. CODE § 31-3508(e)(2) (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2403(1)(d)
(2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.018(4)(b) (2015).
88.
42 U.S.C. § 2718 (2015).
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permitting it to keep $5,000,000 for administrative costs and profits.
Meanwhile a plan with 10,000 enrollees in Rochester, New Yorkwhere
prices and utilization are relatively lowwould expect just $23,190,000 in
medical reimbursements, and would be allowed to keep only $3,500,000 for
administrative costs and profits. Presumably, insurance executives prefer
operating in markets where higher provider prices give insurers additional
cushions for administrative costs and profits.
The concept envisioned here is intended to be deployed in regions
where costs are excessive and those costs are attributable to high prices. A
commissioner can look to benchmarks to make a determination as to whether
prices are excessive. National data is available from various sources, which
can be used to compare a region’s prices for hospitals and physicians.
Prices beyond a certain threshold could be the triggering mechanism
for the pushback process. For example, the HCCI has promulgated a set of
economic metrics they have dubbed the Healthy Marketplace Index
(“HMI”), “intended to provide baseline measurements of health care market
performance related price, productivity, and competition.”89
An HMI measures a “basket of health care services allowing for
consistent comparisons” across regions at the Core-Based Statistical Area
(“CBSA”) level, permitting “differences between markets [to] be attributed
to prices rather than the types or amounts of services used.”90 An “index
value of 1.00 indicates that, on average for a basket of services, the prices in
the CBSA were equal to those of the total population.”91 A CBSA with an
index value of 1.05 would have prices 5% higher.92
Suffice it to say, there is no obvious threshold for a price index
trigger. The Dayton, Ohio inpatient price index of 1.18 would seem to
qualify as a true outlier, but the Milwaukee level of 1.09 would also justify
taking action if it is causing insurance premiums to be unaffordable for
consumers or businesses.
The triggering mechanism could have multiple parts. An HHI
measurement exceeding 2500, or an even higher threshold, would verify that
market concentration is the principal culprit in high prices. A third triggering
benchmark could look to hospital financial indicators. High levels of
hospital reserves, profit margins, or executive compensation could be viewed
as markers of excessive prices.

89.
See ERIC BARRETTE, HEALTH CARE COST INST., INC. TAKING THE PULSE OF
HEALTH
CARE
MARKETS
1
(2015),
http://www.healthcostinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/Data-Brief-2-September-2015-HMI.pdf.
90.
Id. at 2.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 3.
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While the substance of antitrust law relating to health care providers
is beyond the scope of this Article, one can point to a template for private
antitrust enforcement by an insurer against a provider: Litigation mounted in
the 1990s by Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield
Clinic.93 The case was hardly straightforward in either its atypical fact
pattern—the insurer eventually prevailed because it proved the defendant had
divided territories with a potential competitor but no damages were awarded;
and judgment on a monopolization charge under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act was reversed—or in its procedural journey—two trials and two trips to
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.94 Rather, it illustrates the ideal
envisioned: An insurer serving a high-cost region taking on a large health
system that had stifled competition, bearing great expense to painstakingly
assemble a complex case and pursue it aggressively.95 Warren Greenberg,
who served as an expert witness for the plaintiff, noted that this expense was
borne entirely by one insurer, even though a successful outcome would have
benefited competing insurers, consumers, and employers who did not
contribute.96 A multi-payer mandate from a commissioner to pursue such
litigation would more fairly apportion costs.
To be sure, a rate ruling that effectively orders insurers to file
antitrust litigation would represent a heavy lift.97 First, there are legal
hurdles.98 As Robert Berenson wrote, “[t]he [h]orse [h]as [a]lready [l]eft the
[b]arn”99 in the sense that “monopolies lawfully acquired or, in the case of
consummated mergers, fully entwined entities . . . are impractical to
successfully unwind.”100
In such instances, plaintiffs could request conduct remedies that
would “regulate the conduct of the monopolist, for example, by providing for
binding arbitration to resolve payer-provider price disputes or requiring
maintenance of open medical staffs.”101
Second, litigation would be expensive. It would be helpful if one of
the many philanthropies dedicated to health care policy could fund a forensic
resource center to marshal legal and economic thinking relevant to modern

1995).

93.

152 F.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 1998); see also 65 F.3d 1406, 1408 (7th Cir.

94.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 152 F.3d at 588, 590–96; Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 65 F.3d at 1416–17.
95.
See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 152 F.3d at 590–91.
96.
Greenberg, supra note 6, at 118 n.1, 122, 123; see also Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wis., 152 F.3d at 590–91.
97.
See Berenson, supra note 1, at 713–14.
98.
See id. at 725–26.
99.
Id. at 725.
100.
Id. at 726 (citation omitted).
101.
Id. (citation omitted).
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understanding of health care organizations, formulate principles and
guidelines for applying antitrust and non-profit law, and collect evidence for
and testify in adversarial proceedings.
2.

Commissioners’ Catchall Authority to Declare Insurance Acts and
Practices Unfair

A commissioner’s plenary authority to prohibit unfair practices
could be used to prohibit insurers from capitulating to contracting terms that
reflect inappropriate provider market leverage, particularly in the sphere of
the must-have provider. Many states’ insurance codes include a grant of
authority similar to this:
If the [c]ommissioner believes that any person engaged in
the insurance business is in the conduct of such business engaging
in this state in any method of competition or in any act or practice
not defined in NRS 686A.010 to 686A.310, inclusive, which is
unfair or deceptive and that a proceeding by the Commissioner in
respect thereto would be in the public interest, the Commissioner
shall, after a hearing of which notice and of the charges against
such person are given to the person, make a written report of the
findings of fact relative to such charges and serve a copy thereof
102
upon such person and any intervener at the hearing.

Melnick and Fonkych urge policymakers to limit:
“all-or-none” contracting by multi-hospital systems and
prohibiting other anti-competitive contract language that flows
from market power achieved by large multi-hospital systems.
Such pro-competitive regulation would allow for hospital systems
to integrate to improve efficiencies without the deleterious side
effects of increased market power which can result in reduced
103
price competition and higher costs to consumers.

A commissioner’s catchall authority might be invoked to accomplish
this.104 Rhode Island’s Health Insurance Commissioner has promulgated
“Hospital Contracting Conditions, [and] [t]hese conditions support
102.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 686A.170(1) (2016); see also CAL. INS. CODE §
790.06(a) (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-130(1) (West 2016); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 33-18-1003(1) (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-40(a) (2016).
103.
Melnick & Fonkych, supra note 31, at 6 (footnote omitted).
104.
See STATE OF R.I. & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS OFFICE OF THE HEALTH
INS. COMM’R, CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR AND AGAINST THE
ADOPTION OF THE AMENDMENTS TO OHIC REGULATION 2, POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE
OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 7–8 (2015).
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affordable health insurance by making the approval of insurer rate filings
contingent on the [h]ealth [i]nsurer’s agreement to abide by contracting
standards with hospitals that limit service price inflation, improve the quality
of care, and work towards increased administrative efficiencies.”105
The Hospital Contracting Conditions have two main provisions.106
One limits annual rates of price increases for inpatient and outpatient
services to increases in the CMS Hospital Input Price Index plus 1% for each
year covered by the contract.107 The second “require[s] that insurer contracts
with hospitals include a quality incentive program, [in which] at least 50% of
the annual price increase for hospitals must be” tied to performance on
quality measures.108
According to Christopher F. Koller, the former Rhode Island Health
Insurance Commissioner, legal authority for promulgating the conditions was
implied by the combination of the statutory mandate to improve health care
quality and efficiency and the power to approve rates.109 The fact that no
explicit oversight of hospital rates was granted to the Commissioner suggests
that regulators in other states could also take an expansive view of catchall
authorities to pursue this option.110
Tools used by government agencies as active purchasers are not
closely analogous to those available to the insurance regulator, but could
conceivably be adapted.111 Covered California, the insurance exchange
established in that state to implement the Affordable Care Act, has
conditioned participation in its marketplace on an insurer’s efforts to obtain
low prices from providers.112 Beginning in 2018, an insurer that wants to sell
in the California exchange must “report on its strategy to assure that
contracted providers are not charging unduly high prices, which may include
but are not limited to: Telemedicine [and] [u]se of Centers of Excellence.”113
While the intent is not explicitly stated, the mention of telemedicine
and Centers of Excellence suggests that the state might encourage insurers to
substitute providers who are outside the region for overpriced providers
105.
Id. at 12.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id. at 12–13.
109.
See 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-2(4) (2016).
110.
See id.; STATE OF R.I. & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS OFFICE OF THE HEALTH
INS. COMM’R, supra note 104, at 7–8.
111.
See 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-2(4); PLAN MGMT. ADVISORY GRP.,
COVERED CAL.: PLAN MANAGEMENT AND DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM ADVISORY GROUP
MEETING
AND
WEBINAR
18
(2016),
hbex.coveredca.com/stakeholders/planmanagement/PDFs/Plan-Management-Advsiory-Group-FINAL-slides-2016-2-11.pdf.
112.
PLAN MGMT. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 111, at 18.
113.
Id.
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within its service area.114 An insurer might be able to find academic medical
centers outside its geographic market that have prestige equal to local musthave providers but are willing to treat patients at a lower cost.115 Covered
California has also indicated that by 2019, insurers “will be expected to
exclude hospitals and other facilities that demonstrate outlier high cost.”116
It is surely easier to tell insurers that they must exclude overpriced
outliers from their networks in the exchange market than in the small group
market because: (1) insurer participation in the exchanges is voluntary, and
it is now presumed that it will constitute less than 100% of companies and
(2) employer-sponsored insurance is a fringe benefit used to attract
employees, so there is greater pressure to have a robust network.117 It might
be easier to facilitate or mandate reference pricing, which preserves access to
the high priced provider, than to ban the high-priced provider altogether.118
With reference pricing, a payer includes expensive, must-have
providers in its network but requires the patient to pay the difference
between what a lower-cost provider charges and the higher price.119
The payment limit typically is the median or some other mid-point
in the distribution of prices in the local market. Consumers who
select a provider that charges less than the purchaser’s limit
receive standard coverage, with minimal cost sharing. Consumers
who select a provider charging above the contribution limit must
120
pay the entire difference.

The technique was pioneered by CalPERS, and it is unclear whether
it has migrated from self-insured plans to fully-insured plans. Insurance
regulators cannot set administered prices like Medicare or Maryland’s allpayer rate setting board; however, they could create safe harbors for
reference prices by approving, in advance, acceptable price levels for a given
procedure in a market. This could pressure high-cost providers to lower their
prices. A commissioner might go a step further by declaring payments
beyond a set luxury level to constitute an unfair insurance practice, having
the effect of imposing a reference price requirement.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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Convening Insurers to Fight Balance Billing

Under the quantum meruit doctrine, which governs medical billing
in the absence of agreed-to price terms, out-of-network physicians are
entitled only to UCR-based reimbursement.121 As such, an insurer’s payment
of the UCR amount should suffice to make the physician whole—at least two
courts have held that balance billing is restricted under such
circumstances.122 But, because most consumers do not have the savvy or
resources to fight these bills, which may have an adverse effect on credit
scores, this plainly illegal business model has succeeded.123 Insurance
regulators could spur insurers to pledge to defend collection lawsuits, which
would likely bring an end to the out-of-network business model and bring
these physicians into networks at lower prices.124
Under common law principles, when a consumer obtains a service
without an express agreement as to price, the legal doctrine of quantum
meruit applies.125 The classic example of this, as explained by Judge Richard
Posner in Confold Pacific, Inc. v. Polaris Industries, Inc.,126 is the patient
who comes to the emergency room with no ability to inquire into or negotiate
over prices.127 In such circumstances,
the plaintiff [doctor] is entitled to the market value of his services
rather than to the benefit that he conferred on the defendant, which
might be much greater—for example, if the plaintiff physician had
saved the defendant’s life. The court tries to simulate a
competitive market; and in such a market, price is based on the
cost to the seller rather than on the subjective value to the buyer,
which often is much greater.128

The Pennsylvania Superior Court applied this doctrine in its decision
in Temple University Hospital, Inc. v. Healthcare Management Alternatives,
Inc.129 That case involved the amount the hospital was owed by a health
insurer for services rendered after the network contract between the parties

121.
See Gianetti v. Riether, No. CV020398555S, 2011 WL 4347211, at *4–5
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2011).
122.
Id.; Dennis v. PHC-Martinsville, Inc., No. CL 14-483, 2016 WL 4717657,
at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 2016).
123.
See Dennis, 2016 WL 4717657, at *7.
124.
See 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-2(5).
125.
Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., 433 F.3d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 2006).
126.
433 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2006).
127.
Id. at 958.
128.
Id.
129.
832 A.2d 501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
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expired.130 The hospital insisted that the insurer was liable for billed charges
at its published rates, or chargemaster.131 But, evidence at trial established
“that the [h]ospital . . . [received 80%] or more of its full published charges
only [6%] of the time.”132 Further, data indicated “that the [h]ospital was
paid its full published charges only [1] to [3%] of the time” and that its “full
published [rates] represented 300% of the [h]ospital’s [actual input] costs.”133
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania explained that in the absence of
agreement on price terms, Pennsylvania “law implies a quasi-contract, which
requires the defendant to pay to plaintiff the value of the benefit
conferred,”134 or “a reasonable fee for a health provider’s services.”135
“Thus, in a situation such as this, the defendant should pay for what the
services are ordinarily worth in the community.”136 “Services are worth what
people ordinarily pay for them.”137
Since the relevant question is “what health care providers actually
receive for those services,”138 if a provider rarely recovers its billed charges,
those charges “cannot be considered the value of the benefit conferred
because that is not what people in the community ordinarily pay for medical
services.”139 The purpose of quantum meruit is to place the provider in the
position he would have been in had services been delivered in the ordinary
course of business, not in a “better position than [he] would have been had
the services been performed for the majority of [his] other patients.”140
Therefore, in instances where the insurer has tendered a UCR
amount, the doctor has been compensated in full.141 As such, there ordinarily
130.
Id. at 505.
131.
Id.
132.
Id. at 506.
133.
Id.
134.
Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc., 832 A.2d at 507 (quoting AmeriPro Search, Inc.
v. Fleming Steel, Co., 787 A.2d 988, 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)).
135.
Id. at 508 (citing Eagle v. Snyder, 604 A.2d 253, 254 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992)).
136.
Id. (citing Eagle, 604 A.2d at 254).
137.
Id. (citing Eagle, 604 A.2d at 254, 256).
138.
Id.
139.
Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc., 832 A.2d at 500.
140.
Id. at 509; see also Hailey v. Medcorp., Inc., No. L-05-1238, 2006 WL
2640238, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2006) (vendor can collect only “the reasonable value
of the material and services that accrued to the actual benefit of the other party . . . .”); Doe v.
HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 197–98 (Tenn. 2001); River Park Hosp.,
Inc. v. Bluecross Blueshield of Tenn., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 43, 57–58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). In
Illinois, providers can collect charges if they are equivalent to UCR. See Victory Mem’l
Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 11920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
141.
See Gianetti v. Riether, No. CV020398555S, 2011 WL 4347211, at *5
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2011).
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should remain no lawful balance to collect from the patient.142 A
Connecticut case, Gianetti v. Riether,143 has so held.144
Gianetti was a plastic surgeon on call in an emergency room. 145 He
treated the defendant and was reimbursed $349.54, on an out-of-network
basis, by the defendant’s insurance company; he then billed the patient for
the balance of his $425 charge, $75.46.146
The court held that the doctor did not meet his burden of proving
“that $425 was the reasonable value of such service.”147 “The plaintiff
provided no evidence as to what similar doctors or physicians charge for
similar work.”148 “The plaintiff provided no evidence concerning his usual
and customary charges for similar work.”149 But the court went on:
Additionally, there is evidence from which the court can
and does find that the reasonable value of the first item was only
$349.54. The court takes judicial notice that health insurance
companies typically reimburse physicians for the usual and
customary charges for similar medical services by area physicians.
The amount reimbursed is prima facie evidence of the
reasonableness of such charges. The plaintiff has failed to rebut
such evidence. Consequently, the court finds that the plaintiff was
fully compensated therefor.150

Similarly, the court in Dennis v. PHC-Martinsville, Inc.,151 rejected a
hospital’s billed charges of $111,115.37 and looked to “the reasonable value
of . . . services rendered to” the patient.152 The court determined that it
would be “the amount the hospital would have received had Dennis pre-paid
his bill as an uninsured patient.”153 The hospital’s policy was to grant a 75%
discount from its chargemaster amount in such circumstances.154 This
amount was $27,778.84, which was $523.89 more than Dennis’s insurer had

2011).

142.
143.

See id.
No. CV020398555S, 2011 WL 4347211 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 42,

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151
152.
153.
154.

See id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Gianetti, 2011 WL 4347211, at *5,
Id.
Id.
No. CL14-483, 2016 WL 4717657 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 2016).
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
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paid.155 As such, unlike Gianetti’s patient, Dennis was ordered to pay a
relatively small balance.156
The hospital has appealed the ruling to the Virginia Supreme
157
Court.
Three Virginia health care lawyers commented that “the Dennis
decision is a shot across the bow for all hospitals” and “may have significant
implications for the current rate-setting and debt collection process for
hospitals.”158
A third decision is worth mentioning here, although it does not
involve interpretation of the common law.159 Texas’ workers compensation
statute sets forth several criteria for fixing the compensation of out-ofnetwork providers, one of which is a fair and reasonable amount, which
appears to be congruent with the standard for quantum meruit awards.160
Reimbursement of Air Ambulance Services Provided by PHI Air
Medical161 presented the question of whether an air ambulance service could
collect its full billed charges that were “typically at least two to three times
the Medicare rate” when 72% of the provider’s patients received 125% of the
Medicare rate or less.162 The insurance carriers involved had tendered
reimbursement at 125% of Medicare.163 An Administrative Law Judge,
analyzing the facts under the fair and reasonable criterion, found that the
billed charges did not meet the standard because “patients should not be
required to pay two or three times the rates paid by 72% of PHI’s
patients.”164
In determining the appropriate reimbursement amount, the
Administrative Law Judge looked to the provider’s operating costs.165 The
judge settled upon 149% of Medicare as fair and reasonable because it

155.
Id.
156.
Compare Gianetti v. Riether, No. CV020398555S, 2011 WL 4347211, at
*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2011), with Dennis, 2016 WL 4717657, at *7.
157.
Jeremy Ball et al., The Dennis Decision: A Shot Across the Bow for
Hospitals, JDSUPRA (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-dennis-decisiona-shot-across-the-20038/.
158.
Id.
159.
See Decision and Order, In re Reimbursement of Air Ambulance Servs.
Provided by Phi Air Med., Docket No. 454-15-0681.M4 (Tex. Dep’t of Ins. Sept. 8, 2015).
160.
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 413.011(d) (West 2015); Jackson Williams,
Policy Dir., Dialysis Patient Citizens & NAIC Funded Consumer Rep., Public Hearing on
Surprise Balance Billing of Health Insurance Consumers (Oct. 1, 2015).
161.
Decision and Order, supra note 217.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
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reflects PHI’s average cost to provide service to each patient and
to attain the profit it has earned the past few years. . . . [T]his is the
amount that, if paid by every PHI patient, would allow PHI to
operate exactly as it did during the time period at issue, making a
profit that Carriers’ expert conceded is adequate. 166

When state common “law caps out-of-network physician fees at the
market price, . . . legislation is not necessary to prohibit balance billing.”167
The cases cited here indicate that balance billing is essentially a bluff that is
not being called due to a collective action problem.168 What is needed is a
coordinated effort to enforce current law.
While [a]
[c]ommissioner may not have jurisdiction over providers, she does
have jurisdiction over insurers, and can therefore convene insurers
and consumer advocates to act cooperatively. Patients pay balance
bills because: (1) they [do not] know their rights; (2) they are
afraid of unpaid bills affecting their credit scores; and (3) they
would be unable to defend a collection lawsuit if the physician
staffing company filed one. All three of these barriers can be
overcome through sub-regulatory action by [a] [c]ommissioner and
cooperation by insurers. This has been done before.
....
. . . [I]n the 1990s, no-fault auto insurers in Michigan
were involved in a similar dispute with providers over the legality
of balance billing. The insurers banded together, and with the
approval of the insurance commissioner, did the following: (1)
advised their insureds [not] to pay the balance bill; (2) told the
insureds that if they were sued by the provider, the insurer would
defend them and indemnify them if they lost the suit; (3) warned
the credit reporting agencies [not] to report the balance on the
consumer’s credit report. The providers did not file collection
suits but instead filed two class action lawsuits—one in state court,
one in federal—seeking a declaratory judgment of their right to
collect balances. Both suits were quickly dismissed, and the
problem was resolved.
....
. . . [T]he favorable case law can be leveraged to protect .
. . consumers . . . who are balance-billed [through] a collaboration
in which stakeholders undertake the following activities: . . .
Insurance Commissioner: respond to consumer complaints about
balance billing by telling consumers they are free to disregard bills
166.
Decision and Order, supra note 217 (footnote omitted).
167.
Williams, supra note 160; see also Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus.,
433 F.3d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 2006).
168.
See Confold Pac., Inc., 433 F.3d at 958; Williams, supra note 160.
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if the insurer has paid the UCR amount—the commissioner may
have to verify that insurers are using a legitimate method of
determining UCR; confirm that the Temple [rationale] applies to
all hospital-based out-of-network providers; admonish credit
reporting agencies that they must not report balance-bill debts
furnished by these providers because they are inaccurate;
promulgate an official [Explanation of Benefits notification
(“EOB”)]; . . . Insurers: commit to defending and indemnifying
their insureds in the unlikely event of a physician’s collection
lawsuit; notify consumers of their rights on EOB forms; . . .
Consumer Advocates: coordinate activities; publicize the project;
disseminate the project to other states; find consumer attorneys
willing to sue under the Fair Credit Reporting Act if credit
reporting agencies do not cooperate.
I would not anticipate a need for insurers to actually
defend individual lawsuits. The staffing companies would need to
pull physicians away from their hospital shifts to testify in court if
collection cases were defended. [F]urther, these companies
operate across states and could not afford the risk of making bad
law—generating a direct unfavorable legal precedent—that could
immediately force changes to their business model in other states.
....
. . . [One suspects] that the simple fact of a joint
announcement by [a] [c]ommissioner and insurers to pursue the
Michigan option, communicated to consumers on the EOB, would
169
suffice to end balance billing in [a state where it is a problem].

If not, however, the [c]ommissioner could help facilitate bellwether
trials.170 In the context of federal multi-district litigation, bellwether trials
are arranged for cases deemed typical of the multiple claims consolidated
before the multi-district litigation court.171 The outcomes of such trials give
litigants a sense of the settlement value of claims, expediting compromise of
all the litigation.172 In the context of out-of-network providers, bellwether
trials could fix the quantum meruit value of services, ideally as a percentage

169.
Williams, supra note 160; see also Advocacy Org. for Patients &
Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 176 F.3d 315, 326–27 (6th Cir. 1999); Temple Univ.
Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
170.
See Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers, 176 F.3d at 328; McGill v.
Auto. Ass’n of Mich., 526 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Williams, supra note 160.
171.
Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers, 176 F.3d at 318, 328.
172.
See id. at 318; Burns, supra note 51.
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of Medicare rates.173 The [c]ommissioner could play a coordinating role in
getting payers to share the costs of such trials.174
V.

CONCLUSION

The problem of excessive provider prices is well understood, well
documented, and one for which several existing legal and practical remedies
are available. In the Author’s view, the principal hurdle to alleviating the
problem is one of will. The same multiplicity of purchasers that causes them
disadvantage relative to providers in negotiating prices also deters individual
purchasers from taking action upon which other purchasers could free-ride.
If lower health care prices are truly a public good, the solution is for
government to marshal cooperative efforts among purchasers. The Insurance
Commissioner’s authority and stature as a representative of consumer
interests make that office a natural locus for coordination.

26.

173.

See Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc., 832 A.2d at 507–09; Gold et al., supra note

174.
See Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers, 176 F.3d at 328 n.9.
Commissioners may also have a regulatory option: Mandating, as part of their enforcement of
network adequacy regulations, that an insurer have at least one fully participating hospital in
their network. See HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN NETWORK ACCESS AND ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 5
(Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’rs 2015). A fully participating hospital would be one that guarantees
either that its hospital-based physicians will be in that insurer’s network, or that the hospital
will hold patients harmless for any balance billing. See Burns, supra note 51; Gold et al.,
supra note 26. This concept, first suggested by a regulator participating in a National
Association of Insurance Commissioners workgroup, draws inspiration from the Blue Cross
Blue Shield Association’s Blue Distinction program. See Blue Distinction Centers of
Excellence,
EXCELLUS
BLUECROSS
BLUESHIELD,
http://www.excellusbcbs.com/wps/portal/xl/prv/pc/coe (last visited May 8, 2017); Gold et al.,
supra note 26. That program lists Centers of Excellence for various procedures that have been
vetted by BCBSA. See Blue Distinction Centers of Excellence, supra; Gold et al., supra note
26. The hospitals have the option of certifying that any hospital-based physicians delivering
ancillary care during or in consequence of the procedure are also in-network, and presumably
these hospitals will be more attractive to consumers worried about surprise bills. See Gold et
al., supra note 26. The fully participating hospital proposal assumes two premises: First, that
consumers would prefer such a hospital, even for emergency care, and consult their insurer’s
provider directory—or heed a fully-participating hospital’s advertising—to learn which
nearby hospital has that status; second, that hospitals would perceive a competitive advantage
from the status and that one or more would require that the staffing agency granted the
physician franchise in their facility agree to terms with insurers or submit their rates to binding
arbitration. See id. To date, hospitals have been unwilling to impose such a requirement. Id.
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STATE LAW GOVERNANCE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY
CASON SCHMIT*
Howdy! So I am new to Texas A&M and that is the official Texas
A&M greeting. It is a little awkward for a former California boy to say.
Thank you very much to NSU for welcoming me. Thank you to the faculty
and staff. It is really an honor to be here.
So I am a recent transplant from the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, and I have to acknowledge that a lot of what I am
going to be talking about today is work that I did while I was there. I worked
with a truly fantastic team of attorneys, including Gregory Sunshine, Dawn
Pepin, Tara Ramanathan, Akshara Menon, and, of course, our director
Matthew Penn, and they put a lot of work into what I am going to be
presenting today.
Of course, as a former government attorney, we have to have our
disclaimer. Believe me, these are not CDC official determinations or
policies. This is [for] educational purposes only. I am an attorney, but I am
not your attorney—[this is] not legal advice. So, let’s dive into this here.
[The] US Health system is in the middle of a digital revolution. It
has already transformed the health systems efficiency, capacity, and
function. Health information, in all shapes and sizes in all sectors of
healthcare and public health systems, is being created and shared
electronically. Electronic health information is incredibly diverse: it includes
electronic medical records, laboratory reports, syndromic surveillance data,
electronic prescriptions, vital records, and epidemiological reports.
Digitization of health information allows for a single piece of health
information to be used for multiple purposes simultaneously, and law plays a
critical roll in this health information technology revolution. Every data
type, every data use is governed by law. Consequently, the future of health
information technology is heavily dependent on this legal framework. While
some of the laws have changed to adapt to this new technology, in many
cases, it is the technology that has been forced to adapt to the law.
Thirty years ago, the Office of Technology Assessment made the
claim that “technological change is now outpacing the legal structure that
governs the system, and [it] is creating pressures on Congress to adjust the
*.
This is a transcribed talk given by Cason Schmit, J.D. Schmit is a
Research Assistant Professor in the Department of Health Policy and Management at Texas
A&M University. He serves as the HIPAA Privacy Officer of the Texas A&M School of
Public Health, and is a licensed attorney in the state of Arizona.
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law to accommodate these changes.”1 Now, given the pace of technological
change, the age of this statement should be really alarming. Since then, the
pace of information technology development has only increased, and I
thought it would be interesting to put things in perspective for you. If we
were to assume that the speed of legal adaptation has not changed—and
knowing our current Congress, that is probably a little generous—if we
assume that information technology remains consistent with Moore’s law by
doubling about every two years, and if we assume that 1986 was the first
time that the pace of technology passes or sped past the pace of legal
adaptation, then we find a staggering difference in the rates of that change
for technology and law. Under this methodology, legal adaptation is
estimated to have changed by a factor of eleven, whereas pace of technology
is estimated to have changed by a factor of 32,768. Obviously, this is a
pretty crude estimation, but it is helpful to put things into perspective, the
relative change between law and technology. These significant technological
advances are not taking place in a regulatory vacuum. There are many
preexisting laws that might apply to these new technologies; however, these
existing laws are designed to handle the technology that was in place when
those laws were enacted, and they often do not account for future technology
developments. Thus, these laws can become quickly outdated, and this puts
an incredible amount of stress on existing laws to compensate.2
As technology advances, both the benefits and risks of technology
are apparent. Society places rules on technology to attempt to balance the
potential benefits with the potential risks. These rules come in many forms:
They can be laws, they can be policies, they can be industry standards, but all
of these rules collectively form the governance framework for that
technology.
Ideally, we would hope that a governance framework
maximizes the potential benefits [and] minimizes the potential risks.
When I was with the CDC Public Health Law Program, we
conducted a study of state laws on electronic health information. This study
provides evidence that the current state law component of health information
technology might be poorly suited to appropriately balance the risks and
benefits of this rapidly evolving technology. Now, if true, the current
governance framework for health information technology could leave us
vulnerable to consequences of mismatches between technology and the law.
Commentators note two significant consequences for these types of
1.
U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-302, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 3 (1986).
2.
Gregory N. Mandel, Regulating Emerging Technologies, 1 L. INNOVATION
& TECH. 75, 75 (2009).
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mismatches. 3 On one hand, outpaced laws could impede and stall
technological development, and this would ultimately delay the potential
benefits of that technology. On the other hand, outpaced laws might leave
regulatory gaps that allow technology to develop unchecked, ultimately
exposing society to the potential risks of the technology, potential and
preventable in many cases.
Given this staggering estimated difference in health information
technology that we just went through, health information technology is
probably vulnerable to these two consequences. It is possible that state law
frameworks are contributing to a stalled health information technology
sector, delaying the true potential benefits of health information technology,
and, conversely, there are probably some applications of health information
technology that are not being regulated and that are exposing society to some
potential risks.
Now, understanding the legal framework is critical to identifying
strategies to improve health information technology governance.
Commentators note that the dynamics between law and technology are
similar to the tortoise and the hare allegory. So, in this allegory, the hare
outpaces the tortoise, but then stops and rests while the tortoise eventually
catches up. Once caught up, the hare eventually wakes up and continues the
race. Technology, like the hare, moves very swiftly, but it can only progress
so far before the laws become mismatched.
We see those mismatches, and users of health information
technology start to experience more uncertainty, risk, or experience laws that
are otherwise impeding the development of the technology. The law must
catch up to technology to provide innovators with clarity to move forward.
Health information technology is really a story of two hares. The first hare is
information technology more generally, and this hare has taken off and
introduced society to radical new applications and uses for health
information generally. The second hare is health information technology
specifically. This hare has been remarkably slow. In 2005, the chairman of
the Center for Information Technology Leadership noticed the slow rate, and
noted that the “healthcare information technology market [was] broken.” 4
Since then, the tortoise has made some progress. In 2009, the HITECH Act
was passed, which is a federal law that incentivized the adoption and
meaningful use of electronic health records, so this incentivized widespread
3.
Jennifer Kozma, Properly Paced or Problematic? Examining the Past and
Present Governance of GMO’s in the United States, in INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE MODELS
FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2014).
4.
Blackford Middleton, Achieving U.S. Health Information Technology
Adoption: The Need for A Third Hand, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1269, 1269–72 (2005).
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advances in health information technology. At CDC, we are interested in
incentives that HITECH provided to health public health uses of health
information technology, including case reporting, syndromic surveillance,
and many new public health registries.
However, these new improvements to the health information
technology infrastructure supported by HITECH enabled more uses of health
information technology, including bidirectional communication between
providers and public health, including the ability to have increased
situational awareness tools in emergencies.
In some cases, it has
revolutionized the way that we investigate disease outbreaks. Many of these
new health information technologies were initiated by state governments
under new statutes and new regulations.
At the CDC Public Health Law Program, we investigated these laws
to better understand this state legal landscape.5 So here is what we did: We
used Westlaw to identify relevant laws using standardized search streams
and systematic searches. Our search scope was limited to laws that related to
electronic health information, and that is an incredibly broad net. We
included only those laws that were in effect January 2014. We used two or
three legal researchers to categorize each legal provision on the nature of the
described use of the prescribed use within the law, and we did this blind to
each other. We independently coded each legal provision, and then held
meetings to discuss any inconsistencies to determine final consensus codes.
Our coding scheme involved two types of codes—main-codes [and] crossreference codes. We assigned every single law a main-code relating to the
general purpose of health information within the law, or the general activity
that comprised the focus of the law.
Now, some laws related to more than one use of health information
technology or health information, so we assigned those laws cross-reference
codes for whenever the law related primarily to one use but also referenced
other uses in health information technology. Consequently, every law
contained a main-code, but not every law had a cross-reference. This study
identified 2364 state statutes and regulations relating to health information
technology. State law frameworks varied qualitatively and quantitatively.
Jurisdictions averaged just over forty-three laws. Texas, Oregon, and
California were the states with the most laws—Texas had 145, Oregon had
104, [and] California had 103. We only found three territories with laws
with health information technology—Guam, Virgin Islands, [and] Puerto
5.
Cason Schmit et al., Assessing the Impact of State Laws Related to
Electronic Health Information in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services State
Innovation Models Initiative, Presentation at the National Association of County and City
Health Officials Annual Conference (Jul. 8, 2015).
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Rico. Each of those had fewer than ten laws. Hawaii, South Carolina,
Delaware, and South Dakota were the states with the fewest health
information technology laws, and each of them had fewer than twenty laws.
We identified three primary use categories relating to patient treatment: This
is treatment in traditional settings, treatment in correctional settings, and
treatment in educational settings. We also identified forty-six use categories
that relate to other uses of health information apart from patient treatment.
These secondary use categories are incredibly diverse, covering traditional
public health functions, such as case reporting [and] vital records, to new
public health registries, voter registration, and medical marijuana among
many, many others. In total, we found 228 different main-code/crossreference code combinations, suggesting that the landscape is not only big, it
is incredibly complex, and states are approaching health information
technology governance in very different ways.
It follows then that the race between law and technology does not
involve one tortoise and a hare, it involves fifty tortoises running fifty very
different races. This then begs the question: Is it good to have more laws?
A number of scholars that have examined other emerging technology, such
as bio-technology, nanotechnology, and genomics, have placed some pretty
hard criticism on complex governance frameworks. Some have suggested
the quality oversight can suffer without sufficient coordination,6 or that the
multiplicity of statutes and agencies involved could create confusion among
the regulated industry, reduce the clarity, or otherwise slow technological
development. 7 Others have argued that when there are multiple entities
managing the risks, there is a chance they might neglect some risks by
relying on other risk managers, or they can make decisions that have
unintended consequences without sufficient coordination, or otherwise slow
technological development here. 8 [The] International Risk Governance
Council has warned that whenever a governance system involves multiple
entities [or] multiple responsibilities, there is a real danger that the risk
response is not going to be coordinated.9 This can be duplicated efforts. We
see this in HIT with health information exchanges and wasted resources,
reinventing the wheel over and over again.
All these critiques aside, it might be the case this complex health
information technology governance framework is inevitable. Many health
6.
GARY E. MARCHANT ET AL., INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 11 (2013).
7.
Mandel, supra note 2, at 82.
8.
INT’L RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, RISK GOVERNANCE DEFICITS:
ANALYSIS, ILLUSTRATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2010),
http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/IRGC_RiskGovernanceDeficits_PolicyBrief2010.pdf.
9.
Id. at 16.
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information technology applications are undertaken or at least supported by
government entities. These government entities need legal authority to do
these things. In many cases, this means new statutes and new regulations to
authorize these new technological applications. Now, fortunately, this study
does not conclude that more health information technology laws are
necessarily bad for health information technology. 10 It is undeniable that the
federal HITECH incentives have been a driving force in health information
technology adoption. Moreover, at the 2015 National Association for
County and City Health Officials Annual Meeting, we reported that there are
some important healthcare and public health objectives that are associated
with jurisdictions with more health information technology laws. For
example, using data from this assessment, we found that the number of laws
relating to health information exchange among those states that are
innovating—the state innovation model states—were positively correlated
and significantly correlated with the percentage change and information
sharing among federal acute care hospitals.11
Similarly, we found that the number of laws relating to health
information technology oversight was positively and significantly correlated
with the percentage of non-federal acute care hospitals that are sharing public
health data with local and state health authorities. Consequently, we have
evidence that some types of laws could be enabling health information
technology uses rather than stifling the development.
To kind of wrap things up with some key points here: This Public
Health Law Program state law study revealed the governance framework for
health information technology is incredibly complex and could pose a
significant risk to health information technology development. However,
given that many health information technology uses involve state actors,
some of this complexity might be inevitable. Additionally, we do have
evidence that at least some laws could be authorizing governments and
enabling entities to engage in new and innovative health information
technology uses.
So, moving forward, experience from other emerging technologies,
such as biotechnology, genomics, [and] information technology more
generally, these different approaches and different thoughts about
governance with relation to these technologies might point to different
innovative governance models for health information technology. Some
people argue for the use and increase in soft law mechanisms. We have seen
some industries rely on leveraging legal requirements for contracts between
entities to impose a governance framework. We have also seen some
10.
11.

Schmit, supra note 5.
See id.
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proposals for adding and coordinating a governing entity among the different
industries. We hope that this public health law program study can provide a
strong foundation to analyze new approaches if people are so interested.
With that, there is my contact information. Thank you very much. [applause]
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The law plays a significant role in all negotiations, regardless of the
context.1 The law can determine the who, what, when, where, and why of all
1.
See Lucas V.M. Bento, Preserving Negotiation Whilst Promoting Global
Order: Should We Bargain with Salt-Water Devils?, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 285, 297
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negotiations.2 Given the importance and power of law in the negotiation
context, adopting clear legal principles tailored to negotiations in specific
contexts will help willing and unwilling negotiators reach their desired
outcomes.3 Negotiation comes into play in a number of different areas, both
legal and otherwise.4
One venue where the negotiation principles used in legal and nonlegal areas coincide is the venue of ransom negotiations.5 Like other
negotiations, ransom negotiations feature adverse parties with competing
interests struggling to promote their own ends.6 With ransom negotiations,
however, the stakes are often much higher than a standard negotiation and
the party demanding the ransom payment has the opposing party at a distinct
disadvantage.7
Ransom negotiations take place fairly often in the contexts of piracy
and terrorism.8 Several laws and a wealth of experience have shaped how
negotiations in these contexts are able to progress.9
Insights into
negotiations in these contexts can be used to shape negotiations in favor of
the party facing a ransom demand in a different ransom context—the context
of cybercrime.10 Cybercriminals continue to develop new inventive means
of extorting valuable assets from computer users, including holding
computer systems hostage.11 Cybercriminals are employing viruses that lock
a computer user out of their own system and demand payment in return for
(2014); Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal
Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 46 (1985); Alex J. Hurder, The Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be
or Not to Be a Problem-Solving Negotiator, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 253, 253–54 (2007).
2.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 297; Gifford, supra note 1, at 46; Hurder,
supra note 1, at 25354.
3.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 297; Gifford, supra note 1, at 46; Hurder,
supra note 1, at 253–54.
4.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 297; Gifford, supra note 1, at 46; Hurder,
supra note 1, at 253–54.
5.
See 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, XTIUM,
http://www.xtium.com/beta/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Xtium_10-Minute-Guide-toRansomware-Protection.pdf (last visited May 2, 2017); Larry N. Zimmerman, Ransomware —
Your Data for Dollars, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Apr. 2015, at 16, 16.
6.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 307–08.
7.
Id. at 308, 311; see also 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware
Protection, supra note 5.
8.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 299; Rivka Weill, Exodus: Structuring
Redemption of Captives, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 177, 180 (2014).
9.
Bento, supra note 1, at 297–98; Weill, supra note 8, at 180–81.
10.
GAVIN O’GORMAN & GEOFF MCDONALD, SYMANTEC, RANSOMWARE: A
GROWING MENACE 2 (2012); Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16.
11.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2; Dean F. Sittig & Hardeep
Singh, A Socio-technical Approach to Preventing, Mitigating, and Recovering from
Ransomware Attacks, 2016 APPLIED CLINICAL INFORMATICS 624, 625.
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regained control of the system.12 To make matters worse, these viruses are
often capable of stealing private information from the captive computer as
the virus locks down the system.13 The healthcare industry, with its endless
amount of electronic private patient information and high-demand
environment, is especially at risk from the virus.14
This Article discusses the history, composition, and value of the
ransomware virus, as well as its impact on the healthcare industry.15 The
Article then moves to a discussion of negotiation and legal theories applied
to the contexts of piracy and terrorism.16 After analyzing the existing legal
framework of electronic private patient information in the healthcare
industry, along with the best practices to avoid cyberattacks in the first place,
negotiation theory is applied to the ransomware context to shed light on
whether healthcare organizations should be permitted to engage in ransom
negotiations with cybercriminals.17
II.

THE BASICS OF RANSOMWARE

Ransomware, as its name suggests, is a type of computer malware
designed to extort ransom payments from its targets.18 Ransomware acts by
infecting a computer, disabling the entire computer or disabling specific
programs or functions of the computer, and presenting a message on the
computer demanding a ransom payment in exchange for regaining the

12.
COMPUT. CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
HOW
TO
PROTECT
YOUR
NETWORKS
FROM
RANSOMWARE
2
(2016),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/872771/download [hereinafter CCIPS WHITE
PAPER]; O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2.
13.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2.
14.
Christiaan Beek, Healthcare Organizations Must Consider the Financial
Impact
of
Ransomware
Attacks,
MCAFEE
(Apr.
21,
2016),
http://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/executive-perspectives/healthcare-organizations-mustconsider-financial-impact-ransomware-attacks/; Mark Hagland, Special Report on Data
Security: With the Ransomware Crisis, the Landscape of Data Security Is Shifting,
HEALTHCARE
INFORMATICS
(May
26,
2016),
http://www.healthcareinformatics.com/article/special-report-data-security-ransomware-crisis-landscape-datasecurity-shifting.
15.
See infra Part II.
16.
See infra Parts II, III.
17.
See infra Section IV.
18.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2; Alexandre Gazet, Comparative
Analysis of Various Ransomware Virii, 6 J. COMPUTER VIROLOGY & HACKING TECH. 77, 77
(2010).
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computer’s functionality.19 Ransomware has taken on many different forms
and has evolved since its birth many years ago.20
A.

The History of Ransomware

The original ransomware would infect a computer, encrypt certain
files in the computer so that the user could not open them without an
decryption key, and demand a ransom payment in exchange for the
decryption key.21 The modern day ransomware is capable of locking an
infected computer’s screen, rendering the computer useless to the user.22
The virus will then display a message demanding payment in exchange for
regained access to the computer.23 This modern form of ransomware is
believed to have originated near Russia.24 Instead of simply demanding a
ransom payment and disclosing the criminal nature of the screen lock, some
early forms of ransomware would instead display a message on the infected
computer purporting to be from Microsoft and claiming that in order to
activate the computer, the user must send a text message to a phone number
which would charge the user a premium charge for the text.25 The user
would thus be sending what he or she thought was a simple activation text to
Microsoft, but in reality his or her computer had been infected with
ransomware and the premium charge from the text message was being
collected by the hacker.26 Another early variant of the virus did not bother
with concealing the criminal nature of the ransom and instead of posing as a
representative of Microsoft, the hacker would simply display a pornographic
image on the user’s screen and lock the screen with the image on display.27
The hacker would then send a message demanding payment through a
similar premium charge phone call or text message as the Microsoft variant,
in exchange for removal of the pornographic image and regained computer
function.28 This version of ransomware was successful by shaming the
19.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2; LYNNE DUNBRACK, IDC
HEALTH INSIGHTS, PROVIDING OUTSIDE-IN AND INSIDE-OUT PROTECTION AGAINST
RANSOMWARE AND OTHER INTENSIFYING CYBERTHREATS 2 (2016).
20.
See O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2.
21.
Id. at 3; see also CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2.
22.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2; CCIPS WHITE PAPER,
supra note 12, at 6.
23.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2; CCIPS WHITE PAPER,
supra note 12, at 2.
24.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 3.
25.
Id. at 4.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
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computer’s user into paying the ransom and this version lasted for quite
some time.29
Starting around 2011, a new ransomware variant was introduced.30
The virus is similar to its predecessor in that the virus still locks the user’s
computer screen or locks the user out of specific computer files.31 The major
difference is in the content of the ransom message displayed on the computer
user’s screen.32 The new displayed messages claim to be from a government
agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), or from a local
law enforcement agency.33 The fake message would inform the user that his
or her computer had been locked because the user had committed a crime
and the only way to regain access would be to pay a fine for the crime. 34
Interestingly, some forms of the virus use accessible location services in
order to determine where the infected computer is located geographically.35
Determining where the computer is located allows the hacker to tailor the
ransom message to appear more legitimate, such as by ensuring the message
is written in the predominant language where the computer is located and by
displaying law enforcement images portraying the agencies existing in that
country.36 This new ransomware also abandoned the premium charge text
and phone method of collecting its ransoms.37 Modern ransomware hackers
now take advantage of online pre-payment methods, which act similarly to
online pre-paid visas.38 The computer user loads funds into an online
account, which the hacker has access to using his or her own credit card.39
The hacker then retrieves the funds and decides whether to unlock the
victim’s computer or dishonor their agreement.40
B.

How Does Ransomware Infect Computers?

Of course, in order to ever succeed in their goal of extorting a
ransom from their victims, hackers must first infect computers with the

16.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 4.
Id.
Id.; Gazet, supra note 18, at 77; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16.
See O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 4.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4; see also Gazet, supra note 18, at 77; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at

35.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 5.
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 4–5.
38.
Id. at 5.
39.
Id.
40.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 6; see also 10-Minute Guide
to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
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ransomware virus.41 There are many different techniques used by hackers to
infect computers with the ransomware virus.42 One of the most common
methods used is referred to as a drive-by download.43 A drive-by download
occurs when the hacker has already gone through the process of hacking into
a website.44 The hacker then inserts hidden malware onto the website.45 An
unsuspecting person visiting the website will automatically be redirected to a
second website operated by the hacker, which installs the ransomware onto
the person’s computer.46 In order to hack into a website in the first place, the
website must have some type of vulnerability that the hacker can exploit.47
To avoid the hassle of exploiting an already existing weakness in a
website, some hackers legitimately buy advertising space on a website.48
The advertisement may purport to be promoting anything, but once the user
clicks on the advertisement, the user is directed to the hacker’s website
containing the ransomware virus.49
A different tactic used by hackers is referred to as spear phishing.50
Spear phishing is a hacking technique where the hacker sends a false email to
an employee of a company.51 The email may claim to be from the
employee’s coworker or supervisor and may instruct the employee to follow
a series of tasks, which would actually result in the employee infecting his or
her system with a virus, such as ransomware.52
Other means of infecting computers with the ransomware virus
include piggybacking the virus onto a different form of malware already
infecting a computer, or by sending out emails containing spam along with
the virus.53 Ransomware will often be paired with another form of malware
designed specifically to steal data and other information located on the
infected computer.54 Thus, while the ransomware virus locks the computer
41.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2; Hagland, supra note 14.
42.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2.
43.
Id. at 4; see also DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 1.
44.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 4.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 4.
50.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 1–2; Hagland, supra note 14; 10-Minute
Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
51.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5; see
also DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2.
52.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5; see
also DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2.
53.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 10; see also O’GORMAN & MCDONALD,
supra note 10, at 4.
54.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 8.
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and demands ransom from the victims, the additional malware is stealing
data from the hostage computer.55
While the version of ransomware which requires a computer user to
click on a certain advertisement or email is still commonly used, newer
versions of the virus are being developed that rely on vulnerabilities in an
organization’s web server.56 If a healthcare organization’s web server is
unprotected or unpatched, hackers are able to exploit this weakness and
infiltrate the organization’s online network.57 Once inside the network, the
virus is able to move from the initial hacked computer to other computers
using the same network, collect login data and credentials from employee
staff, steal private stored data, and infect multiple systems with the
ransomware virus.58
C.

Ransomware and the Black-Market Economy

The earning prospects for cybercriminals using the ransomware virus
vary by country and by virus.59 In one study, a variant of the virus was
discovered to have infected 5700 computers in approximately one day.60 Of
this number, 168 users appear to have tried to free their computers by
entering a pin number, which is given to the user by the hacker after the user
pays the demanded ransom.61 The study demonstrated that the number of
users who potentially paid the ransom was approximately 2.9% of those
infected, the average amount demanded was $200, and that this would result
in the hackers extorting $33,600 in ransom payments in a single month using
this variant of the ransomware virus.62 Expanding this finding to an entire
year, the researchers concluded that an estimated $394,400 could be
transferred in ransom in an entire year with this virus if only 2.9% of the
yearly targets pay.63 As of the beginning of 2016, over 4000 cyberattacks
using the ransomware virus have occurred every single day on average.64
This number marks an increase of 300% when compared to the number of
attacks that occurred in 2015.65 While these numbers alone are sufficiently
55.
56.
note 10, at 4.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
See DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2; O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2.
Id.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2.
Id.
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significant to demonstrate the growing threat of ransomware, they may
represent only a fraction of the total sums extorted from organizations, as
many organizations do not report being attacked by ransomware hackers, nor
do they report paying the hacker a ransom.66
The ransomware virus is being used by hackers moderately to
aggressively target computers in the United States.67 Just as the virus itself
has evolved over time, so has its targets.68
D.

The Threat of Ransomware in the Healthcare Setting

Healthcare organizations are appealing targets to hackers.69 In 2015,
healthcare organizations were targeted by cybercriminals more than most
other industries.70 Some research suggests that on average, healthcare
organizations experience a cyberattack almost every single month.71 The
same research also suggests that nearly half of the healthcare organizations
involved in the study had experienced a cyberattack within the past twelve
months in which private patient information was at risk.72

66.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
There are a number of reasons why an organization may choose not to report an attack.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5. If word gets out that the organization was
successfully attacked or, even worse, that the organization paid a hacker’s ransom demands,
other cybercriminals may be encouraged to attack the organization upon seeing its willingness
to pay or upon discovering its cyber-vulnerability. Id. The organization that pays a
ransomware hacker may also be met with a negative reputation if word of the payment gets
out because the organization has indirectly financed criminal activity. Id.
67.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 9; 10-Minute Guide to
Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5. In May of 2017, a series of ransomware
attacks worldwide resulted in hundreds of thousands of computer systems being infected from
over one-hundred countries. Ross Koppel & Harold Thimbleby, Lessons from the 100 Nation
Ransomware
Attack,
THE
HEALTH
CARE
BLOG
(May
14,
2017),
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2017/05/14/lessons-from-the-100-nation-ransomwareattack/. The variant of the ransomware virus employed in these attacks has been labeled
“WannaCry” and is believed to have been developed based on vulnerabilities in Microsoft
operating systems, which were originally discovered by the U.S. National Security Agency.
Id.; David Goldman, Global Cyberattack: A Super-Simple Explanation of What’s Going on,
CNN (May 15, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/14/technology/global-cyberattackexplanation/index.html.
68.
Hagland, supra note 14.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
PONEMON INST., THE STATE OF CYBERSECURITY IN HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS IN 2016 (2016), http://cdn1.esetstatic.com/eset/US/resources/docs/whitepapers/State_of_Healthcare_Cybersecurity_Study.pdf.
72.
Id.
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The ransomware virus has been very effective at infecting healthcare
organizations.73 Between 2005 and 2014, $57.6 million in ransom payments
were made by healthcare organizations to ransomware hackers.74 During
these years, ransom payments to hackers ranged from $200 to $10,000.75
However, in the year of 2015 alone, approximately $24 million in ransom
payments were made by healthcare organizations to ransomware hackers.76
On February 12th, the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in
Hollywood, California fell prey to a ransomware attack.77 A doctor of the
medical center claimed that the medical center’s system “was being held for
ransom.”78 Later reports indicated that the health center had lost control of
its electronic health record system for longer than a week and that those
responsible demanded over $3 million in order to bring the medical center’s
system back online.79 The CEO for the hospital later revealed that the
medical center had paid approximately $17,000 to the hackers and the
hackers had honored their word and restored the medical center’s access to
their system.80 A March 28th incident revealed that integrated systems
storing health data were also at risk when a Columbia-based integrated
healthcare system was targeted by a ransomware virus.81 The system stored
information for ten hospitals and the information systems reportedly took
several weeks to restore while the hospitals attempted to function and care
for patients as best as possible.82 A single attack on a Maryland-based
hospital led to an $18,500 ransom payment.83
Healthcare organizations are an appealing target to data hackers.84
Patients’ electronic health records are worth far more than a victim’s credit
or debit card number.85 In fact, data indicates that electronic health records

73.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Hagland, supra note 14.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Hagland, supra note 14.
83.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2.
84.
See 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note
5; Beek, supra note 14; William Maruca, Hacked Health Records Prized for their Black
Market Value, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP: HIPPA, HITECH & HIT (Mar. 16, 2015),
http://hipaahealthlaw.foxrothschild.com/2015/03/articles/articles/hacked-health-recordsprized-for-their-black-market-value/.
85.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5;
Kevin Lonergan, Why the Healthcare Industry Badly Needs a Cyber Security Health Check,
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may be worth ten times more to data hackers than a credit or debit card
number.86 In 2015, there was a larger volume of U.S. based ransomware
attacks than previously, specifically focusing on the healthcare industry. 87
Healthcare organizations may be so appealing to hackers because every
minute could literally be a matter of life and death, and every minute the
organization does not have full access to its electronic information, each
patient is at risk.88
As noted above, electronic health records are extremely valuable to
cyber hackers.89 Healthcare organizations are using and creating more
electronic healthcare data than ever before.90 Electronic healthcare data
allows healthcare providers different advantages to providing patients with
quality care; however, with more data being stored in an online format,
hackers have more targets and far more incentive to target the healthcare
industry.91
Healthcare organizations are storing “valuable financial,
insurance, and demographic data” which can be used, or sold to be used, to
commit identity theft.92
As an additional threat, hospital employees and medical staff are
now using their personal or organization-provided mobile devices in order to
access private patient health records stored on the organization’s servers.93
Alerts are sent to the mobile devices of healthcare staff to keep them
informed of patients’ vital statistics.94 Medical imaging machines are
connected to healthcare servers using the Internet.95 New technologies are
being developed that allow constant health monitoring of patients by
healthcare professionals, such as smart glasses.96 This constant stream of
private health information is recorded and digitally sent to the healthcare
organization’s servers where it becomes accessible to the monitoring
healthcare professional.97 Older technology, such as copy machines, are also
INFO. AGE (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.information-age.com/why-healthcare-industry-badlyneeds-cyber-security-health-check-123460052/; Maruca, supra note 84.
86.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5;
Lonergan, supra note 85; Maruca, supra note 84.
87.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
88.
See DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 1–3.
89.
See 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note
5; Lonergan, supra note 85; Maruca, supra note 84.
90.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2–3.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 2.
93.
Id. at 3.
94.
Id.
95.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 3.
96.
Id.
See id.
97.
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connected to the organization’s servers.98 Unfortunately, these technologies
are very vulnerable to cyberattacks.99 It seems that as the technology itself
boldly strides forward, the efforts to secure and protect the information being
sent by the technologies are left behind.100
E.
Using a Negotiation Theory Approach to Solving the Ransomware
Problem
Intelligent negotiation can aid in dispute-resolution without having
to deal with lengthy and costly conflicts.101 Negotiators employing what is
referred to as the problem-solving approach to negotiations appreciate the
costs and benefits of each side of the negotiation and seek to reach a
resolution beneficial to both sides.102 The problem-solving negotiator seeks
creative solutions to disputes that will satisfy, at least in part, the goals of
each party.103 Negotiation theory is an ideal framework from which to
analyze negotiations with ransomware hackers, as it takes into account the
costs and benefits of ransom negotiations, as well as considering other
external factors, such as the legal landscape surrounding the negotiation and
the human costs of ransom negotiations, which can aid negotiators dealing

98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 4. Hackers are already using these new technologies to breach
healthcare organization’s networks. See DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 4. Connected
technologies including “insulin pumps, heart monitors, and picture archiving and
communication systems” have already been hacked in order to gain access to the connected
healthcare organization’s network. Id.
100.
Id. Ransomware hackers are able to use these new technologies as back
doors to gain access to a healthcare network. Id. The hacker no longer needs to find
vulnerabilities in the organization’s network itself, but instead hackers can breach the more
vulnerable healthcare technologies that are connected and transmitting information to the
network. Id. This type of back door hacking is known as medjacking. DUNBRACK, supra
note 19, at 4. After breaching the single, connected device, the hacker can use the virus to
infiltrate the organization’s network and move from system to system on the network,
infecting devices, and stealing information. See id. Once infected, cybercriminals could “take
. . . control of the [specific] device” itself, but this is uncommon, and hackers normally use
these devices as a means of gaining access to the more lucrative prize of the connected
organization’s network. Id. Healthcare organizations are woefully unprepared for this type of
threat as most organizations have not integrated these new technologies into their existing
security framework. See id.
101.
Hurder, supra note 1, at 254.
102.
Id. at 254, 273.
103.
CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT
11–12 (7th ed. 2012); see also SPENCER PUNNETT, REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION: A
GUIDE TO OPTIMAL RESULTS BASED ON INSIGHTS FROM COUNSEL, MEDIATORS, AND PROGRAM
ADMINISTRATORS 412 (2013); Gifford, supra note 1, at 46.
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with ransomware hackers and other criminal hostage-takers to achieve
optimal results.104
III.

NEGOTIATING WITH PIRATES

Piracy poses a major threat across the globe to human life, the global
economy, and the environment.105 Pirates who engage in hostage-taking for
ransom payments put ransom negotiators in the position to save lives, while
trying not to financially benefit the pirates.106 Effective negotiation can
reduce these costs and creative legal strategies can reduce the incidence of
piracy worldwide.107
A.

Piracy in the Modern Age

Piracy has become an increasing problem over the past decade.108 In
2008, pirates committed or attempted roughly 293 attacks.109 In 2012, the
number of attacks increased to roughly 300.110 Pirates long ago realized that
simply to pillage and plunder a seized vessel was a wasted opportunity when
the vessel’s crew could be ransomed off for far more lucrative bounties.111
In fact, the ransoming of crewmembers has largely become the primary
motivation for modern-day pirates seizing maritime vessels.112 Between
2008 and early 2014, ransom payments exceeding $300 million had been
paid to pirates.113 In 2011, more than 1200 people were held for ransom by
pirates.114 Of this number, 35 of the hostages and 111 pirates died during the
process.115 Further, many piracy attacks never go reported at all, as ship
owners try to keep the attacks quiet in order to avoid increased insurance

104.
See CRAVER, supra note 103, at 11–12; PUNNETT, supra note 103, at 412;
Bento, supra note 1, at 305; Gifford, supra note 1, at 46.
105.
Daniel Pines, Maritime Piracy: Changes in U.S. Law Needed to Combat
this Critical National Security Concern, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 69, 71 (2012).
106.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 313–14, 321–22.
107.
See id. at 287–88, 292, 326; Hurder, supra note 1, at 254.
108.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 294.
109.
ICC Int’l Maritime Bureau [IMB], Privacy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2012, at 5–6 (Jan. 2013).
110.
Id.
111.
Bento, supra note 1, at 287, 304.
112.
Id. at 287.
113.
Paul Redfern, Over $300m Paid in Ransom to Pirates Since 2008, THE E.
AFR. (Feb. 9, 2013, 8:40 PM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Over-USD300m-paid-inransom-to-pirates-since-2008/2558-1689648-jxsa4h/index.html.
114.
ICC IMB, supra note 109, at 24.
115.
Id.
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premiums.116 While the costs of human life and ransom payments may be
the most prominent costs of piracy, there are also secondary costs involved in
piracy situations, such as the costs to deliver the ransom, to repair damaged
vessels, to replace stolen cargo, to pay for legal services, etc.117 The pirates’
course is simple: Seize the vessel while ensuring its continued navigability
and seize the crew in order to maximize the pirates’ expected return for their
efforts.118 The negotiation phase begins here and the stakes could not be
higher: The lives of the sailors.119
B.

The Piracy Ransom Negotiation Context

Recent history is replete with graphic examples of negotiations with
pirates gone bad for many of the same reasons negotiations in the business or
legal setting turn sour—miscommunication, refusal to cooperate, delayed
payments, an aggressive negotiation style, technical difficulties, etc.120 In
2011, Somali pirates seized and killed four American sailors when
negotiations fell apart between the pirates and the U.S. Navy. 121 The next
year, Somali pirates killed a sailor over the delay of a ransom payment.122
Grisly illustrations of negotiations with pirates gone south tend to
cloud the public’s perception of how pirates view these transactions: It is
only business.123 From a pirate’s perspective, ransoming sailors is nothing
more than a matter of financial gain.124 This is one of the major details
separating the pirate from the terrorist.125 Although ransom situations may
result in harm or death to the hostage crew, such situations may also
conclude with the successful release of the hostages after the ransom is
paid.126 In 2012, pirates attacked a Greek vessel and held its crew for

116.
Bento, supra note 1, at 293.
117.
Id. at 291.
118.
See Yvonne M. Dutton & Jon Bellish, Refusing to Negotiate: Analyzing
the Legality and Practicality of a Piracy Ransom Ban, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 299, 301, 305–
06 (2014).
119.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 291.
120.
See id. at 287–88.
121.
Id.
122.
Id. at 288; see also Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 301.
123.
See Pines, supra note 105, at 73–74, 78.
124.
See id. at 78.
125.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 303–04.
126.
See Barry Hart Dubner & Kimberly Chavers, The Dilemma of Piratical
Ransoms: Should They Be Paid or Not? On the Human Rights of Kidnapped Seamen and
Their Families, 18 BARRY L. REV. 297, 300 (2013); Thaine Lennox-Gentle, Piracy, Sea
Robbery, and Terrorism: Enforcing Laws to Deter Ransom Payments and Hijacking, 37
TRANSP. L.J. 199, 200 (2010). Between January and December of 2012, approximately 585

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss3/1

74

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2017]

KEEPING INTERNET PIRATES AT BAY

363

ransom.127 The pirates successfully ransomed the crew for $5 million and
accordingly spared the crew.128 If pirates never intend to make good on their
ransom deals, they would eventually cease to exist because ransoms would
no longer be paid.129
The ransoms negotiated by pirates provide a means of financial
support to both the pirate and to the local economy of the pirate’s
community.130 The correlation between dismal local economic conditions
and piracy provides insight into a pirate’s motivations.131 While the pirates’
actions are certainly deplorable, ignoring their motivations is a critical
mistake for the negotiator on the other side of the table.132
Attorney Lucas V.M. Bento distinguishes between three different
interests at play in ransom negotiations with pirates.133 Non-pecuniary
interests are those involving “the well-being of hostages during captivity,
their safe release and post-incident care.”134 Pecuniary interests are those
involved in recovering the vessel and its cargo.135 Lastly, hybrid interests are
a combination of the first two interests.136 Bento explains that, although the
majority of ransom negotiations involve hybrid interests, non-pecuniary
interests tend to be more concerning.137
Beyond the financial and non-financial interests at stake in pirate
ransom negotiations, understanding the nature and complexity of pirate
organizations is vital to reaching desired outcomes.138 Pirate organizations
can vary in their sophistication just like other criminal syndicates.139 The
pirates physically present and boarding their target vessels may not have the
clout in a negotiation to make decisions on behalf of the pirate
sailors were held as hostages by pirates. Dubner & Chavers, supra, at 300. Of this total
number, the pirates killed six of the sailors, leaving the remaining sailors alive. Id.
127.
Bento, supra note 1, at 295.
128.
Id.
129.
Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 301.
130.
See id. at 305–06.
131.
See Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at 298–99; Lennox-Gentle, supra
note 126, at 205; Pines, supra note 105, at 77–78.
132.
See Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at
205; Jennifer W. Reynolds, Breaking BATNAS: Negotiation Lessons from Walter White, 45
N.M. L. REV. 611, 612 (2015).
133.
Bento, supra note 1, at 291. Lucas V.M. Bento is an attorney based in
New York specializing in international disputes and arbitration. Id. at 285 n.*.
134.
Id. at 291.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
Bento, supra note 1, at 291.
138.
See Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 205.
139.
Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 306; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126,
at 205–06.
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organization.140 For the negotiator opposing the pirates, it is paramount to
discover whether the pirates involved in the discussion have the authority to
make flexible decisions or whether they are strictly following a preconceived
plan with no option to deviate.141 Shedding light on all of the inner workings
of a pirate organization is often impossible, but by putting in the effort to
learn as much about the organization as possible, the opposing negotiator can
increase the chances of arriving at a desired outcome.142
C.

Arguments Against Paying Ransoms to Pirates

International state actors differ in their approaches to addressing the
problem of negotiating with and paying ransoms to pirates.143 Many nations,
including the United States, France, Britain, Columbia, and Italy, as a matter
of policy, oppose paying ransoms to pirates to free hostages, however these
countries do not make the payment of pirate ransoms illegal.144 Somalia has
illegalized the payment of ransoms to pirates.145 The opponents of paying
ransoms to pirates contend that giving in to ransom demands only emboldens
the pirates and encourages them to commit similar acts in the future because
the pirates know their demands will be met.146 Further, opponents believe
that paying ransoms indirectly funds the enterprise of piracy, thus giving the
same pirates the means to conduct additional operations.147 An argument
against paying a pirate’s ransom demands, often employed by the United
States, is that piracy is commonly intertwined with other international
crimes, such as terrorism.148 While international terrorism is a separate
international crime from piracy, paying a ransom demand in response to one
crime may end up resulting in the other.149
In 2010, former President of the United States, Barack Obama,
issued an executive order banning any financial transactions with certain
140.
See Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 305–06.
141.
See id. at 301, 306; Pines, supra note 105, at 78.
142.
See Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 205.
143.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 288–89; Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at
317–22; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 206–07.
144.
Bento, supra note 1, at 288–89; Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at
320–22; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 206.
145.
Somalia: Six Jailed for ‘Pirate Ransom’ Cash, BBC (June 20, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13826050; see also Bento, supra note 1, at 288–89.
146.
Bento, supra note 1, at 288–89; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 309–
10.
147.
Bento, supra note 1, at 289; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 309–
310.
148.
Bento, supra note 1, at 290; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 215.
149.
Bento, supra note 1, at 290; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 214–15.
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Somali organizations, some of which had ties to pirate gangs.150 The United
Kingdom (“U.K.”) similarly criminalizes ransom payments made to pirate
gangs with sufficient links to terrorist organizations.151 Thus, although very
few state actors go as far as to illegalize ransom payments to pirates, some
states ban these payments if there is a threat that the funds may end up in
terrorist hands.152 The economic success of piracy has led to a pirate stock
exchange, through which individual or corporate investors are actually
investing in and receiving a cut of ransom payments given to pirates.153
Paying ransoms to pirates may encourage the growth of and continued
investments to the industry of piracy globally.154
D.

Arguments in Favor of Paying Ransoms to Pirates

The maritime industry, however, has expressed concern that an
outright ban on ransom payments would put sailors’ lives at risk and
significantly hamper the industry as a whole.155 After all, what sailor would
be interested in traversing pirate-infested waters with the knowledge that, if
taken for ransom, nobody would be answering the call?156 Proponents of
paying ransoms to spare the lives of hostages also note that, even if ransom
payments are made illegal, pirates may simply amplify their violence toward
hostages in order to compel the sailors’ family membersas well as ship
owners—to make the illegal ransom payments.157
E.

Negotiation Solutions to the Ransom Problem: The Piracy Context

Many scholars argue against an absolute ban on negotiations with
pirates.158 The varying interests of all parties involved should be weighed in

150.
151.

Bento, supra note 1, at 290.
CHATHAM HOUSE, PIRACY AND LEGAL ISSUES: RECONCILING PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE INTERESTS 15 (2009).
152.
See Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 320, 322; Lennox-Gentle, supra
note 126, at 214–15.
153.
Avi Jorisch, Today’s Pirates Have Their Own Stock Exchange, WALL
STREET
J.
(June
16,
2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304520804576341223910765818.
154.
Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 306–07.
155.
Id. at 313–14; Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at 319.
156.
See Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at 319.
157.
See ADJOA ANYIMADU, CHATHAM HOUSE, COORDINATING AN
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE PAYMENT OF RANSOMS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING
RANSOM PAYMENTS 8 (2012); Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at 319.
158.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at
327.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

77

Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1

366

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

order to assess the potential payoffs of each approach to the problem.159 The
options available to governments and private parties or corporations facing
ransom demands are either to pay the ransom or not to pay the ransom. 160
The options available to pirates demanding ransom are either to release the
hostages or not to release the hostages.161 Of these potential options, there is
only one possible solution that benefits both parties: Where the government
or private party pays the ransom and the pirates release the hostages.162 If the
private party chooses not to pay the ransom and, by some miracle, the pirates
choose to release the hostages unharmed, the private party will have
achieved its goal in the negotiation, whereas the pirates’ goal will have been
thwarted.163 If the private party pays the ransom, but the pirates do not
release the hostages, or if the pirates kill the hostages, then the private party
will have been thwarted, and the pirates will have achieved their goal.164
Lastly, if the private party chooses not to pay the ransom and the pirates
choose not to release the crew—a scenario seen often—then neither party
will have achieved their goals.165
While this framework provides a view of the competing interest of
the parties, it is insufficient on its own to shed light on an appropriate policy
regarding paying ransoms to pirates.166 First, each option cannot be given
equal weight, since the outcome in which the private party does not pay the
ransom and the pirates release the hostages is unlikely; the outcome in which
the private party pays the ransom and the pirates do not release the hostages
is, at least, somewhat likely; and the situation where the private party pays
the ransom and the pirates release the hostages can hardly be said to be an
absolute win for the private party.167 The private party is already at a loss for
having to negotiate with pirates to begin with, and thus, the parties are on
unequal footing going into the negotiation.168 A key argument against
paying ransoms is to prevent the funding of future criminal activity, a
159.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330.
165.
Id. In 2010, seven crewmembers were held hostage by pirates aboard the
vessel, the Iceberg 1, for 800 days while the pirates’ demands for ransom went ignored. See
Why David Cameron Will Not Stop Somali Pirates Getting Their Pieces of Eight,
COLINFREEMANSITE
(Sept.
6,
2012),
http://www.colinfreemansite.wordpress.com/2012/09/06/why-david-cameron-will-not-stopsomali-pirates-getting-their-pieces-of-eight/. During this time, one of the crewmembers
committed suicide. Id. The situation was resolved by military intervention. Id.
166.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330.
167.
See id.
168.
See id.
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response to which this analysis does not provide.169 However, completely
banning private parties from paying ransoms to pirates could likely result in
loss of life and remove that important option from the private party
negotiator.170
This struggle between two options, which many perceive as
unacceptable, has led scholars to propose more creative solutions to the
problem.171 A starting proposal argues that while private parties should be
permitted to negotiate with and pay ransoms to pirates, state actors, such as
the United States and the U.K., should have an absolute non-negotiation
policy.172 That approach ensures state actors take a stance against the actions
of pirates and, ideally, will work toward reducing and eliminating the source
of the problem, piracy itself.173 Another solution is to permit private parties
to pay ransoms to pirates, but to tax the ransom payments.174 The benefits of
this solution are twofold: First, additional funds are raised which can be
applied toward combatting piracy; and second, those in charge of the ships at
risk will be incentivized to take extra care to prevent these situations from
occurring and protecting their vessels as best as possible.175 The detriment of
this solution is that victims of piracy are essentially being taxed for paying to
spare the lives of their crew.176 A further solution proposes holding shipowners liable to their crew for failing to properly safeguard them from
pirates.177 The United States already permits sailors to sue ship-owners for
negligence in situations involving pirate raids and for sending sailors into
areas the owners know are plagued by pirate attacks.178 Another solution
would be to require ship-owners to employ guards on voyages through

27.

169.
170.
171.

See id. at 327; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 313.
Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 314.
Bento, supra note 1, at 330–33; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 324–

172.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 330 n.278.
173.
Id.
174.
Id. at 331.
175.
Id. This solution also provides a silver lining to those opponents of
paying any type of ransom to criminal pirates, in that the pirates who hold sailors for ransom
are indirectly supporting the efforts to end piracy. Id. at 332. When private parties pay
ransoms to pirates—in a sense rewarding pirates for their criminal activity—these ransom
payments will then be taxed, and the proceeds will contribute to government efforts aimed at
stopping piracy. Bento, supra note 1, at 332.
176.
Id. at 331. An additional downside of this approach is that private
companies paying ransoms for the release of their crew will be faced with an incentive not to
report the incident at all in order to avoid being taxed on the ransom payment. Id. at 332.
177.
Id. at 331.
178.
Id. at 331–32.
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pirate-infested waters.179 In 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard required ships
traveling in dangerous areas near Africa to employ guards.180
Negotiating with pirates need not feature an all-or-nothing outlook,
in which a party either closes off from negotiations or where a party pays
every ransom.181 A cost-benefit analysis should be conducted during every
negotiation to ensure that the negotiator is able to maximize its benefits,
minimize its losses, and weigh context-based factors accordingly.182 The
ransom negotiator must also consider governmental efforts to curb piracy,
such as taxes on ransom payments and ship-owner liability.183
IV.

NEGOTIATING WITH TERRORISTS

Terrorists frequently participate in kidnapping to bankroll their other
terrorist activities.184 Ransoming off victims of terrorist kidnappings is
highly lucrative and reports in recent years indicate that terrorists are
receiving higher ransom rewards than in the past.185 Newer terrorist
organizations, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”), have
used the tactic with great success and have shed light on the different
approaches taken by various countries in dealing with ransom negotiations
with terrorists.186

at 612.

179.
180.
181.

See Bento, supra note 1, at 331.
Id.
See id. at 326; Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62; Reynolds, supra note 132,

182.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62;
Reynolds, supra note 132, at 612.
183.
Bento, supra note 1, at 331; see also Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at
325–27.
184.
Sima Kazmir, The Law, Policy, and Practice of Kidnapping for Ransom in
a Terrorism Context, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 325, 326 (2015); Weill, supra note 8, at
180–81.
185.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 326. The New York Times conducted a 2014
study demonstrating the growth in terrorist ransom payments. Rukmini Callimachi, Paying
Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-alqaedas-patron.html?_r=0. In 2003, Al Qaeda was ransoming hostages at an average of
$200,000 per hostage. Id. Compare this with 2008 where two Canadian hostages were
ransomed for $1 million, and with 2013 where four French hostages were ransomed for $40
million. Id. The New York Times study concluded that between 2008 and 2015 Al Qaeda,
and its supporting organizations, have made approximately $125 million through hostage
negotiations and ransom payments. Id.
186.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 327. In 2014, ISIL had been paid
approximately $20 million in ransom payments by various countries. David S. Cohen, Under
Sec’y of the Treasury for Terrorism and Fin. Intelligence, Remarks at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace: Attacking ISIL’s Financial Foundation (Oct. 23, 2014).
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The Heightened Interest of International Terrorism

When it comes to making ransom payments to terrorist
organizations, there seems to be a heightened interest at play compared to
paying ransoms to other brands of criminal organizations.187 This could be
due to the intense hostility toward terrorism and the heightened threat
communities tend to perceive when confronted with terrorism.188 In recent
years, questions surrounding the wisdom of paying ransoms to terrorists have
been thrust to the forefront of public attention, given the rise of ISIL.189 ISIL
is known to have taken hostages from at least twelve different countries,
including the United States, England, Italy, Russia, France, Denmark,
Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and Belgium.190 Many of these hostages have
been ransomed and returned to their respective countries, while others are
still being held by the organization.191 The threat posed by international
terrorism has led to it generally being treated as a heightened interest in
terms of ransom and other laws.192 The heightened interest is utilized as a
policy argument in support of an outright ban on ransom payments to
terrorist organizations, whereas, in other criminal enterprises, an outright ban
on cooperative efforts is typically shied away from.193
Countries have taken different approaches to the problem of
negotiating with and paying ransoms to terrorist organizations.194 This
patchwork of differing laws and policies is complicated further by
international legal entities, such as the United Nations (“U.N.”), which also
has set forth extensive resolutions on the issue.195

187.
Weill, supra note 8, at 184–85.
188.
Id.
189.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 327.
190.
See OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & U.N. ASSISTANCE
MISSION FOR IR., REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT IN IRAQ: 6
JULY10 SEPTEMBER 2014 3 (2014); Jethro Mullen, How Many More Western Captives is ISIS
Holding?, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/15/world/meast/isis-western-captives/ (last
updated Sept. 15, 2014); Karen Yourish, The Fates of 23 ISIS Hostages in Syria, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/24/world/middleeast/the-fateof-23-hostages-in-syria.html?_r=0.
191.
See Mullen, supra note 190; Yourish, supra note 190.
192.
Bento, supra note 1, at 301–04; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 319–
20.
193.
Bento, supra note 1, at 301–04; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 319–
20.
194.
See Kazmir, supra note 184, at 328, 337–40.
195.
See id. at 329.
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The International Law of Paying Ransoms to Terrorists

The U.N. and other international legal entities have taken the broad,
outward position that ransom payments should generally be banned.196
However, this position, along with the resolutions passed by U.N. memberstates, are not binding under international law.197 In 2009, the U.N. passed
Security Council Resolution 1904, which mandates that U.N. member-states
freeze funds and assets in order to prevent ransom payments, but the
resolution did not explicitly ban paying ransoms to terrorists.198 Security
Council Resolution 2133, which was passed in 2014, required states to
prohibit terrorist organizations from “benefiting directly or indirectly from
ransom payments.”199 Finally, in 2015, the U.N. passed Security Council
Resolution 2199, which prohibits member-states from paying ransoms to
terrorist organizations.200 Security Council Resolution 2199 is surprisingly
broad in its scope, in that the resolution prohibits the payment of any ransom
payment by anyone, “regardless of how or by whom the ransom is paid,” to a
terrorist organization listed on a designated list of sanctioned terrorist
organizations.201 Despite the seemingly clear stance the U.N. has taken in its
approach to paying ransoms to terrorists, its resolutions have not resulted in
any prosecutions of either state-members or private individuals who have
made ransom payments to prohibited terrorist organizations.202
The laws and policies supported by individual countries regarding
ransom payments are far more complicated than the U.N.’s approach and
send an inconsistent international approach to ransom payments.203 Some
countries, including the United States and the U.K. strongly oppose the
practice of paying ransoms to terrorists.204 On the other hand, there are
countries, including Germany and France, which publicly take a stance
against paying terrorist ransom demands, but have allegedly made such
payments.205
196.
Id. at 329–30.
197.
Id. at 329.
198.
S.C. Res. 1904, ¶ 1(a) (Dec. 17, 2009); The Threat Posed by Kidnapping
for Ransom by Terrorists and the Preventive Steps the International Community Can Take,
GOV.UK
(June
18,
2013),
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207542/Kidnapp
ing-for-ransom.pdf.
199.
S.C. Res. 2133, ¶ 3 (Jan. 27, 2014).
200.
S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 19 (Feb. 12, 2015).
201.
Id.
202.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 337.
203.
Id.
204.
Id. at 337–38.
205.
Id. at 338; Yourish, supra note 190. France has actually made it illegal to
provide financial, or other support, to terrorist organizations and it is unclear if French citizens
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The U.S. Approach to Paying Ransoms to Terrorists

The United States takes the approach of banning ransom payments to
terrorists and has tried to dissuade individual citizens from making such
payments.206 Families of U.S. hostages have accused the U.S. government of
threatening them with legal prosecution if the families attempted to pay
terrorists’ ransom demands to secure the return of their family members. 207
In response to such accusations, the U.S. government has stated that it does
not engage in threatening the families of hostages being held by terrorist
groups, but claims it has a policy of informing such families of the laws in
place that prevent the government or private U.S. citizens from making
ransom payments to terrorist groups.208 This dissuasion has led to some
controversy between the U.S. government and U.S. citizens who want the
government to support the release of their family members being held
hostage.209
The Patriot Act is the legal instrument through which paying
ransoms to terrorist organizations may be deemed illegal in the United
States.210 Section 2339B of the Patriot Act makes it unlawful for any person
to knowingly provide material support to terrorist organizations.211 This
section imposes a prison sentence of between fifteen years to life for
would be prosecuted for paying terrorists’ ransom demands in order to secure the release of
their hostage family members. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 421-2-2 (Fr.).
206.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 338–39; Brian Ross et al., ‘So Little
Compassion’: James Foley’s Parents Say Officials Threatened Family Over Ransom, ABC
NEWS (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://www.abcnews.go.com/International/governmentthreatened-foley-family-ransom-payments-mother-slain/story?id=25453963.
207.
Michael Isikoff, Sotloff’s Parents Told They Could Be Prosecuted for
Paying Ransom to IS, YAHOO NEWS (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.yahoo.com/news/sotloff-sparents-were-told-they-could-be-prosecuted-for-paying-ransom-to-is-234329991.html?ref=gs;
Paula Mejia, U.S. Threatened James Foley’s Family Over ISIS Ransom Demand, His Mother
Says, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:16 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/us-threatened-jamesfoleys-family-over-isis-ransom-demand-270151. The families of two U.S. citizens, James
Foley and Steven Sotloff, held hostage by ISIL, both reported being threatened with criminal
prosecution by the U.S. government if they attempted to pay ISIL’s ransom demands in
exchange for their family members. Isikoff, supra; Mejia, supra.
208.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 339–40; Mejia, supra note 207.
209.
Family Releases Statement on Death of Warren Weinstein in U.S.
Operation, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/04/23/family-releases-statement-on-death-of-warren-weinstein-in-u-soperation/?utm_term=.7a897b402cf9. Warren Weinstein was a U.S. citizen taken hostage by
al-Qaeda. Id. Weinstein was killed by a drone strike conducted by the United States, while
Weinstein was being held by the terrorist group. Id. Weinstein’s wife would later express her
desire for a more consistent approach by the U.S. government in aiding hostages and
supporting their families. Id.
210.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).
211.
Id. § 2339B(a)(1).
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violations, depending on whether any loss of life results from the
violation.212 To violate section 2339B of the Act, the person providing
material support must do so knowing that he or she is providing support to a
terrorist organization.213 Further, the violator must provide material support,
which can be monetary support, training, advice, etc.214 While there is
nothing illegal under this section with the U.S. government or a private
citizen having a conversation, or even negotiating with a terrorist
organization, providing support—such as through a ransom payment—would
violate this section of the Patriot Act.215 However, section 2339C of the
Patriot Act prohibits financing terrorism, attempting to finance terrorism, or
conspiring to finance terrorism.216 Thus, under section 2339C, the U.S.
government or the family of a hostage may violate the Patriot Act by
negotiating with terrorists under the Attempts and Conspiracy provisions of
section 2339C.217 This section, however, does include a heightened intent
requirement, mandating that a violator of the section must intend that his or
her support be used for terrorist activities.218 If negotiations are permitted by
section 2339C, the payment of ransoms to terrorist organizations would be a
violation of both sections 2339B and 2339C.219
D.

Insurance Policies Covering Ransom Payments to Terrorists

To offset the high prices of negotiation and ransom payments, some
insurance companies offer kidnapping and ransom (“K&R”) insurance.220
These policies can cover a number of aspects in ransom negotiations,
including fees necessary for consultations, any money lost while actually
recovering the hostage, and the ransom payment itself.221 While it is unclear
how various countries will treat K&R insurance policies that seemingly flout
212.
Id.
213.
Id. However, in order for a violation to occur, it is not necessary that the
person providing support knowingly further the terrorist activities of the terrorist organization.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16 (2010); United States v. Al Kassar, 660
F.3d 108, 12930 (2d Cir. 2011). All that is necessary to violate the provision is that the
person providing the support knew that their support was being given to a terrorist
organization. Holder, 561 U.S. at 16–17.
214.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), (g)(4).
215.
Id. § 2339B(a)(1); Kazmir, supra note 184, at 346.
216.
18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(2).
217.
Id.; Kazmir, supra note 184, at 347.
218.
18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1).
219.
Id. § 2339B–C.
220.
Meadow Clendenin, “No Concessions” with No Teeth: How Kidnap and
Ransom Insurers and Insureds Are Undermining U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, 56 EMORY
L.J. 741, 750 (2006).
221.
Id. at 751–52.
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laws by illegally providing financial support to terrorists, such as the Patriot
Act, the U.K. has designed legislation intended to criminalize such
policies.222
E.

Solutions to the Ransom Problem: The Terrorism Context

The United States’ rationale for banning ransom payments to
terrorists is that doing so would place U.S. citizens at an even higher risk of
being targeted as hostages by terrorist organizations.223 The idea behind the
argument in favor of an outright ban on paying ransoms to terrorists is that
making such payments would only incentivize and legitimize the practice of
hostage-taking and indirectly fund the terrorists’ operations.224 The
downside to this argument is that placing a blanket ban on ransom payments
reduces a ransom negotiator’s flexibility to employ that option, which tends
to result, as we often see, in a state actor or international entity paying the
ransom anyway in direct violation of its own policy. 225 Closing the door
entirely on negotiations cuts off any possibility of engaging in conversations
that may prove beneficial from a cost-benefit perspective for the ransom
negotiator.226
An approach that attempts to remedy this issue is referred to as a
process-structural approach.227 This approach is designed to “take the
specific individual into consideration, while bolstering his or her bargaining
power and reducing terrorists’ incentives to kidnap.”228 First, this approach
to dealing with terrorists’ ransom demands is to be set out by statute to
ensure the public understands their government’s approach to dealing with
the issue.229 Next, any decision to accept or decline a ransom demand must
be met with the approval of the Executive Branch and a majority of the
Legislative Branch.230 Deliberations over whether or not to accept the
demand are to be conducted in private and the government will simply
222.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 357; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B–C; Sarah
Veysey, U.K. Terrorism Bill Proposes Ban on Insurance Coverage of Ransom Payments, BUS.
INS.
(Dec.
7,
2014,
12:00
AM),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20141207/NEWS07/141209865?tags.
223.
Press Briefing by the Press Secretary, 11/18/2014, WHITE HOUSE (Nov.
18, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/18/press-briefingpress-secretary-11182014.
224.
Weill, supra note 8, at 192, 196.
225.
See id. at 202–05.
226.
Id. at 205.
227.
See id. at 217.
228.
Id.
229.
Weill, supra note 8, at 211, 217.
230.
Id. at 218. The theory is designed to aid democratic governments in
addressing the issue of ransom demands by terrorists. Id.
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answer whether they accept or decline the ransom demand. 231 The families
of the hostages are to be given a hearing on the matter, during which the
families can make their own case for paying or not paying the ransom.232
The goal of this approach is to maximize a government’s bargaining power
by conducting closed-door discussions over whether the ransom deal would
be to the country’s advantage, while at the same time giving the entire
ransom negotiation process uniformity, structure, and fairness to the hostages
and their families.233 Such a policy may give ransom negotiators enough
flexibility to maximize the return for their party’s interests, minimize their
costs, and save lives.234
V.

NEGOTIATING WITH RANSOMWARE HACKERS

Although never having to engage with a ransomware hacker is the
best-case scenario, many healthcare organizations find themselves having to
do so following a successful attack.235 Ransom negotiators working on
behalf of healthcare organizations in the face of a ransomware attack must
deal with the same principles as ransom negotiators in other contexts:
Maximizing benefits while minimizing costs, accounting for victim-based
factors, and remaining in compliance with existing legal boundaries.236
A.
The Existing Legal Framework for Ransomware Negotiations: The
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)
HIPAA has become synonymous with private patient healthcare
information.237 HIPAA is intertwined with the threat posed by ransomware
because the virus may steal electronic private patient information from
healthcare providers.238 A ransomware attack may rise to the level of a
breach under HIPAA if the hacker actually obtains the protected patient

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 220.
Id. at 225.
See Weill, supra note 8, at 220, 225, 230.
See id. at 217.
See CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2, 7.
Id. at 5, 7; Weill, supra note 8, at 217, 225.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXAMINING OVERSIGHT OF
THE PRIVACY & SECURITY OF HEALTH DATA COLLECTED BY ENTITIES NOT REGULATED BY
HIPAA 1, 3 (2016).
238.
See CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2; Zimmerman, supra note 5,
at 16.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss3/1

86

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2017]

KEEPING INTERNET PIRATES AT BAY

375

information, which would be an unpermitted disclosure “which compromises
the security or privacy of the protected [personal] health information.”239
1.

Who Is Covered by HIPAA?

As a starting point, HIPAA only governs “covered entities and
business associates.”240
Covered entities include doctors, clinics,
psychologists, dentists, chiropractors, nursing homes, and pharmacies that
transmit electronic information.241 Covered entities also include health
insurance companies, HMOs, employment-based health plans, Medicare,
Medicaid, other government health insurance programs, and healthcare
clearinghouses.242 These covered entities must abide by HIPAA’s numerous
provisions and they may also be held liable under certain HIPAA
provisions.243
2.

The HIPAA Privacy Rule

The HIPAA Privacy Rule creates national standards designed to
protect private health information.244 The Privacy Rule applies to a certain
type of information, known as protected health information.245 Protected
health information, also referred to as individually identifiable health
information, is information relating to: “[T]he individual’s past, present, or
future physical or mental health or condition; the provision of healthcare to
the individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of
healthcare to the individual,” which either identifies the specific person or
which can reasonably identify that person.246
Individually identifiable health information cannot be used by
covered entities for any reason other than reasons allowed in the Privacy
Rule or if the individual, whose information is at issue authorizes, in writing,
the information to be used for specific purposes.247 The information cannot
239.
45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2015); see also CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12,
at 2; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16.
240.
Covered Entities and Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/covered-entities/index.html (last visited
May 2, 2017).
241.
Id.
242.
Id.
243.
Id.
244.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OCR PRIVACY BRIEF: SUMMARY OF
THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (2003).
245.
Id.
246.
Id. at 3–4; see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).
247.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN. SERVS., supra note 244, at 4.
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be disclosed by covered entities unless it is disclosed to the actual
individuals, upon request, or to certain government agencies if there is an
ongoing investigation.248 Covered entities also may use or disclose this
information for the organization to treat, pay, and conduct other healthcare
activities.249
Treatment includes “the provision, coordination, or
management of healthcare and related services for an individual by one or
more healthcare providers, including consultation between providers
regarding a patient and referral of a patient by one provider to another.”250
Payment includes
activities of a health plan to obtain premiums, determine or fulfill
responsibilities for coverage and provision of benefits, and furnish
or obtain reimbursement for healthcare delivered to an
individual and activities of a healthcare provider to obtain payment
or be reimbursed for the provision of healthcare to an
251
individual.

Healthcare operations include several actions, such as:
(a) quality assessment and improvement activities,
including case management and care coordination; (b) competency
assurance activities, including provider or health plan performance
evaluation, credentialing, and accreditation; (c) conducting or
arranging for medical reviews, audits, or legal services, including
fraud and abuse detection and compliance programs; (d) specified
insurance functions, such as underwriting, risk rating, and
reinsuring risk; (e) business planning, development, management,
and administration; and (f) business management and general
administrative activities of the entity, including but not limited to:
[D]e-identifying protected health information, creating a limited
data set, and certain fundraising for the benefit of the covered
252
entity.

Further, the Privacy Rule requires covered entities to implement
safeguards designed to ensure individually identifiable health information
248.
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(2) (2005); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN. SERVS.,
supra note 244, at 4.
249.
45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1)(i)–(ii) (2005); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN.
SERVS., supra note 244, at 4–5.
250.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN. SERVS., supra note 244, at 5; see also 45
C.F.R. § 164.501 (2005).
251.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN. SERVS., supra note 244, at 5; see also 45
C.F.R. § 164.501.
252.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN. SERVS., supra note 244, at 5; see also 45
C.F.R. § 164.501.
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remains private and is not made public intentionally or unintentionally.253
Individuals also can request that covered entities restrict access to their
individually identifiable health information strictly for the purposes of
treatment, payment, and other healthcare activities.254
If a covered entity fails to abide by HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, it may be
subject to civil monetary penalties.255 Penalties can range from $100 to over
$50,000, with an annual cap on the amount an organization may be penalized
of $1,500,000.256 The penalty imposed depends on the circumstances of the
privacy breach, including any possible intent or negligence on the part of the
covered entity in regard to the privacy breach.257 If the organization was not
willfully negligent in regard to the privacy breach and the organization
remedied the breach within thirty days of the organization discovering the
breach or within thirty days of the day the organization should have known
of the breach, then a civil penalty will not be imposed.258 Criminal penalties
also may be imposed for intentional breaches of the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
which ranges depending upon the circumstances of the breach, with more
egregious violations, such as violations committed with commercial motives,
often resulting in penalties.259
3.

The HIPAA Security Rule

The HIPAA Security Rule mandates that entities covered by the Act
implement measures that can work to lower an entity’s risk of any
cyberattack.260 The Security Rule applies to a specific type of protected
health information, referred to as “electronic protected health
information.”261 Electronic protected health information is protected health
information transmitted by the organization using some electronic means.262
The Security Rule requires organizations to conduct regular risk
analyses to detect potential vulnerabilities to the electronic protected health
253.
45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c)(1) (2005); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 244, at 1, 3.
254.
45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a)(1) (2005); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 244, at 4.
255.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 244, at 17.
256.
Id. at 17–18.
257.
See id.
258.
Id. at 17.
259.
Id. at 18.
260.
Summary
of
the
HIPAA
Security
Rule,
HHS.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/ (last visited May 2,
2017).
261.
Id.
262.
Id.
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information being stored by the organization.263 The organization then must
work to minimize these vulnerabilities.264 Organizations must have protocol
in place to detect and prevent malicious software from infecting their
computer systems.265 Users of healthcare organization computer systems
must be trained on how to protect their systems against malicious software,
as well as reporting any suspicions that malicious software has infected one
of the organization’s systems.266 The Security Rule also requires healthcare
organizations to use access controls, allowing only necessary users to have
access to electronic protected health information.267 The Security Rule
requires organizations to conduct a risk analysis of all threats to any
electronic protected health information generated by the organization or its
affiliates to determine if any electronic protected health information is in
jeopardy of theft, exposure, or loss.268 Covered entities must also ensure that
their entire workforce is in compliance with the Security Rule.269
Although the Security Rule is somewhat similar to the Privacy Rule,
in its application to electronic protected health information, the Security Rule
does require two additional broad measures regarding health information.270
First, organizations must maintain the integrity of electronic private health
information under the Security Rule.271 Integrity is defined by the Security
Rule as ensuring that the electronic protected health information is not
destroyed or altered without authorization.272 The Security Rule also
requires organizations to maintain electronic protected health information’s
availability.273 Availability is defined by the Security Rule as maintaining
the accessibility and usability of electronic protected health information.274
The Security Rule further requires covered entities to conduct a risk
analysis, which must include several components.275 The analysis must
identify possible threats to electronic protected health information and assess
263.
264.
supra note 260.
265.
supra note 260.
266.
267.
268.
260.
269.
270.
271.
note 260.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2), (e); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
See Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
Id.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
Id.
45 C.F.R. § 164.304 (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
Id.
Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.304.
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
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the impact of such threats, as well as the likelihood that they will occur.276
The organization must develop measures to deal with the risks identified. 277
The measures taken to deal with security threats must be recorded. 278
Finally, the organization must maintain the security measures
implemented.279
In order to ensure that these provisions are applied and upheld,
healthcare organizations are required to name a security official whose role is
to ensure that their organization is following through on these procedures.280
Covered organizations are required to implement policies authorizing only
certain staff members to have access to electronic protected health
information.281 Organizations must train and supervise all personnel
handling electronic protected health information.282 If a member of an
organization’s staff violates the organization’s internal safeguards, the
organization must issue appropriate sanctions.283 Organizations must
periodically review their procedures and ensure their staff is in
compliance.284
The Security Rule also provides for a number of provisions designed
to ensure the physical safety of electronic protected health information.285
Organizations must ensure their physical facilities, where they keep the
equipment storing their electronic protected health information, are secure.286
Covered entities must also ensure that only authorized personnel are able to

276.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(2)(iv) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security
Rule, supra note 260.
277.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security
Rule, supra note 260.
278.
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1), 164.316(b)(1) (2015); Summary of
the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
279.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(e); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
260.
280.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(2) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260.
281.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(4)(i); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra
note 260.
282.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(5)(i); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra
note 260.
283.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260.
284.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(8); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra
note 260.
285.
45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)–(d) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260.
286.
45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
260.
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access devices storing electronic protected health information.287 Further, the
entity must have policies in place designed to protect its electronic protected
health information during its “transfer, removal, disposal, and re-use.”288
The HIPAA Security Rule imposes a number of technical safety
measures, including access controls, which allow only certain users to access
systems containing electronic protected health information and only for
certain purposes.289 Organizations also must install hardware, software, or
other methods designed to record how the information is being used and
accessed by the organization.290 Steps must be taken to ensure that the
information is not destroyed or modified without authorization, as well as
steps taken to ensure the information is monitored to ensure it is not
destroyed or modified.291 Finally, the Security Rule requires organizations to
take steps to ensure that electronic protected health information is secured
and protected when being transmitted electronically.292
4.

The HIPAA Breach Notification Rule

As an additional incentive to avoid putting electronic protected
health information at risk, and to put those negatively affected on alert,
HIPAA provides for a number of rules requiring healthcare organizations to
notify different parties in the case of a breach.293 These provisions make up
HIPAA’s Breach Notification Rule.294 The Breach Notification Rule applies
to all protected health information, not only electronic protected health
information.295 Under title 45, section 164.402 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, a breach is defined as: “[T]he acquisition, access, use, or
disclosure of protected health information in a manner not permitted, . . .
which compromises the security or privacy of the protected health
information.”296 Any impermissible use of protected health information is
note 260.

287.

45 C.F.R. § 164.310(b)–(c); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra

288.
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260; see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.310(d)(i)–(iv).
289.
45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)–(e) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260.
290.
45 C.F.R. § 164.312(b); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
260.
291.
45 C.F.R. § 164.312(c); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
260.
292.
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
293.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–.414 (2015).
294.
Id.; Breach Notification Rule, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/breach-notification/ (last visited May 2, 2017).
295.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.400.
296.
45 C.F.R. § 164.402.
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presumptively a breach requiring notification, unless the covered entity is
able to demonstrate that there is a low likelihood the protected health
information was actually compromised based on several factors.297 Not
included as a breach under the rule are:
(i) [a]ny unintentional acquisition, access, or use of
protected health information by a workforce member or person
acting under the authority of a covered entity or a business
associate, if such acquisition, access, or use was made in good
faith and within the scope of authority and does not result in
further use or disclosure in a manner not permitted [by the rule];
(ii) Any inadvertent disclosure by a person who is authorized to
access protected health information at a covered entity or business
associate to another person authorized to access protected health
information at the same covered entity or business associate, or
organized healthcare arrangement in which the covered entity
participates, and the information received as a result of such
disclosure is not further used or disclosed in a manner not
permitted [by the rule]; [and] (iii) A disclosure of protected health
information where a covered entity or business associate has a
good faith belief that an unauthorized person to whom the
disclosure was made would not reasonably have been able to retain
298
such information.

If a covered entity commits a breach that involves unsecured
protected health information, the entity is required to make disclosures to the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, any individuals who may
be affected by the breach, and, depending on the circumstances, to the public
through the media.299 Unsecured protected health information is defined as
“protected health information that is not rendered unusable, unreadable, or
indecipherable to unauthorized persons through the use of a technology or
methodology [as] specified” by the Department of Health and Human

297.
164.402(2).

Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294; see also 45 C.F.R. §

(1) The nature and extent of the protected health information involved,
including the types of identifiers and the likelihood of re-identification; (2) [t]he
unauthorized person who used the protected health information or to whom the
disclosure was made; (3) [w]hether the protected health information was actually
acquired or viewed; and (4) [t]he extent to which the risk to the protected health
information has been mitigated.

45 C.F.R. § 164.402(2)(i)–(iv).
298.
45 C.F.R. § 164.402(1)(i)–(iii).
299.
Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.406(a)
(2015).
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Services.300 Covered entities must only disclose to the media if over 5002
residents of a certain jurisdiction are affected by an entity’s breach.301
B.
Best Practices for Healthcare Organizations to Avoid Ransomware
Attacks
Of course, never ending up in a situation where one has to negotiate
with a ransomware hacker is the most effective means of protecting a
healthcare organization’s information and resources.302
The U.S.
government has encouraged that systems administrators and computer users
take certain preventive steps to lower the risk of a successful ransomware
attack.303
1.

Backup—and Then Backup Your Backup

Backing up all electronic data to a secured backup location can
prevent a terrible situation from becoming a nightmare.304 A healthcare
organization with a secured, isolated backup at an isolated location can
restore its computer system in approximately four hours.305 These backups
should be tested and assessed annually to ensure they can deal specifically
with a ransomware threat.306 Once a computer is infected with ransomware,
the virus can move between computers using the same network, which is
why it is imperative to store backup data outside of the original network to
ensure it also would not be exposed to the virus.307 External backups can be
stored in a cloud-based system or stored in physical form.308

5.

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

45 C.F.R. § 164.402(2)(iv).
45 C.F.R. § 164.406(a).
See CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3, 5.
Id. at 3–4.
See 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note

305.
Id.
306.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 4.
307.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2; CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 4.
308.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 4. Although, there are variants of
the ransomware virus that are capable of infecting backups located on cloud-based storage
systems if those systems regularly back up the original system automatically. Id. at 6. This
method of automatic back up from a cloud-based system is referred to as persistent
synchronization. Id. at 4. Healthcare organizations with a persistent synchronization back up
network may want to consider utilizing a separate back up network as well. See id.
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Controlling Access to Operating Systems

Perhaps not every healthcare organization staff member requires
access to the organization’s shared network to perform their tasks and,
therefore, access to the network can be limited based on priority. 309
Administrative access to shared networks should only be granted if necessary
and limiting the use of access can reduce the window of opportunity that a
ransomware hacker has to infiltrate the network.310 Access controls can also
be used to limit the files a user is able to access, thus controlling the potential
danger zones a user can access.311
3.

Monitoring Inbound and Outbound Emails

Although newer versions of the ransomware virus no longer require
an employee to open a dangerous email, the older virus is still being used and
other viruses are also dispatched in this manner.312 Known as phishing
emails, these treacherous emails only pose a threat if they are opened by an
employee.313 While training and awareness programs can be effective at
reducing the risk of an employee opening these false emails, some hackers
are very skilled at making the emails appear authentic and important.314
Along with a prevention training program, healthcare organizations should
take efforts to ensure these emails never reach their employees in the first
place.315 Spam filters can be enabled to detect these malicious emails, and
authentication technologies are available to detect emails being sent from
unknown locations.316 System administrators should also monitor inbound
and outbound emails for suspicious activity.317

5.

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id.; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note

314.
See CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3. Hackers have used a virus
variant that sends an authentic-appearing email to an employee, listing that employee’s
employer as the sender. 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note
5. The unsuspecting employee is more likely to open an urgent, yet spam, email from their
boss than they are to open an email from an anonymous or unfamiliar sender. Id.
315.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3.
316.
Id. Among these different verification programs are “Sender Policy
Framework (“SPF”), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance
(“DMARC”), and DomainKeys Identified Mail (“DKIM”).” Id.
317.
Id.
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Human Error Is the Greatest Risk

Although not all versions of the ransomware virus depend on human
action, many versions infect computers by deceiving computer users into
clicking links or opening emails.318 One of the simplest preventive steps a
healthcare organization can take to defend itself from ransomware attacks is
to inform its personnel of the risk posed by ransomware, common methods
by which the virus is used to infect computers; and actions to avoid while
using a healthcare server, such as clicking on advertisements, browsing
unnecessary websites, or opening emails that seem in any way suspicious.319
A training and awareness program specific to the threat of ransomware,
along with periodic reminders, can go a long way toward preventing an
attack.320
5.

Cyber-Defensive Measures

As mentioned previously, some variants of ransomware are able to
breach an organization’s shared network due to vulnerabilities or unpatched
areas in the system’s network.321 The risk of this type of ransomware variant
being successful can be mitigated by employing a patch management system
to detect and prevent holes in the system’s network.322 Other more common
methods of defending computer systems include setting up firewalls that
block unknown IP addresses and ensuring anti-virus and anti-malware
settings are set to scan for threats.323
6.

How HIPAA Helps

If complied with, HIPAA’s numerous provisions can aid a healthcare
organization in protecting itself from ransomware and all other
cyberattacks.324 HIPAA’s Security Rule requires organizations covered by
the law to implement a risk assessment plan and to actively minimize the
cybersecurity risks identified in the plan.325 The Security Rule also requires
covered organizations to train personnel with access to electronic protected
health information and to designate a security official in charge of managing
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
supra note 260.

DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2; CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3.
Id.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3.
Id.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 244, at 4.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
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access to electronic protected health information.326 Further, the Security
Rule requires covered organizations to impose access controls regarding
which employees may access this information.327
HIPAA’s Enforcement Rule gives the law teeth by imposing
disclosure requirements on organizations which experience certain types of
breaches pertaining to their stored protected health information.328 The
Enforcement Rule requires healthcare organizations to disclose breaches of
certain magnitudes to the individuals affected, the press, or the
government.329 These penalties encourage healthcare organizations to abide
by HIPAA’s Privacy and Security Rule provisions, which can minimize the
risk of a ransomware attack in the first place.330 These disclosure
requirements will also help to inform individuals affected by a data breach to
enable them to take steps to protect themselves.331
7.

Dealing with a Ransomware Attack

If a computer or operating system is infected with the ransomware
virus, the U.S. Government further suggests the organization take certain
steps to deal with the attack.332 If the virus is detected early enough that it
has only infected one or a small number of computers, those computers
should be disconnected from the organization’s network to prevent the virus
from spreading further.333 If there are computers that have been infected, but
not entirely disabled, these computers should also be disconnected from the
network and shut down.334 If the organization has a backup system, this
should be monitored to ensure it has not been infected by the virus, and if the
backup is connected to the same network as the original system, the backup
should be disconnected from the network.335 The U.S. Government also
recommends that organizations contact the FBI or the Secret Service if they
fall victim to a ransomware attack.336 The organization should then secure as
326.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(e), .308(a)(2) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA
Security Rule, supra note 260.
327.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
260.
328.
45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2015); Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294.
329.
45 C.F.R. § 164.402; Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294.
330.
See Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294.
331.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.402; Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294.
332.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 4–5.
333.
Id.; see also DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 10.
334.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 4; see also DUNBRACK, supra note
19, at 10.
335.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5; see also DUNBRACK, supra note
19, at 11; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
336.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5.
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much of its uninfected system as possible and change any passwords
associated with the network, if possible.337 Finally, the U.S. Government
does not recommend paying ransoms to ransomware hackers.338
8.

The Role of Law Enforcement

The U.S. Government recommends that organizations infected with
ransomware make contact with law enforcement.339 Law enforcement, such
as the Secret Service or the FBI, may be able to tap into resources able to
help the organization, to which the organization—acting alone—would not
have access.340 One such resource would be the international law
enforcement community, which can aid in tracking down international
hackers or foreign variants of the virus.341 While notifying law enforcement
may seem futile or embarrassing in ransomware cases, law enforcement
officials have been successful in several ransomware cases.342
Despite these best practices, all organizations face a strong
possibility of being attacked successfully by a ransomware hacker.343
Healthcare organizations, along with each and every one of their users, must
be vigilant at all times to prevent these attacks, whereas, a ransomware
hacker only has to get lucky once.344 This state of constant defense does not
bode well for healthcare organizations with the result being that sooner or
later many organizations will find themselves negotiating with ransomware
hackers.345
C.
Negotiation Solutions to the Ransom Problem: The Ransomware
Context
If ransomware hackers are able to infect a healthcare organization’s
system with the virus, the organization is faced with two options: (1) pay the

5.

337.
338.

Id.
Id.; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note

339.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5.
340.
Id.
341.
Id.
342.
Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16. For example, in mid-2014 the U.S.
Department of Justice was able to takedown an entire malware system being used to launch
ransomware attacks. Id. This system was known as Gameover ZeuS. Id.
343.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
344.
Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
345.
See 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note
5.
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ransom or (2) do not pay the ransom.346 Paying the ransom is the only
realistic hope of having the virus removed from the system. 347 However,
paying the ransom with the hope that the virus will be lifted rests on a
number of assumptions.348 First, if the virus depends on a decryption key to
unlock the infected computer, the organization is assuming that if its pays,
the hacker will give it the decryption key.349 Second, the organization
assumes that if it is given the decryption key, it will actually work and
remove the virus.350 Third, the organization assumes that if the decryption
key is provided and effectively removes the virus, that the virus will be
removed from all of its systems and not just some of its systems. 351 Fourth,
the organization assumes that the ransomware hacker will not simply hack it
again after seeing their efforts rewarded.352 On the other hand, refusing to
pay the ransom would result in practically zero chance of lifting the virus,
which, when dealing with healthcare organizations, can result in lost time,
resources, and patient information, all of which can be especially critical in
the healthcare context.353 However, this may be an acceptable loss if the
proper protocols have been adhered to.354
As discussed in the context of piracy above, the various interests of
the opposing parties in the ransomware context must also be considered and
each outcome predicted when deciding whether or not to pay ransom
demands.355 The successfully hacked healthcare organization may either pay
the ransom or refuse to pay the ransom.356 The successful hacker may either
release the hostage computer system, along with all of its data, or refuse to
release the system, leaving it infected and unusable.357 The only win-win
situation here occurs where the healthcare organization pays the ransom and
the ransomware hacker releases the computer system.358 The healthcare
organization will regain its ability to function and provide healthcare services
346.
Id.
347.
Id.
348.
Id.
349.
Id.
350.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
351.
Id.
352.
Id.
353.
Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16.
354.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 9–11; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
355.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; see also supra Section III.E.
356.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
357.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
358.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
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and the ransomware hacker will have realized his or her financial goal.359 A
second resolution arises where the healthcare organization decides to pay the
ransom demand, but the ransomware hacker refuses to release the computer
system from the virus, despite the payment.360 This resolution plays out
fairly often, unfortunately, since ransomware hackers are not the most honest
of criminals, making payment of ransom demands a less-than-appealing
option.361 This is a lose-win situation for the hospital and the hacker,
respectively.362 The next outcome, in which the healthcare organization
decides not to pay the ransom demand and the ransomware hacker chooses to
release the hostage computer system, is a win-lose outcome favoring the
healthcare organization and will almost never occur because the ransomware
hacker has already succeeded in attacking the organization’s computer
system and, therefore is in a superior bargaining position in which he or she
unlikely would act contrary to his or her own interest.363 The final
outcome—in which the healthcare organization chooses not to pay the
demanded ransom, and the hacker chooses not to release the hostage
computer system—is a lose-lose scenario in which the organization will not
recover its lost system functioning, and the hacker will not realize his or her
financial goal.364
359.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
360.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
361.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
This was the case where a ransomware hacker successfully infected a Kansas-based hospital
with the ransomware virus. Id. The hospital chose to pay the ransom, likely hoping that the
first outcome would occur where the hospital regains functioning of its computer systems and
the hacker is satisfied with their reward. 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware
Protection, supra note 5; see also Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330. However, instead of
honoring their agreement, upon receiving the ransom sum, the hacker released only part of the
hospital’s operating system. 10-Minute Guide to Ransomware Protection, supra note 5. The
hacker then demanded further ransom payments to release the rest of the system—a
significant portion of the system—from the ransomware virus. Id. Thus, while hoping to
achieve the first outcome of the possible resolutions to a ransom negotiation, this negotiation
ended up reaching the second outcome, in which the hospital pays the ransom and the
ransomware hacker refuses to release the computer system from the virus. See Bento, supra
note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Ransomware Protection, supra note 5. This is a losewin situation for the hospital and the hacker, respectively. See Bento, supra note 1, at 326,
330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
362.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
363.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
364.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 321, 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
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Similar to the context of piracy, this outcome-based framework for
analyzing ransomware negotiations is insufficient on its own for several
reasons.365 As in the piracy context, each option cannot be given equal
weight because the outcome in which the healthcare organization does not
pay the ransom, and the ransomware hacker releases the computer system
will almost certainly not occur—the outcome in which the healthcare
organization pays the ransom and the hacker does not release the parts of, or
the entire computer system, is a possibility and has occurred in the past—and
the situation where the healthcare organization pays the ransom, and the
hacker releases the computer system, is actually not a win at all for the
healthcare organization; in fact, it is a serious loss.366 The healthcare
organization will have lost resources for the amount used to pay the hacker
for the downtime suffered during the negotiation and—worst of all—for any
stolen protected patient information.367
However, if the healthcare
organization has adhered to the best practices for preventing a ransomware
attack prior to being attacked, it will have backed up all of its electronic
information onto a separate server, safe from the ransomware attack.368 This
action would mitigate the potential damage if the organization chooses not to
pay the ransom and does not recover the system controlled by the hacker.369
A system backup would further allow the organization to recommence
operation much faster than would be possible if the organization engages in
negotiations with the hacker.370 This scenario makes the lose-lose outcome
more appealing, especially considering that at any point after a ransomware
hacker takes control of a computer system, a hacker could steal protected
patient data.371 Thus, under any of the four outcomes, protected patient data
could be stolen, resulting in a significant loss for the healthcare organization
and its patients.372
365.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5; supra Section III.E.
366.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5; supra Section III.E.
367.
Beek, supra note 14.
368.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 11; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; 10Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
369.
See DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 11; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16;
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
370.
See DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 11; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16;
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5. In fact, if the
organization engages with and pays a ransomware hacker, the organization may never regain
control over its stolen computer system. 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware
Protection, supra note 5.
371.
See Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; Hagland, supra note 14.
372.
See Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; Hagland, supra note 14.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

101

Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1

390

1.

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

Arguments in Favor of Paying Ransoms to Ransomware Hackers

The arguments in favor of paying ransoms to pirates and terrorists
are similar to the arguments in favor of paying ransoms to ransomware
hackers, including: The possibility of recovering the hostage data and the
notion that ransom negotiators should not limit their options by removing the
possibility of paying ransoms.373 However, the digital nature of the hacker
ransom demand transaction can allow hackers to back out on their side of the
agreement with greater ease than a pirate, or terrorist, who takes people
hostage.374 Where both sides of a ransom negotiation are entirely digital, the
possibility of recovering the hostage data decreases substantially.375
2.

Arguments Opposed to Paying Ransoms to Ransomware Hackers

Once again, the arguments in the contexts of piracy and terrorism are
similar to the arguments opposed to paying ransoms to ransomware hackers,
including: The idea that ransom payments will only further the ransomware
hacking enterprise; the argument that paying a ransomware ransom may
expose the organization as vulnerable and willing to pay out, which
encourages future ransomware attacks; and the argument that ransomware
hackers may simply accept the ransom payment and sell off the ransomed
data on the black market.376 These arguments are compelling in greater part
because they have been proven accurate based on ransomware attacks on
healthcare organizations in the past.377 However, imposing an outright ban
on healthcare organizations paying ransom payments to ransomware hackers
would unnecessarily deprive negotiators of a valuable option in the
negotiation.378 Further, there may be nothing to be gained by depriving
healthcare organizations of the right to pay ransom to ransomware hackers
because these hackers will have an incentive to use the virus and demand
ransom, even if they are fully aware that healthcare organizations are banned
from paying them.379 The hackers still have an incentive to hack the
373.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126,
at 317–19, 327; Weill, supra note 8, at 200, 204–05.
374.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
375.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 289; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
376.
Bento, supra note 1, at 288–89; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 309–
11; Weill, supra note 8, at 192, 194, 197; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware
Protection, supra note 5.
377.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
378.
See Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62; Reynolds, supra note 132, at 612;
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5.
379.
Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; Hagland, supra note 14.
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organizations to steal their valuable, protected patient data and they still may
demand ransom payments, hoping that the organizations will pay regardless
of the ban, perhaps in order to make the problem go away quietly.380
D.

Alternative Solutions to the Ransomware Problem

Although an outright ban on ransom payments to ransomware
hackers may be too restrictive of an option for negotiators, other alternative
solutions can be employed to help combat the issue using the legal
landscape.381
1.

A Heightened Terrorist-esque Interest for Ransomware Negotiations

As mentioned above, the problem of terrorism has been accorded a
heightened interest, which is used by many countries to justify an all-out ban
on ransom payments to terrorists, as well as enabling several other practices
considered too extreme to use in response to other crimes.382 The idea
behind this heightened interest is that terrorism is a uniquely difficult
problem that cannot be solved using conventional methods alone.383
Whether the threat posed by ransomware necessarily rises to the level where
it would warrant an all-out ban on ransom payments need not be answered
because of the unique electronic nature of the entire ransomware transaction,
and the incentive of ransomware hackers to use the virus in order to steal
protected patient data resulting in no beneficial purpose to be gained by an
all-out ban on ransom payments.384
2.

Imposing a Tax on Ransomware Payments to Be Used for AntiHacking Efforts

An alternative method of reducing the incentives of ransom
negotiators to pay the ransom—and of hostage takers to take hostages to
begin with—is to impose a tax on ransom payments made, with the proceeds
being used to combat the ransomware problem.385 This solution has been
discussed in the context of piracy ransom negotiations.386 In the ransomware
380.
381.

Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; Hagland, supra note 14.
See Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62; Reynolds, supra note 132, at 612;
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5.
382.
Weill, supra note 8, at 180–81.
383.
Id. at 181.
384.
See Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62; Reynolds, supra note 132, at 612–13;
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5.
385.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 332.
386.
Id.
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context, a federal tax could be imposed on all ransom payments made to
ransomware hackers and the proceeds could be used to fund federal efforts to
prevent cyberattacks.387 Such a tax reduces the incentive of healthcare
organizations to pay ransoms to ransomware hackers because doing so would
result in them having to pay an additional sum on top of the ransom
payment.388 The tax also reduces the incentive of ransomware hackers to
demand ransom from these organizations because doing so will indirectly
fund government efforts aimed at preventing cyberattacks in the first
place.389 The major shortfall of this alternative approach is that healthcare
organizations may become even less likely to report ransomware incidents to
avoid the imposed tax.390
3.

Prohibiting Insurance Coverage for Ransomware Attacks

Insurance companies have been offering coverage to companies and
individuals facing ransom situations, such as K&R policies in the terrorism
context.391 Noting the rising threat of cyber-hacking in today’s world, many
different forms of cyber insurance are now available.392 Cyber-insurance
seeks to cover insured entities for the cost of digital loss and repair following
Healthcare
a cyberattack on the insured’s computer network.393
organizations have an incentive to purchase cyber insurance as coverage can
aid an organization financially in recovering from a debilitating attack. 394
387.
See id. at 332–33.
388.
See id. Reducing the incentive of healthcare organizations to pay ransoms
to hackers, hoping to ensure that their lost network will be functioning, is an important goal
considering how often healthcare organizations pay the ransom demand and the ransomware
hackers refuse to restore the organization’s network or make additional ransom demands. See
id.; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5. Further, once a
healthcare organization pays a ransom demand, it may be seen by other hackers as vulnerable,
increasing the likelihood that they will be attacked again. 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
389.
Bento, supra note 1, at 332.
390.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 332; CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5;
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
391.
Clendenin, supra note 220, at 750.
392.
See Jean Bolot & Marc Lelarge, Cyber Insurance as an Incentive for
Internet Security, in MANAGING INFORMATION RISK AND THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 269,
273 (M. Eric Johnson ed., 2009); RUPERTO P. MAJUCA ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF
CYBERINSURANCE 2 (2006); Kathleen Richards, Is Cyberinsurance Worth the Risk?,
TECHTARGET,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Is-cyberinsurance-worth-the-risk
(last updated Aug. 2014).
393.
See Bolot & Lelarge, supra note 392, at 270–71; MAJUCA ET AL., supra
note 392, at 3; Richards, supra note 392.
394.
See Bolot & Lelarge, supra note 392, at 270–71; MAJUCA ET AL., supra
note 392, at 2–3; Richards, supra note 392.
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However, many organizations choose not to purchase cyber-insurance
because, among other reasons, the organizations do not want to disclose that
its system has been compromised following an attack, because doing so may
expose the organization as vulnerable to future attacks.395
Although some would argue that ransom-based insurance policies
promote security, since the occurrence of successful cyberattacks are nearly
inevitable, others argue that this type of coverage only lulls covered
organizations into a false sense of security and results in the organization
failing to implement other appropriate safeguards to prevent ransom
situations from arising.396
The major difference here between the
ransomware context and the contexts of terrorism and piracy is that
ransomware hackers may obtain something of value from healthcare
organizations merely by taking the organization’s system hostage: Protected
patient information.397 Unlike human hostage situations, where the criminals
are only successful if their ransom demands are met, ransomware hackers are
still successful even if their demands are not met.398 Cyber-insurance can
help a healthcare organization regain a functioning network in the face of an
attack, but the organization still has every incentive to take other steps to
protect its system because cyber-insurance typically does not help the
organization with respect to HIPAA claims and other liability due to lost
patient data.399
4.

Requiring Healthcare Organizations to Pass Annual CyberInspections and Employ Cyber-Guards

HIPAA already places several requirements on healthcare
organizations pertaining to its electronic protected health information,
including a requirement that the organization conduct regular risk analyses
on its electronic security measures.400 This requirement could be expanded
to require healthcare organizations to pass an annual cyber-inspection every

395.
See Richards, supra note 392.
396.
See Bolot & Lelarge, supra note 392, at 277; MAJUCA ET AL., supra note
392, at 2–3; Clendenin, supra note 220, at 750–51; Richards, supra note 392.
397.
See CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 8; Zimmerman, supra note 5,
at 16.
398.
See Weill, supra note 8, at 205–07, 217; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16;
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 8.
399.
Bolot & Lelarge, supra note 392, at 270–71; MAJUCA ET AL., supra note
392, at 2–3; Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294; Richards, supra note 392; Summary of
HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
400.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(1) (2015); see also Breach Notification Rule,
supra note 294; Summary of HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
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year by an authorized institution.401 Such a requirement would push
healthcare organizations to ensure its electronic protected health information
is protected to clear inspection.402
Further, an alternative solution raised by some in the piracy context
is to require ship-owners to employ guards on their vessels when they know
their crew is being sent into pirate-infested waters.403 This solution could be
applied to the ransomware context by requiring healthcare organizations to
employ electronic data protection experts to conduct regular performance
reviews of a healthcare organization’s security measures.404
5.

A Process-Structural Approach to Ransomware Ransom Payment
Decision-Making

An alternative solution proposed in the terrorism context, as opposed
to an outright ban on ransom payments to terrorists, is what is described as a
process-structural approach.405 The process-structural approach to ransom
payments requires a clear legal standard determining when, and how the
decision to pay a ransom demand will be reached.406 The approach requires
a distinct group of decision-makers to reach a consensus privately as to
whether or not they will agree to the ransom demand.407 Finally, the human
and personal factors involved are taken into account, with those who will be
affected by the decision being given the opportunity to be heard by the
decision-makers.408 The process-structural approach is ideal in the terrorism
or even the piracy context because it allows an existing decision-making
body, a democratic government, to reach a contemplated consensus while
promoting both transparency behind its approach, as well as a private means
of reaching a decision.409
Unfortunately, this approach would be
inapplicable to the context of ransomware because the approach requires
decision-makers to engage in a lengthy process of discussion in order to
401.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(1); Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294;
Summary of HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
402.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(c); Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294;
Summary of HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
403.
Bento, supra note 1, at 331–32.
404.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(2) (2015); Summary of HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260. HIPAA already requires covered organizations to designate an individual in
charge of ensuring the organization complies with HIPAA-required safeguards pertaining to
protected patient information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(2); Summary of HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260.
405.
Weill, supra note 8, at 217–18.
406.
Id. at 218.
407.
Id. at 217.
408.
Id. at 217–18.
409.
Id.
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reach a consensus, which cannot work in the face of a ransomware attack
where a virus is employed that steals protected patient data over time.410
VI.

CONCLUSION

The threat of ransomware likely will only increase as the virus is
modified to overcome cyber-defenses in the healthcare industry, which
seems to continually struggle to keep up with technological advancements.411
Despite the persistence of ransomware hackers, understanding the
preemptive steps healthcare organizations can take to protect their electronicprotected patient information and complying with HIPAA’s other, numerous
requirements will ideally protect healthcare organizations from many
ransomware attacks.412 If and when, however, these defenses fail and a
hacker is successful at infecting a healthcare system with the ransomware
virus, understanding the advantages and disadvantages of various
negotiation-based approaches can help the organization manage the crisis as
best as possible.413 Further, there are ways that the legal landscape can be
changed to better fight the ransomware problem.414 Alternative methods
such as taxing ransom payments, imposing stricter cyber testing
requirements, and requiring inspections by experts in the cyber security field
can be helpful legal tools to curb the ransomware problem without depriving
negotiators of the option to pay the ransomware hacker’s demands or, at
least, allow the hacker to believe the organization may pay his or her
demands.415 These options demonstrate how different approaches, such as
the negotiation theory approach, can be utilized to better understand and
fight the growing ransomware menace.416

at 2.

410.

See Weill, supra note 8, at 217–18; CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12,

411.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2; O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note
10, at 10; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
412.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 244, at 1; see also
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2; O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 10; 10-Minute
Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5; Breach Notification Rule, supra
note 294; Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
413.
See CRAVER, supra note 103, at 11–12; PUNNETT, supra note 103, at 412;
Gifford, supra note 1, at 46.
414.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) (2015); Bento, supra note 1, at 332; Breach
Notification Rule, supra note 294; Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
415.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a); Bento, supra note 1, at 332; Breach Notification
Rule, supra note 294; Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
416.
CRAVER, supra note 103, at 11–12; see also PUNNETT, supra note 103, at
412; Gifford, supra note 1, at 46.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Right now, a healthcare provider somewhere in the United States is
being hacked or suffering the repercussions of a successful hack. Those
healthcare providers that have not been attacked successfully likely have an
individual attempting to penetrate the healthcare provider’s network. The
attacker is targeting the weakest link in the healthcare provider’s network, a
connected medical device. The device is a wireless infusion pump that is
present in nearly every hospital room and contains a host of cybersecurity
vulnerabilities. A successful attack would allow the individual to change the
dose of medicine the pump provides and potentially seriously injure or kill
the patient, but the attacker only wishes to use the infusion pump to pivot
*.
Christopher Kersbergen, M.S., J.D., is a Professor of Criminal Justice and
the Program Director for the Legal Studies program at Keiser University. He is a United
States Army veteran and received his law degree from Nova Southeastern University in 2015.
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into the hospital’s network. Once in the network, the attacker can access
every device in the hospital and every patient’s health record. The attacker
then holds the hospital hostage by launching a ransomware attack.1 The
hospital is crippled by the attack and cannot access vital patient records,
nurses’ stations, test results, and monitoring equipment. The attacker holds
the hospital hostage for a sum of money, which the hospital is forced to pay.
The attack is over, but the repercussions to the hospital and the patients
impacted last a lifetime. The hospital is fined millions of dollars for the loss
of protected patient health information. The stolen patient information is
sold and used.
A victim of the attack is denied a surgery by his or her health
insurance carrier because a person used his or her stolen health information
to have surgery a continent away. Another victim is billed for healthcare
someone else received. Yet another person has private and embarrassing
health information posted on the internet. All of the victims suffer in one
form or another, many not realizing they have been a victim until it is too
late. The frightening realization is that everyone, at one point, has been the
victim of a cyberattack on a healthcare provider. The healthcare industry has
become virtually dependent on medical devices, and individuals motivated
by the enormous profits achievable by attacking medical devices are causing
severe concerns for all stakeholders in the healthcare industry.2
The regulatory agencies that are responsible for protecting healthcare
critical infrastructure from cybersecurity threats have been slow and reactive
to the danger. Only within the last couple of years have they made
cybersecurity a top priority.3 The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is
the government agency “responsible for . . . [ensuring] that medical devices
are [both] safe and effective for use.”4 The FDA exercises its regulatory
authority with regard to cybersecurity of medical devices in the form of
1.
Alert: Ransomware and Recent Variants, US-CERT (Mar. 31, 2016),
http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A. “Ransomware is a type of malware that
infects computer systems, restricting user[] access to the . . . system[] . . . [until] a ransom is
paid . . . .” Id.
2.
TRAPX LABS, TRAPX SEC., INC., ANATOMY OF AN ATTACK: MEDJACK
(MEDICAL DEVICE HIJACK) 7–8 (2015).
3.
See Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, ICS-CERT (June 13,
2013), http://www.ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/ICS-ALERT-13-164-01; Billy Rios, Hospira
Plum A+ Infusion Pump Vulnerabilities, BILLY (BK) RIOS (June 8, 2015), http://www.xssniper.com/blog/2015/06/08/hospira-plum-a-infusion-pump-vulnerabilities.
4.
Laura Hagen, Coding for Health: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices,
HEALTH LAW., June 2016, at 25, 25–26; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 351, 360c(f), 360e(a) (2012);
21 C.F.R. § 806.1 (2016).
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guidance documents issuing alerts about medical devices and product
recalls.5 In May of 2015, the FDA issued one such alert regarding a
vulnerability identified with an infusion system that could allow an
unauthorized user to control the device and change the dosage the pump
delivers.6 The alert came ten days after the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) issued warnings on the very same pump.7 It was the first
time the FDA advised healthcare providers to discontinue use of a medical
device because of cybersecurity concerns.8
Both agencies and the
manufacturer were aware of the vulnerability for over a year before the
advisory was issued.9 This prompted the increased focus by the FDA and
other government agencies on the cybersecurity of medical devices.10 The
increased focus led to the FDA issuing guidance documents for the industry,
titled Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices.11
The FDA has largely been reactionary to cybersecurity threats but
appears to be moving towards a proactive approach to ensure the safety of
medical devices.12 The guidance documents are a step in the right direction
because of their risk-based approach to cybersecurity.13 The guidance does
have flaws, as it falls short on the issue of patient privacy protection, which
is neither discussed nor mentioned.14 The regulatory function of the FDA is
5.
Hagen, supra note 4, at 25–26; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of Hospira
Symbiq Infusion System: FDA Safety Communication, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 31,
2015),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm456815.htm;
Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump Systems: FDA Safety
Communication,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(May
13,
2015),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm446809.htm.
6.
Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump
Systems: FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5.
7.
See id. The FDA published a safety communication for Hospira’s PCA 3
LifeCare, PCA 5 LifeCare, and Symbiq lines of products. Id. ICS-CERT published an
advisory for Hospira’s Plum A+, Plum A+3, and Symbiq lines of products. Advisory:
Hospira Plum A+ and Symbiq Infusion Systems Vulnerabilities, ICS-CERT (June 10, 2015),
http://www.ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-161-01; Advisory: Hospira Symbiq
Infusion System Vulnerability, ICS-CERT (July 21, 2015), http://www.ics-cert.uscert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-174-01.
8.
See Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump
Systems: FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5.
9.
See RIOS, supra note 3.
10.
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
WORK PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2015 22 (2015), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/reports-andpublications/archives/workplan/2015/FY15-Work-Plan.pdf.
11.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF
CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2016).
12.
See id.
13.
See id.
14.
See id.
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focused primarily on the safety of the devices it regulates, not privacy, and
because of that focus, manufacturers are free to ignore many of the issues
that are causing the cybersecurity crisis of medical devices.15
This Article restricts the scope of the discussion of the FDA
guidance documents to three key recommendations newly introduced, rather
than a review of their contents.16 The newly introduced recommendations
include the introduction for the manufacturer defined essential clinical
performance of a medical device, the distinction between controlled and
uncontrolled risks, and promotion of membership in Information Sharing and
Analysis Organization (“ISAO”) for manufacturers.17 Additionally, the
guidance documents focus on medical devices that are already in the market
and deployed in healthcare organizations.18 Therefore, cybersecurity issues
related to premarket considerations of a device are outside the scope of this
Article. First, this Article addresses why medical devices have become such
an attractive target for attackers and the cybersecurity challenges facing
manufacturers.19 The cybersecurity challenges that are discussed include
hard-coded passwords, old and outdated equipment, and the inability for
devices to detect or scan for malware infections.20 Next, this Article focuses
on the newly introduced definitions and recommendations found in the
guidance documents.21 Finally, this Article points out key shortcomings of
the guidance documents, including: the lack of attention to patient privacy
due to language that could potentially allow manufacturers to leave known
vulnerabilities that do not affect the safety of the device unaddressed, the
vague and problematic description of ISAO, and the lack of enforceable rules
in the guidance.22
II.

CHALLENGES SECURING MEDICAL DEVICES

The use of medical devices that are connected to computer networks
has proliferated, as have attacks on medical devices.23 Medical devices are
now part of the Internet of things, and are exposed to the same cybersecurity

15.
Id. The Office of the Inspector General is currently examining whether
FDA oversight of networked medical devices is sufficient to effectively protect patient health
information. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 50.
16.
See infra Parts II–IV.
17.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
18.
Id.
19.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; infra Part II.
20.
See infra Sections II.A–C.
21.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; infra Part III.
22.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; infra Part IV.
23.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
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threats to which anything connected to the Internet is exposed.24 While
networked medical devices facilitate care, they also introduce a host of new
cybersecurity risks for patients and for the hospitals that are using the
devices.25
Criminals can gain access to devices that contain little or no
cybersecurity protection, and, once breached, they are able to access any
personal or medical information that is stored on the device or potentially
control the device itself.26
Healthcare is increasingly targeted by
cybercriminals for a relatively simple reason: Crime pays.27 Patient health
information is worth substantially more money on the black market than is
credit card information.28 Credit card information can be sold for one or two
dollars; patient health information, though, can go for as high as forty dollars
per record.29 That information can be used to commit insurance fraud,
identity theft for financial gain, or a specific targeted attack against an
individual.30 For example, an attacker can take information obtained from
patient health information to disclose embarrassing or private and sensitive
information to the victim’s friends and family.31 In terms of safety, they
could possibly change the coding of a medical device—controlling anything
from the amount of medicine that is dispensed, to even changing health data
collected by a device.32 A doctor could conceivably make wrong decisions
based on altered information obtained from a medical device.33
Multiple government agencies have been focusing on the
cybersecurity of medical devices in recent years.34 Among them, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) investigated healthcare as a high profile risk,
releasing a private industry notification, FBI Case No. 140408-009, stating
there will be a likely increase in cyber intrusions due to lax cybersecurity
24.
Internet of Things Poses Opportunities for Cyber Crime, FBI: INTERNET
CRIME COMPLAINT CTR. (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.ic3.gov/media/2015/150910.aspx.
25.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; Internet of Things Poses
Opportunities for Cyber Crime, supra note 24.
26.
Internet of Things Poses Opportunities for Cyber Crime, supra note 24;
see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
27.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 7–8.
28.
See id. at 8.
29.
Id.; Elizabeth Clarke, Hackers Sell Health Insurance Credentials, Bank
Accounts, SSNs and Counterfeit Documents, SECUREWORKS: CTU RESEARCH (July 15, 2013),
http://www.secureworks.com/blog/general-hackers-sell-health-insurance-credentials-bankaccounts-ssns-and-counterfeit-documents.
30.
INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., HACKING HEALTHCARE IT IN
2016: LESSONS THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY CAN LEARN FROM THE OPM BREACH 4, 25 (2016).
31.
See id. at 3–4, 11, 16.
32.
Id. at 48; see also Hagen, supra note 4, at 25.
33.
See INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 48.
34.
Id. at 2; Hagen, supra note 4, at 25.
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standards.35 Clearly, the main factor driving cyberattacks on connected
medical devices is that successful attacks lead to enormous profits.36
Compounding the problem are reports that the healthcare industry is not
prepared to combat even the most basic of cyberattacks.37 Healthcare
organizations and the medical devices they use are low hanging fruit because
there are no regulations that require a medical device to meet minimum
cybersecurity standards before going to the market.38 Over two-thirds of
healthcare provider organizations have experienced a cyberattack in one
form or another over the last few years, with the number of attacks possibly
being much higher.39
Numerous other factors contribute to the explosion of attempts to
attack medical devices, but one of the largest contributors is healthcare
organizations converting to electronic health records.40 It is frightening to
consider that medical devices often run the same standard operating systems
as copy machines and printers, and connect to the Internet in similar or the
same way as laptops and smartphones connect through Wi-Fi or Bluetooth.41
Unlike many personal devices, medical devices often do not receive updates
to protect security, nor are they protected from outside intrusions.42 Many
have hard-coded passwords that can be looked up by anyone with knowledge
of the device.43 A medical device that provides the best example of just how
difficult of a challenge securing medical devices can be is an infusion
pump.44 Infusion pumps are generally networked in nearly every hospital

35.
Health Care Systems and Medical Devices at Risk for Increased Cyber
Intrusions
for
Financial
Gain,
FBI
CYBER
DIV.
(Apr.
8,
2014),
http://www.aha.org/content/14/140408--fbipin-healthsyscyberintrud.pdf.
36.
Id.; see also INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at
11.
37.
Health Care Systems and Medical Devices at Risk for Increased Cyber
Intrusions for Financial Gain, supra note 35.
38.
See J.M. Porup, Why Aren’t There Better Cybersecurity Regulations for
Medical
Devices?,
VICE: MOTHERBOARD
(Oct.
19,
2015,
7:00
AM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/why-arent-there-better-cybersecurity-regulations-formedical-devices.
39.
Alex Ruoff, Health-Care Industry Spending More on Security but Not
Ready for Cyberattack, BLOOMBERG BNA: HEALTH IT L. & INDUSTRY REP. (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.bna.com/healthcare-industry-spending-n57982063383.
40.
Health Care Systems and Medical Devices at Risk for Increased Cyber
Intrusions for Financial Gain, supra note 35.
41.
INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 44, 46, 61.
42.
Id. at 3, 61.
43.
See id. at 36, 70; infra Part II.B.
44.
See Hagen, supra note 4, at 25.
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room and have been on the market for years.45 The cell phone in your pocket
likely has more cybersecurity protection than an infusion pump, a critically
important medical device.46 Medical devices will never be completely
secure from cybersecurity vulnerabilities.47
However, many of the
vulnerabilities that affect medical devices are self-inflicted by design.48 The
devices themselves do not deserve all of the blame, as healthcare
organizations often do not consistently report security issues to the FDA
reporting program.49
A.

Hard-Coded Passwords

The majority of infusion pumps have both maintenance usernames,
which allow for technical support, and passwords that are hard-coded.50 In
2013, the DHS issued an alert stating that over 300 medical devices from
forty different vendors contained hard-coded passwords that could be
exploited in order to change critical settings in the device.51 A hard-coded
password is exactly what it sounds like, a password for the device that is
programmed by the manufacturer and cannot be changed.52 Devices affected
included infusion pumps, ventilators, patient monitors, and surgical devices,
among many others.53 The dilemma facing medical device manufacturers
that choose hard-coded passwords for their devices is a complicated one to
reconcile.54 A hard-coded password allows manufacturers to troubleshoot
45.
See HEALTHCARE TECH. SAFETY INST., AAMI FOUND., SAFETY
INNOVATIONS: BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INFUSION PUMP-INFORMATION
NETWORK INTEGRATION 3–4 (2012); Hagen, supra note 4, at 25.
46.
See INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 36, 61.
47.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
48.
See INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 48.
49.
Russell L. Jones, Networked Medical Device Cybersecurity and Patient
Safety: Thoughts on Collaborative Approaches, DELOITTE: DCHS (Oct. 21, 2013, 12:00 PM),
http://www.deloitte.typepad.com/centerforhealthsolutions/2013/10/networked-medicaldevice-cybersecurity-and-patient-safety-time-to-step-up-to-the-plate.html#.
50.
See GAVIN O’BRIEN, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., WIRELESS
MEDICAL INFUSION PUMPS 3–4 (2015); INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note
30, at 33, 70; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3.
51.
Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3.
52.
JASON HEALEY ET AL., THE HEALTHCARE INTERNET OF THINGS: REWARDS
AND RISKS 14 (2015); see also INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at
33–34, 70; O’BRIEN, supra note 50, at 2; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords,
supra note 3.
53.
Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3; see also
O’BRIEN, supra note 50 at 2–3.
54.
HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
TECH., supra note 30, at 35, 70–74; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra
note 3.
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any problems with the device remotely because, generally, only the device
manufacturer can provide technical support and fixes to a malfunctioning
device.55
Hard-coded passwords also allow medical personnel access to the
device in case of an emergency.56 For example, if a person with an
embedded pacemaker collapses while on vacation, a hard-coded password
allows medical personnel to quickly render assistance because they can look
up the password for the device quickly.57 The downside is that anyone can
obtain the password to that device with a little bit of effort and a Google
search.58 When medical personnel leave the hospital, there is an inability to
revoke the access to the device of the former employee. 59 The most
distressing issue with hard-coded passwords is that an attacker can breach a
device and actively be in a healthcare organization’s network for months
without detection.60 The use of hard-coded passwords may be the easiest
cybersecurity challenge to fix for manufacturers in the future, as all that
would be needed is to not deploy devices with hard-coded passwords.
B.

Outdated Software and Operating Systems

The FDA’s alert regarding the Hospira’s Infusion System shows the
challenges of securing medical devices that have been in the market for years
from attackers.61 The pump was over ten years old at the time of the alert but

55.
HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; see also INST. FOR CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 36–37; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded
Passwords, supra note 3.
56.
HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; see also INST. FOR CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 36–37; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded
Passwords, supra note 3.
57.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14.
58.
INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 73; Alert:
Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3.
59.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; INST. FOR CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 3–4.
60.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; INST. FOR CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 3, 70, 73–74; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded
Passwords, supra note 3.
61.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 510(k) No. K042081, PLUM A+ INFUSION
SYSTEM WITH HOSPIRA MEDNET SOFTWARE AND PLUM A+3 INFUSION SYSTEM WITH HOSPIRA
MEDNET SOFTWARE (2004), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf4/K042081.pdf;
Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
of Hospira Symbiq Infusion System:
FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5;
Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump Systems: FDA Safety
Communication, supra note 5.
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still widely in use.62 It was also in the process of being phased out for a
newer model for reasons not related to cybersecurity.63 It is likely that the
pump was using an unsupported operating system that was no longer being
updated or patched to address vulnerabilities.64 The device had a staggering
amount of vulnerabilities, the worst of which was that the pump could be
accessed remotely and “allow . . . unauthorized user[s] to control the
device.”65 The Hospira Infusion System case appears to be a common issue
for medical devices.66 Many medical devices are “running out of date . . .
operating systems such as Windows 2000, Windows XP, or Linux.”67 These
operating systems are patched less often than other connected systems.68
Many manufacturers believe that changes to a device, including patches to
address vulnerabilities, would require them to obtain re-approval from the
FDA so they do not update and patch them.69 The FDA guidance documents
actually state that this common misconception, held by manufacturers about
patching vulnerabilities, is not the case.70 Even so, patching or updating a
medical device to address vulnerabilities takes time.71 Time is not a luxury if
there is a severely dangerous vulnerability in a medical device, and if a
medical device is surgically implanted, patching firmware or software may

62.
See 510(k) No. K042081, supra note 61; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of
Hospira Symbiq Infusion System: FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5; Vulnerabilities
of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump Systems: FDA Safety Communication,
supra note 5.
63.
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of Hospira Symbiq Infusion System: FDA
Safety Communication, supra note 5.
64.
See id.
65.
Id.; see also Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion
Pump Systems: FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5.
66.
See INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 73;
Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
of Hospira Symbiq Infusion System:
FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5;
Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump Systems: FDA Safety
Communication, supra note 5.
67.
TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 10.
68.
See id.
69.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 9–
10.
70.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 9; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 11.
71.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 9.
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not be practical or feasible.72 The fix is to disconnect the device from the
network, but this defeats the purpose of having networked medical devices.73
C.

Lack of Malware Scanning

The most serious cybersecurity threat to medical devices is
malware.74 As stated previously, the motivation for the majority of attacks
on medical devices is financial, and the primary way an attacker obtains
profitable information is through the deployment of malware.75 A laptop,
home computer, and a cellphone have the option to download a program that
scans for malware that may be infecting those devices.76 Many medical
devices come without antivirus or malware protection, basic encryption, or
vulnerability lifecycle management.77 Even if there is malware scanning
capabilities in a medical device, medical devices are generally unable to
perform these scans because most are in use twenty-four hours a day, 365
days out of the year.78 They are also closed systems, not open for installation
of any third party software that could scan for viruses or malware.79 If
scanning software can be installed, it may void the warranty of the device.80
This means that unless a device has a malware or virus scanner built in, there
would be no way to determine that the medical devices are infected until it is
much too late.81 “Finally, even when sophisticated attacks are detected, it is
still very difficult to remove the malware and blunt the attack without the full
cooperation of the medical device manufacturer.”82

72.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of
Hospira Symbiq Infusion System: FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5; Vulnerabilities
of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump Systems: FDA Safety Communication,
supra note 5.
73.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 13; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at
35; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of Hospira Symbriq Infusion System: FDA Safety
Communication, supra note 5.
74.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 12.
75.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 5–6; Alert: Ransomware and Recent
Variants, supra note 1.
76.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 13–14; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at
10; Alert: Ransomware and Recent Variants, supra note 1.
77.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 9, 16, 37–38.
78.
Id. at 9–10, 35.
79.
Id. at 35.
80.
See id. at 10–11.
81.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 16; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 11.
82.
TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 35.
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FDA POSTMARKET GUIDANCE OVERVIEW

The FDA faces the challenge of promoting safe and secure medical
devices while trying not to stifle innovation by issuing restrictive and
burdensome regulations.83 Through the use of guidance documents, the FDA
tries to recommend the best possible practices for manufacturers to protect
patient safety.84 The guidance promotes a risk management process for
manufacturers to address cybersecurity.85 It also reiterates that cybersecurity
is a shared responsibility among stakeholders.86 Device manufacturers,
vendors, information technology professionals, health information
technology developers, and the users of medical devices are the stakeholders
responsible for cybersecurity.87 Stakeholders are numerous and varied, but
the FDA only regulates manufacturers of medical devices, which makes
cybersecurity even more difficult.88 That is why the main goal of the FDA’s
cybersecurity approach is collaboration between stakeholders, because an
effective cybersecurity program is only as good as the weakest link.89 Often,
this weakest link changes depending on the threat.90 For example, a device
that is perfectly secure from outside attackers may still end up being
compromised and affect patient safety because the patients themselves
tampered with the device, or a hospital employee infects a hospital network
because they clicked on a link contained in a suspicious email.91 What can
the FDA do when a user of a medical device does not follow good
cybersecurity practices and infects an entire network, putting patient safety at
risk? The guidance attempts to achieve this goal of collaboration between
stakeholders by issuing recommendations to manufacturers that help mitigate
the various threats to medical devices.92

83.
See id. at 6, 9–10.
84.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; see also TRAPX LABS, supra
note 2, at 9–10.
85.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at
9–10. “Th[e] [G]uidance applies to: (1) medical devices that contain software, including
firmware, or programmable logic, and (2) software that is a medical device.” U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
86.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
87.
Id.; see also TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 35.
88.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
89.
See id.; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 12.
90.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 12.
91.
See id. at 9.
92.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
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Defining Essential Clinical Performance

The inability to be completely secure from threats is a common
statement made by the FDA, as it has appeared in nearly every cybersecurity
related communication released by the agency.93 The FDA introduces the
term essential clinical performance as a way to compensate for the reality
that a device will never be free of vulnerabilities.94 Essential clinical
performance is thus used to gauge whether a vulnerability in a device would
trigger safety concerns for patients.95 When a vulnerability compromises the
essential clinical performance of a device, there is a situation where that
vulnerability could result in severe injury or death in a patient.96 In that
event, manufacturers would be required to intervene and remedy that
vulnerability as soon as possible to prevent those situations from occurring.97
Manufacturers are directed to define the essential clinical performance of
their device, the outcomes in terms of severity if compromised, and the level
of risk that is acceptable.98 Vulnerabilities that do not have an impact on the
essential clinical performance are supposed to be assessed in case those
vulnerabilities do impact the essential clinical performance of the device in
the future.99 Essentially, the FDA is telling manufacturers to triage
cybersecurity of their devices.100
Manufacturers are recommended to assess the cybersecurity risk to
their device by considering the exploitability of the vulnerability and the
severity of the health impact to patients if the vulnerability were to be
exploited.101 Manufacturers are given latitude in how they assess these two
considerations as long as it is industry accepted.102 The FDA does
recommend using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System, Version 3.0,
to assess exploitability and ANSI/AAMI/ISO 14971: 2007/(R)2010:
Medical Devices—Application of Risk Management to Medical Devices to
assess severity of the health impact to patients.103
93.
Id.
94.
Id. Essential clinical performance is defined as “performance that is
necessary to achieve freedom from unacceptable clinical risk.” Id.
95.
Id.
96.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. “The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (“CVSS”) is an open
framework for communicating the characteristics and severity of software vulnerabilities.”
FORUM OF INCIDENT RESPONSE & SEC. TEAMS, COMMON VULNERABILITY SCORING SYSTEM
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Controlled and Uncontrolled Risks

The FDA states that manufacturers determine if risks to essential
clinical performance are acceptable or unacceptable.104 Here, the guidance
documents again introduce new terms: those that are controlled and
uncontrolled.105 If a risk is acceptable, it is labeled controlled, and
unacceptable risks are labeled uncontrolled.106 Again, acceptable risks do
not impact patient safety.107 Controlled risks do not affect a medical device’s
essential clinical performance, meaning that there is no impact on patient
safety.108 Here, the guidance issues its most important statement.109 Any
change made to the medical device to address a controlled risk is considered
a device enhancement.110 This means that a manufacturer deploying a patch
or update of the device would not have to report it to the FDA.111 This is
welcomed news, as manufacturers are free to update and patch their devices
without worry that their medical devices will need to be reapproved by the
FDA because of changes or updates.112
An uncontrolled risk contains an unacceptable risk to the essential
clinical performance of the device.113 Patient safety is threatened with the
presence of an uncontrolled risk, and control of the medical device could be
compromised.114 Manufacturers are recommended to remedy these risks as
quickly as possible, or to at least reduce the risk to an acceptable level.115
All uncontrolled risks to essential clinical performance are required to be
reported to the FDA according to Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations
part 806.116 Interestingly, the FDA will not enforce reporting requirements if
“[t]here are no known serious adverse events or deaths associated with the
vulnerability.”117 This intent not to enforce the reporting requirements
comes with the caveat that “[w]ithin [thirty] days of learning of the
V3.0:

SPECIFICATION DOCUMENT 1 (2015), http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-v30-specificationv1.7.pdf.
104.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
See id.
108.
See id.
109.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
110.
Id.
111.
See 21 C.F.R. § 806.1(b)(1) (2016); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 11.
112.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
116.
21 C.F.R. § 806.1; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
117.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
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vulnerability, the manufacturer identifies and implements device changes . . .
or compensating controls to bring the . . . risk to an acceptable level.”118
Manufacturers must also notify users and be a participant in an ISAO to
avoid reporting requirements.119 If a manufacturer cannot remedy the
uncontrolled risk, the FDA would then consider that there is a reasonable
probability that the device will cause serious injury or death, and the device
would then “be considered [to be] in violation of the [Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic] Act . . . subject[ing it] to enforcement or other action.”120
C.

Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations

The guidance documents state that the sharing of risk information
and intelligence within the medical device community is of critical
importance in the adoption of a risk-based approach to cybersecurity, and
ISAOs fulfill that critically important role.121 These ISAOs are intended to
serve as focal points for information and collaboration of cybersecurity
issues between the private sector and government.122 The stated purpose of
an ISAO is to develop a shared understanding of risks to medical devices so
stakeholders can efficiently assess patient health risks.123 Participation in an
ISAO is voluntary for manufacturers; however, the FDA considers
participation a critical component of an effective cybersecurity risk
management program.124
The guidance stresses the importance of
participation by calling it “a significant step toward assuring the . . . safety
and effectiveness of . . . medical devices.”125 The FDA further incentivizes
participation by indicating that it “does not intend to enforce certain
reporting requirements of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”126
Participation in an ISAO and following the other recommendations in the
guidance are prerequisites to the FDA using discretion in enforcement of
reporting requirements.127
ISAOs are intended by the FDA to include groups from any sector,
not just healthcare, and participation is inclusive and open to any that wish to
join.128 The FDA states that ISAOs would also allow participating members
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
Id.
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to receive “[a]ctionable . . . useful, and practical cybersecurity [information] .
. . and incident information [through] automated, real-time mechanisms,”
although it does not elaborate on how that will be accomplished.129 The
FDA envisions ISAOs as transparent in terms of providing information to
potential members on how the ISAO operates because they are intended to
be trusted.130 The information shared will be safeguarded to preserve
business confidentiality.131 “[P]articipants in an ISAO can request that . . .
information [provided] be treated as Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information.”132 This “information is shielded from any release otherwise
required by the Freedom of Information Act or State Sunshine Laws and is
[also] exempt from regulatory . . . and civil litigation” use.133
IV.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FDA GUIDANCE

The guidance can essentially be broken down into two components,
both of which fall short of addressing the severe cybersecurity challenges
facing medical devices.134 The FDA recommends that manufacturers adopt
risk management programs consistent with, and incorporating elements of,
the “[National Institute of Standards and Technology] Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”135 The basic elements of
which are “[i]dentify, [p]rotect, [d]etect, [r]espond, and [r]ecover.”136 The
framework is risk based, designed to manage risk, and intended to
complement an organization’s already existing cybersecurity program.137
The framework is a good recommendation, however, it should be tailored to
fit the healthcare industry, as the framework is not industry specific and is
intended to complement existing cybersecurity management programs. 138
Where the recommendations in the guidance fall short is incorporating the
newly introduced “essential clinical performance” and “controlled and
uncontrolled risk” into the risk management process.139 The second
component that is problematic is the pressure to join “information sharing
and analysis organizations” without providing any detail on how they will

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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Id.
Id.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
Id.; see also Hagen, supra note 4, at 34–35.
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operate, what information will be available, and how information shared will
be protected.140
A.

Patient Privacy v. Patient Safety

The guidance, as written, fails to address privacy concerns because
the distinction between controlled and uncontrolled risk will allow
manufacturers to ignore cybersecurity vulnerabilities that impact patient
privacy.141 Essential clinical performance is directly tied only to patient
safety concerns, implying that any vulnerability that will not result in injury
or death could be ignored.142 Manufacturers are free to address any
vulnerability that does not impact safety at their leisure.143 The manufacturer
could also ignore the vulnerability altogether, since there are usually no
consequences for the manufacturer when a healthcare organization has a
breach and patient health information is stolen.144 The guidance documents
do not address any patient privacy concerns and reinforce a view that privacy
is not a cybersecurity priority for the FDA.145 Granted, the FDA’s primary
purpose is to ensure medical devices are safe for patients above anything
else.146 The focus on safety is understandable, as a device that can seriously
injure or even kill a patient is much more harmful than a device that has
stolen the personal and financial information of perhaps every patient in a
given healthcare organization.147 What is not considered is that the loss of
patient privacy can also result in harm to a person’s reputation, economic
situation, and mental health.148 Although patient information is covered by
laws such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”), manufacturers are not usually subject to that law.149

140.
See id.
141.
See id.; Comment Letter from American Association for Justice,
Comment Letter on Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices, (Apr. 21,
2016), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-D-5105-0031.
142.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
143.
See id.; Hagen, supra note 4, at 28.
144.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; Comment Letter from
American Association for Justice, supra note 141.
145.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; Comment Letter from
American Association for Justice, supra note 141.
146.
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 47.
147.
See Hagen, supra note 4, at 26.
148.
INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 8–9.
149.
See Hagen, supra note 4, at 30; When May a Covered Health Care
Provider Disclose Protected Health Information, Without an Authorization or Business
Associate Agreement, to a Medical Device Company Representative?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (Feb. 4, 2004), http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/490/when-may-
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HIPAA regulates either covered entities, which consist of healthcare
providers or health plans, and business associates, which can be entities that
either “create[], receive[], maintain[], or transmit[] [patient] health
information” or perform other services on behalf of a covered entity that
involve the disclosure of patient health information.150 A medical device
manufacturer would generally not be considered a covered entity, but a
medical device manufacturer is subject to HIPAA if they are business
associates of a covered entity.151 While this means that medical device
manufacturers must comply with HIPAA as business associates,
manufacturers can avoid business associate classification altogether by
ensuring that they merely sell or provide software or equipment to a covered
entity and the manufacturer does not have access to the patient health
information.152 Even when there is a situation where patient health
information may need to be accessed by the manufacturer, the manufacturer
could avoid having to comply with HIPAA by ensuring the health
information is not personally identifiable.153 In these cases, a medical device
manufacturer is not subjected to any regulation that protects patient
privacy.154
The College of Healthcare Information Management Executives
(“CHIME”) and the Association for Executives in Healthcare Information
Security (“AEHIS”), in their public comment to the FDA’s guidance,
proposed a solution for addressing the patient privacy shortcomings of the
guidance.155 They suggested inserting patient safety and patient information
subcategories under both controlled and uncontrolled risk.156 This would
ensure that uncontrolled vulnerabilities that do not cause any patient safety
issues, and as such do not affect essential clinical performance, are still
addressed, and any harm to patients and healthcare organizations is

a-covered-health-care-provider-disclose-protected-health-information-withoutauthorization/index.html.
150.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103(4)(1)(i) (2013).
151.
Id. § 160.103(4)(3)(i).
152.
Public Welfare, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5571 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. pt. 160).
153.
Id. at 5574.
154.
See id.; When May a Covered Health Care Provider Disclose Protected
Health Information, Without an Authorization or Business Associate Agreement, to a Medical
Device Company Representative?, supra note 149.
155.
Comment from CHIME & AEHIS, Comment Letter on Postmarket
Management
of
Cybersecurity
in
Medical
Devices
(Apr.
21,
2016),
http://chimecentral.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/CHIME-AEHIS-Letter-to-FDA-onDevice-Cyber.pdf.
156.
Id.; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
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minimized.157 The guidance as it is written now would potentially allow an
attacker to access a networked medical device with a controlled
vulnerability, and then once inside a healthcare organization’s network,
pivot, and potentially access other devices and subsequently impact patient
safety by exploiting vulnerabilities in other devices.158 Attackers are
overwhelmingly focused on, and targeting, patient data.159
The
disproportionate focus by the FDA on patient safety, when there has not been
an event where a patient has been harmed, may send the message to those
intent on stealing information that cybersecurity in devices that do have
vulnerabilities that impact safety is weak.160 The perception of weak security
is already driving motivations to attack, and the guidance setting aside
privacy concerns could lead to a greater numbers of attacks.161
B.

ISAO Poorly Defined and Full of Risk

The guidance suggestion that manufacturers join an ISAO is
problematic because the language implies any group or individual can join an
ISAO and have access to the information being shared about
vulnerabilities.162 Indeed, the guidance specifically states that membership is
inclusive for anyone and everyone that wishes to join.163 The assumption
from the language indicates that information shared with the ISAO would be
publicly available, meaning good intentioned members will be participants in
ISAOs with members that do not have good intentions.164 Hackers and other
opportunists looking for information on exploitable vulnerabilities will no
doubt be members of those very same ISAOs as well.165
In August 2016, MedSec, a startup cybersecurity firm based in
Florida, provided an example of just how badly information-sharing of

157.
Comment from CHIME & AEHIS, supra note 155; see also U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
158.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; HEALEY ET AL., supra note
52, at 11; INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 10; Hagen, supra note
4, at 25.
159.
INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 3–4.
160.
See id.; Comment from CHIME & AEHIS, supra note 155.
161.
See Comment from CHIME & AEHIS, supra note 155; U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
162.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
163.
Id.
164.
See id.
165.
See Clarke, supra note 29; Comment from CHIME & AEHIS, supra note
155.
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cybersecurity vulnerabilities can go.166 The firm discovered alleged security
flaws in pacemakers made by St. Jude Medical, a medical device
manufacturer.167
Rather than offer to sell the information to the
manufacturer, or report the information to the FDA like some researchers do,
they sold the information to Muddy Waters, an investment research firm. 168
Muddy Waters promptly announced it was shorting St. Jude stock based on
the information.169 Based on the reported vulnerabilities, the FDA and the
DHS also announced they were investigating the manufacturer’s device.170
The fees for MedSec were predicated on how well Muddy Waters’ short
position did.171 If the stock tanked, which it did, the fee would be higher.172
St. Jude vigorously denied the allegations and cybersecurity researchers have
panned the report released by MedSec as flawed.173 The damage had already
been done though. Not only are medical devices exploitable, so too is the
information about vulnerabilities affecting those devices.174
The guidance documents are silent on any statutory, or regulatory,
protections members of ISAOs would receive.175 While information-sharing
is important, the value of information diminishes if it is not actionable, or, if
there are large amounts of information.176 The guidance documents require
manufacturers to report all uncontrolled vulnerabilities, even those that do
not affect patient safety, possibly flooding ISAOs with information on
vulnerabilities, many of them harmless.177 Worse, some vital information
may be excluded based on the different regulatory environments of the
varied stakeholders.178 Whether healthcare delivery organizations could
166.
See Elaine Ou, Hacking a Company’s Stock Price, BLOOMBERG: VIEW
(Sept. 12, 2016, 10:30 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-12/hacking-acompany-s-stock-price.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
Jim Finkle, U.S. Health Regulator Plans ‘Thorough’ Probe of St. Jude
Case, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2016, 7:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-st-jude-medicalcyber-fda-idUSKCN11E32Y.
171.
Ou, supra note 166.
172.
See id.; Aaron Pressman, Hacking Report on St. Jude Pacemakers Was
Flawed,
Researchers
Say,
FORTUNE
(Aug.
31,
2016,
9:02
AM),
http://www.fortune.com/2016/08/31/hacking-st-jude-pacemakers-flawed/.
173.
Ou, supra note 166; Pressman, supra note 172.
174.
See Finkle, supra note 170.
175.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
176.
See id.
177.
Id.
178.
Comment from Rapid7, Comments to FDA’s Draft Guidance for
Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices (Apr. 19, 2016),
http://www.rapid7.com/globalassets/_pdfs/rapid7-comments/rapid7-comments-to-fda-draft-
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potentially violate a regulation or law, such as HIPAA, by providing
information regarding a vulnerability to an ISAO that puts patient
information at risk, is a question that should be addressed by the guidance
documents.179
Without any detailed criteria about how these organizations work,
the governance process, or safeguards of information, it is unlikely that
manufacturers would join even though participation is greatly
incentivized.180 The FDA also includes a red herring regarding the incentive
to manufacturers to join an ISAO.181 Medical device manufacturers would
not be required to report uncontrolled cybersecurity vulnerabilities under
Title 21, section 806 of the Code of Federal Regulation if certain
requirements are met.182 The most important requirement is that there are no
known serious adverse events or deaths associated with the vulnerability.183
As previously stated, that means the guidance obligates manufacturers to
report to an ISAO all uncontrolled vulnerabilities, increasing the burden on
manufacturers that right now do not have to report those vulnerabilities.184
C.

Recommendations Not Requirements

Obligating manufacturers to report based on what is written in the
guidance is a misnomer, as nothing in the guidance requires manufacturers to
do anything different than what they are doing now.185 The guidance is
inadequate because it is not enforceable and does not hold manufacturers
“responsible for unsecured or defective [cybersecurity of] medical
devices.”186
Cybersecurity threats and attacks are getting worse.187
Healthcare organizations are being subjected to ransomware attacks,

guidance-for-postmarket-management-of-cybersecurity-in-medical-devices---docket-no.-fda2015-d-5105---apr.-19-2016.pdf.
179.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
180.
See id.; Comment from Fresenius Kabi, Comment Letter on FDA Draft
Guidance on Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2015-D-51050038&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
181.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; Comment from Fresenius
Kabi, supra note 180.
182.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; Comment Letter from
American Association for Justice, supra note 141; see also 21 C.F.R. § 806.1(b) (2016).
183.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
184.
See id.; Comment Letter from American Association for Justice, supra
note 141.
185.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
186.
Comment Letter from American Association for Justice, supra note 141.
187.
Comment from Fresenius Kabi, supra note 180.
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intrusions that steal patient data from millions of people.188 An attacker
using a pacemaker to kill a patient has gone from being a once clever plot in
Hollywood fiction to something that is only a matter of time from happening.
The guidance is non-binding on every stakeholder to which it applies.189 The
guidance urges collaboration, risk sharing, and risk management.190 Lofty
outcomes can only be accomplished by making the recommendations in the
guidance requirements.191 Nothing in the guidance places an undue burden
on manufacturers of medical devices; it merely calls for cybersecurity risks
to be effectively managed through a risk management program.192 The FDA
has been providing guidance to the medical device manufacturer community
for nearly two decades related to cybersecurity.193 Medical devices continue
to be delivered to the market with either unsupported operating systems, no
software maintenance plans in place, or a host of other vulnerabilities.194
The FDA must go from making recommendations that manufacturers should
follow to making standardized requirements if it wants to seriously protect
patient safety and privacy.195
V.

CONCLUSION

The FDA guidance as discussed is merely a draft.196 However, based
on the generally positive reception by the medical device industry, it is very
likely that the draft will be adopted unchanged in the final guidance
document.197 The guidance proposes effective risk management ideas that
should already be in use by manufacturers to prevent attackers exploiting
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.198 Attempting to protect, or anticipate and
remedy every vulnerability a medical device may have now or in the future is
unrealistic. A risk based approach allows manufacturers to adapt to threats
that tend to adapt quicker than those tasked with guarding against them.199
The guidance is a step in the right direction but should be faulted for the lack
188.
Id.
189.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; see also Comment from
Rapid7, supra note 178.
190.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
191.
See Comment from Rapid7, supra note 178.
192.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
193.
See id.; Comment from Rapid7, supra note 178.
194.
See Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of Hospira Symbiq Infusion System:
FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5; supra Section II.B.
195.
See Comment from Rapid7, supra note 178.
196.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
197.
See Comment Letter from American Association for Justice, supra note
141; Comment from Fresenius Kabi, supra note 180; Comment from Rapid7, supra note 178.
198.
See supra Section IV.A.
199.
See supra Section IV.
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of privacy considerations.200 Patient health should be a priority alongside
patient safety.201 Essential clinical performance should include patient
privacy.202 Furthermore, the guidance suggests that ISAOs are critical to
effective medical device cybersecurity, yet spends very little time fleshing
out their vision on how exactly they will work and reassuring manufacturers
that information about cybersecurity vulnerabilities will not be exploited by
opportunists.203 Finally, recommendations should turn into requirements.204
Nothing in the guidance as proposed places an undue burden on
manufacturers, nor does it stifle innovation.205 The FDA has a track record
of issuing guidance that is ignored by those towards whom the
recommendations are directed.206

141.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Section IV.C.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; supra Section IV.C.
See Comment Letter from American Association for Justice, supra note
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a world where a patient wearing a pacemaker or an insulin
pump, just fine moments before, drops dead after his implanted medical
device turns seemingly against him.1 Worse yet, imagine that an insulin
*.
Michael Woods received his J.D. from Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad College of Law, and his LL.M. in National Security & U.S. Foreign Relations
from the George Washington University Law School. He is grateful for his family and friends
for their love and support throughout law school. Michael would like to thank Professors
Kathy Cerminara, James Levy, Michael Richmond, and Randolph Braccialarghe for being a
great influence on his legal education.
1.
See Homeland Security Investigating Medical Device Cybersecurity,
IHEALTHBEAT
(Oct.
23,
2014),
http://web.archive.org/web/20141028015215/http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2014/10/23/h
omeland-security-investigating-medical-device-cybersecurity.
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pump is giving false readings and a user relying on the readings injects too
much insulin, thus being the instrument in his or her own demise.2 These
examples can be the work of malicious actors who hack into implanted
medical devices, which has been possible for years.3 The federal
government has done little to regulate any type of cybersecurity on
implantable medical devices, despite knowing that hacking these devices has
been possible for almost a decade.4 The number of patients with implanted
medical devices is not miniscule either; millions of people in the United
States already have implanted medical devices, and roughly 300,000 new
people are getting them each year.5 The implantable medical device “market
is projected to be around [seventeen] [b]illion dollars by 2019,” resulting in a
large population of patients with this technology in them and little to no
cybersecurity attached to those devices, which is a huge security risk.6
Considering that “[t]he U[nited] S[tates] Department of Homeland Security
has identified the . . . Public Health sector as . . . [a] critical cyber security
infrastructure[]” to the United States, this lack of cybersecurity is a huge
national security risk.7
This Article analyzes the vulnerabilities of implantable medical
devices, such as pacemakers/defibrillators and insulin pumps, to hacking by
malicious actors and the national security risk that those vulnerabilities
pose.8 Part II will explain the lack of cybersecurity of implantable medical
devices, such as cardiac defibrillators and insulin pumps, and the
vulnerabilities of implantable medical devices to cyberattacks that will harm
2.
Benjamin Ransford et al., Design Challenges for Secure Implantable
Medical Devises, in SECURITY AND PRIVACY FOR IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES 157, 164
(Wayne Burleson & Sandro Carrara eds., 2014); see also Homeland Security Investigating
Medical Device Cybersecurity, supra note 1.
3.
Homeland Security Investigating Medical Device Cybersecurity, supra
note 1. “In 2007 . . . Vice President . . . Cheney had some of the wireless features on his
defibrillator disabled due to security concerns” that a terrorist group or an individual person
with a vendetta could hack into his defibrillator and use it to kill him. Id.
4.
See Mike Colias, Cyber Security, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, May 2004,
at 60, 62, 64; Homeland Security Investigating Medical Device Cybersecurity, supra note 1.
5.
Shyamnath Gollakota et al., They Can Hear Your Heartbeats: NonInvasive Security for Implantable Medical Devices, ACM SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM.
REV., Aug. 2011, at 2.
6.
Apurva Mohan, Cyber Security for Personal Medical Devices Internet of
Things, in 2014 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING IN SENSOR
SYSTEMS 372, 372 (Lisa O’Conner ed., 2014).
7.
Nicholas J. Mankovich, Securing IT Networks Incorporating Medical
Devices: Risk Management and Compliance in Health Care Cyber Security, in ADVANCES IN
CYBER SECURITY: TECHNOLOGY, OPERATIONS, AND EXPERIENCES 173, 173 (D. Frank Hsu &
Dorothy Marinucci eds., 2013).
8.
See infra Parts II–IV.
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the patient.9 It will then emphasize how this is a national security risk by
providing instances of lack of cybersecurity causing harm in the United
States and abroad, which includes the research conducted in hacking
implantable medical devices.10
Part III will analyze the current
governmental legislation and regulations on implantable medical devices and
how the government fails to address cybersecurity due to conflicting laws
within agencies and branches of government.11 Part IV delves into possible
solutions for this national security risk by proposing possible governmental
regulations, as well as other private sector-led solutions.12 It will then
conclude by stressing the dangers that poor regulations and laws can cause
by failing to address the cybersecurity risks to the medical device industry.13
II.

UNDERSTANDING HACKING IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES

Manufacturers focus, first and foremost, on functionality of
implantable medical devices, and almost all manufacturers skip any type of
cybersecurity due to a multitude of reasons.14 As devices are increasingly
interconnected with the Internet and wireless functionalities, the lack of
cybersecurity poses a huge security risk to patients wearing implantable
medical devices from malicious actors.15 Part A discusses manufacturer
concerns about adding cybersecurity to implantable medical devices, and
explains how the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) echoes these
fears.16 It also highlights the lack of focus the healthcare industry has overall
in tackling cybersecurity issues.17 Part B examines the many ways hackers
can take over and manipulate implantable medical devices.18 Part C provides
examples of cyberattacks on medical devices across the United States and
overseas, and how preventative measures, such as anti-virus software,
contribute to the harm.19 Part C concludes by discussing laboratory
simulations and public demonstrations of hacking implantable medical

9.
See infra Part II.
10.
See infra Section II.C.
11.
See infra Part III.
12.
See infra Part IV.
13.
See infra Parts IV–V.
14.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 170.
15.
Mankovich, supra note 7, at 174–75; Homeland Security Investigating
Medical Device Cybersecurity, supra note 1.
16.
See infra Section II.A.
17.
See infra Section II.A.
18.
See infra Section II.B.
19.
See infra Section II.C.
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devices and demonstrating the clear and present threat the lack of
cybersecurity has on these devices.20
A.

The Lack of Cybersecurity: A Problem with the Industry

Implantable medical devices are, first and foremost, designed to
provide enormous health benefits to patients.21 These devices, such as
insulin pumps and cardiac defibrillators, all feature wireless communication
to monitor and treat patients through personalized care and send reports to
their physicians.22 They also are updated remotely with the latest firmware,
all for the benefit of the patient.23 As manufacturers keep improving quality
of care and technology by making the devices lighter, smaller, and faster,
they tend to ignore cybersecurity for the devices.24
Implantable medical devices do not have cybersecurity built into
them when they are made.25 This is due to a myriad of reasons: The
“limitations in computing power or memory space” from having such a small
device that is “[un]able to run traditional [anti-virus] software without
impacting [the device’s] performance;”26 fear of creating “a critical, lifethreatening situation if the system responds to a false positive if there is antivirus software in the medical device;27 standard security software is difficult
to use with the limited memory in a customized/scaled back version of the
operating system in the device;28 authentication security measures on the
devices risk patient safety in cases of an emergency when a medical
professional may need to disable or alter the device to treat a patient;29 and
20.
21.

See infra Section II.C.
Wayne Burleson & Sandro Carrara, Introduction to SECURITY AND
PRIVACY FOR IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES 1, 1 (Wayne Burleson & Sandro Carrara eds.,
2014).
22.
Sarbari Gupta, Implantable Medical Devices — Cyber Risks and
Mitigation Approaches, Abstract from the Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech.: Cybersecurity in
Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (Apr. 23, 2012).
23.
Id.
24.
Burleson & Carrara, supra note 21, at 1. This is according to Lessley
Stoltenberg, the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center’s Chief Information
Security Officer. Jim Finkle, U.S. Government Probes Medical Devices for Possible Cyber
Flaws, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2014, 7:11 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecuritymedicaldevices-insight-idUSKCN0IB0DQ20141022.
25.
Finkle, supra note 24.
26.
Axel Wirth, Cybercrimes Pose Growing Threat to Medical Devices, 45
BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION & TECH. 26, 31 (2011).
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 28.
29.
See Sharon R. Klein & Odia Kagan, Unhack My Heart: FDA Issues
Guidance to Mitigate Cybersecurity Threats in Medical Devices, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP 2
(June 24, 2013), http://www.pepperlaw.com/uploads/files/clientalert062413b.pdf.
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heavy encryption for security of the device may drain enough energy that it
would require frequent device replacement, which would require surgery,
resulting in burdening both the patient and the medical profession.30 The
FDA has echoed these fears of “medical device security measures doing
more harm than good in emergency situations.”31 Implantable medical
devices are meant to improve patients’ lives, and thus, manufacturers and
designers have apportioned this above all else to cybersecurity.32
The healthcare industry is estimated to be “‘five to seven years
behind’ other industries in . . . cybersecurity.”33 This is because the
healthcare industry is very diverse and fragmented compared to other
industries, such as the energy industry.34 Traditionally, “[t]he medical device
industry has . . . ignored warnings that its products [are not] protected against
[a] cyberattack.”35 If there is any type of security protection put into devices
by manufacturers, it tends to focus on data theft, not device manipulation by
malicious actors.36 Also, compared to other industries that spend 12% of
their information technology (“IT”) security budget on data protection alone,
a majority of healthcare organizations spend less than 3% of their IT security
budgets on it.37 With the percentage of healthcare organizations that have
reported being hacked rising from 20% in 2009 to 40% in 2013, the medical
industry’s dismal security budget focus and funding, compared to industry
standards of preventative IT security budget, could be considered negligent.38
“[Ninety-four percent] of [all] healthcare institutions [have] reported . . .
be[ing] victims of cyberattacks.”39
Lastly, there is not an effective national reporting system for
cybersecurity related failures that play a significant role in patient injuries or

30.
See Burleson & Carrara, supra note 21, at 4.
31.
Klein & Kagan, supra note 29, at 2.
32.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 170.
33.
Alex Ruoff, Security Exec: Medical Device Industry at Least Five Years
Behind on Cybersecurity, 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 17, 17 (2014).
34.
Daniel J. Barnett et al., Cyber Security Threats to Public Health, 5 WORLD
MED. & HEALTH POL’Y 37, 38 (2013).
35.
Ruoff, supra note 33, at 17.
36.
Id.
37.
Alex Ruoff, Hacking Incidents on the Rise, But IT Security Budgets
Remain Low, Execs Say, 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 20, 20 (2014).
38.
See Caroline Humer & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record Is Worth More to
Hackers Than Your Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014, 2:24 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-hospitals-idUSKCN0HJ21I20140924; Ruoff,
supra note 37, at 20.
39.
Eric D. Perakslis, Cybersecurity in Health Care, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED.
395, 395 (2014).
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deaths.40 “[A]pproximately 1.2 million adverse events of medical devices
were reported to the FDA’s Manufacturer and User Facility Device
Experience . . . database” between 2006 and 2011,41 but there is no
information on those cybersecurity related failures, as cybersecurity
problems are not included in the reporting system.42 Out of the 1.2 million,
23% were listed only as computer-related failures, 94% of which "presented
medium to high risk” of harm to the patient.43
Similarly, the FDA’s Manufacturer and User Facility Device
Experience “database is qualitative rather than quantitative,” and it does not
concern itself with security events.44 For example, if a clinician is using a
device that is slower because of a malware infection, it would most likely not
be reported.45 This is because admitting a role in infecting a medical device
or a network, such as inserting an infected flash drive in a computer or
connecting an infected phone to the network, would lead to disciplinary
action.46 Therefore, the actual number of what is reported is most likely low
because of employees not realizing an issue or fearing retribution.47
B.

The Digital Vulnerabilities of Implantable Medical Devices

Current implantable medical devices can be hacked into and taken
over, overloaded with malware to slow them down, turned off completely,
and overloaded to kill the host at the behest of a malicious actor or actors,
and all harming the host of the device.48 For instance, a Medtronic
pacemaker does not need a password to access the device and the wireless
communication is not encrypted, which makes it easy for a hacker to collect
data from the device, reverse engineer the protocol, and take over the
device.49 Public information, such as any implantable medical device user’s
manual and the specifications for the device’s radio chip, make the reverse
engineering and finding of the remote control personal identification number
40.
Kevin Fu & James Blum, Controlling for Cybersecurity Risks of Medical
Device Software, COMM. ACM, Oct. 2013, at 35, 35–36.
41.
Id. at 35.
42.
Id. at 35–36.
43.
Id. at 35.
44.
Id. at 36.
45.
Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36.
46.
Id.
47.
See id.
48.
See Steven J. Templeton, Security Aspects of Cyber-Physical Device
Safety in Assistive Environments, in PETRA 2011, THE 4TH ACM INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON PERVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO ASSISTIVE ENVIRONMENTS, CRETE,
GREECE, MAY 25–27, 2011 §1, 2.1.1 (Ass’n for Computing Mach. 2011).
49.
Id.
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to control the device relatively simple.50 Once this is done with readily
available information, the hacker can generate misleading information, such
as false readings on an insulin pump or just cause it to inject “insulin into the
patient’s body.”51 Implantable medical devices are exposed to common
cyber threats that normal computers experience because the operating
system, central processing unit, and other software components are generally
off-the-shelf components.52 Medical devices still tend to rely on the original
versions of their operating system—such as Windows XP—even long after
support for the operating system has ended.53 Hackers can also take control
of the device as long as it is around any sort of wireless Internet, and the
strength of the transmission and radio frequency of the implantable medical
device does not matter.54 This is possible because Federal Communications
Commission regulations make it so that implanted medical devices have a
certain radio frequency range, as implantable medical devices “[do] not
normally initiate communication [and only] transmit [as a] response to a
transmission from [another party] or if [they] detect[] a life-threatening
condition.”55 No matter what the implantable medical device is, once it is
connected to a network, it is essentially a node on the network that can be
seen, interacted with, and controlled.56 As these devices are increasingly
using wireless communications among components to improve health and
reporting, hackers have a larger avenue for control of a system.57
Unfortunately, the implanted medical devices already in patients
cannot just have cybersecurity protocols and software patched into them to
resolve this gaping security hole.58 The medical device industry in the
United States is tightly regulated by the FDA, which requires that the
50.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 176.
51.
Id.
52.
Wirth, supra note 26, at 27.
53.
Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36. In 2012, it was reported to the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Information Security and Privacy Advisory
Board that the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston was still using medical
devices that were using the original versions of Windows 95 and Windows XP, despite the
support for these ending in 2006 and 2010 respectively. Id. These devices were not even the
final patch of these versions, and were never upgraded to include any of the patches that came
out to these operating systems over the years. Id. This shows that, even if patching does
occur to devices, hospitals and medical professionals need to apply them in order to be
effective. See id.
54.
See Gollakota et al., supra note 5, at 3–4.
55.
Id.
56.
Robert J. Caruso & Melissa Masters, Applying Cyber Risk Management to
Medical Device Design, BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION & TECH., Spring 2014, at 32, 33.
57.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 176.
58.
Martha Vockley, Safe and Secure? Healthcare in the Cyberworld, 46
BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION & TECH. 164, 167 (2012).
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cybersecurity for any medical device and its upgrades be applied by the
manufacturer and not any person in the stream of commerce for the device.59
Therefore, a hospital cannot upgrade or add any type of cybersecurity to any
medical device without the manufacturer approving the upgrade.60 In
compliance with the FDA review process, a manufacturer needs to test the
proposed patch on the device, making sure the changes to the operating
system do not impact the behavior and functionality of the device.61 That
means that medical devices from a patch level are often “months, if not
years, behind where the operating system manufacturer is,” leading to a
security gap that cannot be remedied swiftly.62 When patches are approved
and finally applied, “they may require complex installation procedures and
acceptance testing” which may result in the patch not actually being
applied.63
Unlike in computers and other software, full automatic
distribution and application of upgrades are difficult to implement in
implantable medical devices because of the associated upgrade timing and
the system reboot endangering the patient; if there were an issue, the patient
would be vulnerable.64 Implantable medical devices can last up to ten years,
leaving the patients vulnerable to attack for a long time.65
The issue of patching and updating medical devices is not new, as it
has been widely recognized by the FDA as being an issue.66 The Department
of Homeland Security has also recognized this issue; for example, it reported
that the Conficker virus has not only been known to have infected
pacemakers through wireless and other connections but, also, cannot be
removed because removal of the virus would be considered a “modification
to the certified software” under governmental regulations.67
Implantable medical devices can also be infected with viruses or
targeted malware from networked devices.68 Any type of medical equipment
that is infected with a virus or malware and is connected to a network will
spread it to the implanted medical device.69 This can either give a hacker
control—if that is the target—or the ability to disable or slow down the
device.70 Many hospitals tend to get medical technology—devices and
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Wirth, supra note 26, at 27.
Id.
Vockley, supra note 58, at 167.
Id.
Wirth, supra note 26, at 28.
See id. at 32.
Gollakota et al., supra note 5, at 2.
Wirth, supra note 26, at 28.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 2.2.
Vockley, supra note 58, at 167.
Id.
See Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 161; Vockley, supra note 58, at 167.
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equipment—from a single vendor, and vendors tend to keep all of their
“equipment on the same patch or configuration level,” which makes the
spread of the virus or malware very easy. 71 Even if a hospital purchased
medical technology and devices from multiple vendors, having different
devices from different manufacturers, each with its own structure and
potential levels of security, would create an insecure tangled digital web of
cybersecurity.72 Targeted malware can move between different devices and
systems passively until it reaches the implantable medical device where it is
designed to activate.73 Due to the fact that implantable “medical devices
such as pacemakers [each] have [a] unique identifier[],” it is possible to
target a specific individual or class of people.74 This Internet of things that
connects physical equipment all together on a network via computers has
created many different avenues for cyberattacks.75
C.

National Security Risk

Concerns about the varying lapses in cybersecurity in implantable
medical devices and medical devices on the same network have merit.76
“Between . . . 2009 and . . . 2011, the [Department of Veterans’ Affairs]
detected 142 . . . instances of malware infections affecting 207 medical
devices found in [fourteen different parts of hospitals].”77 In one instance, in
the catheterization lab, the malware infection of equipment was so severe
that it “required transport of [the] patients to a different hospital.”78 In 2010,
a Veterans’ Affairs catheterization laboratory in New Jersey was closed due
to malware that infected hundreds of medical devices and computers on that
network.79 “[T]he Conficker worm [caused] . . . approximately 10[%] of the
[healthcare] IT infrastructure in Sweden” to go dark in 2010.80 That same
year, the same worm took “15[%] of New Zealand’s [total healthcare]
system . . . offline.”81 These kinds of viruses that can take over computers

71.
Vockley, supra note 58, at 167.
72.
Id.
73.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 2.2.
74.
Id.
75.
Perakslis, supra note 39, at 396.
76.
See Mankovich, supra note 7, at 174; Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36;
Daniel B. Kramer et al., Security and Privacy Qualities of Medical Devices: An Analysis of
FDA Postmarket Surveillance, PLOS ONE, July 19, 2012, at 1, 4.
77.
Kramer et al., supra note 76, at 4.
78.
Id.
79.
See Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36.
80.
Mankovich, supra note 7, at 174.
81.
Id.
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and devices are not bound by country borders and infect anything that links
into the network.82
In addition, there is a real danger of implementing already existing
safety measures, such as anti-virus software, in implantable medical
devices.83 “On April 21, 2010, one-third of the hospitals in Rhode Island
were forced to” stop elective surgeries and treatment of non-trauma patients
in the emergency room because the “anti-virus software update had . . .
misclassified a critical Windows [dynamic link library] as malicious.”84
Another example occurred when a “tornado hit St. John’s hospital in Kansas
City in May 2011.”85 The tornado “caus[ed] the electricity to go out, [and as
a result] doctors and nurses lost access to . . . vital medicine[] in the
[emergency room] and in [almost] every other department,” because the
drugs were in a powered metal cabinet which had an automatic lock
controlled by software.86
“Researchers at [the] Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, . . . have demonstrated [in a
laboratory] that it is possible to hack into wireless implantable medical
devices,” including pacemakers, heart defibrillators, insulin pumps, and even
cochlear implants and neurostimulators, and take control of them to the
detriment of patients.87 Even a programmable radio could control an
implantable defibrillator or an insulin pump by replaying messages, allowing
the operator of the radio to stop the device or to cause it to kill the host.88
Researcher Jerome Radcliffe inspected the Java-based configuration program
in his own insulin pump and was able to “reverse-engineer[] the pump’s
packet structure, revealing that [it did not] encrypt the medical data . . . or . . .
authenticate [when] the components [of the insulin pump communicated] to
one another.”89 A researcher with Radcliffe also demonstrated his ability to
take over and shut down a volunteer’s insulin pump, showing how easy and
swiftly it could be done.90 To further the point, a group of researchers
demonstrated how “analog signal injection of low-frequency waveforms . . .
on the sensing leads of” an implantable defibrillator could be tricked by
crafting electromagnetic interference waveforms to deliver a defibrillation
shock.91 This means that even an attacker who cannot perfectly match an
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 174–75.
See Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36.
Id.
Klein & Kagan, supra note 29, at 2.
Id.
Vockley, supra note 58, at 170.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 161.
Id.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 166.
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electromagnetic interference signal’s wavelength to the length of the sensing
leads could just increase the power to override and trigger the implantable
medical device.92 Researchers have not only been able to do something once
thought of as science fiction in a laboratory, but they have also been able to
do it in the course of a live demonstration.93
III.

CURRENT STATE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

The FDA’s mission is to protect “the public health by assuring the
safety, efficacy, and security of medical devices.”94 The FDA regulates
medical devices and approves them, but its authority is in flux regarding
regulation of cybersecurity.95 Part A of this Section delves into the FDA and
its numerous attempts to tackle cybersecurity of implantable medical devices
through voluntary guidance, regulations, and proposed regulations.96 Part B
examines various congressional attempts to tackle cybersecurity of
implantable medical devices, along with other governmental bodies such as
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Defense, and the White House.97 This Section
highlights the contradictory nature of all of the various governmental bodies’
solutions to the important issue of cybersecurity in implantable medical
devices.98
A.

The Power of the FDA

The FDA classifies a device as an “instrument, . . . machine, . . .
implant, . . . or other similar . . . article, including any component, part, or
accessory, which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in
man or other animals.”99 The FDA subjects all of these to the same laws and
standards, with a definition that is vague enough that even a smartphone
becomes a medical device when employing a cell phone camera to determine
urine analytes.100 “The FDA considers [most] [h]ealth IT products to be
‘similar or related to’ other medical device products,” which results in the
92.
See id.
93.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 164.
94.
Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 36.
95.
See Vockley, supra note 58, at 166–67.
96.
See infra Section III.A.
97.
See infra Section III.B.
98.
See infra Section III.B.
99.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2) (2012).
100.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LETTER TO BIOSENSE TECHNOLOGIES
PRIVATE LIMITED CONCERNING THE UCHECK URINE ANALYZER (2013).
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FDA classifications referring back to themselves in defining medical devices
and standards.101
The FDA has released numerous guidance documents on
cybersecurity throughout the years, all echoing each other with no actual
effect on implantable medical devices.102 “In 2005, the [FDA] issued [a]
‘Guidance for Industry—Cybersecurity for Networked Medical Devices
Containing Off-the-Shelf Software,’” which stated that it was “the
responsibility of medical device manufacturers to maintain cybersecurity”
and to keep them safe and effective through maintenance plans for its
cybersecurity.103 “On September 25, 2013, the FDA [released the] Mobile
Medical Applications Guidance . . . (“MMA Guidance”),” which declared
that it “intend[ed] to regulate software that poses significant risks to patients .
. . .”104 The MMA Guidance also explained that devices classified as
“[mobile medical applications] must have premarket approval or clearance
[from the FDA] before commercialization may begin.”105 The MMA
Guidance also defined “[a] manufacturer as [being] anyone who ‘creates,
designs, develops, labels, re-labels, . . . modifies, or creates a software
system or application for a regulated medical device in whole or from
multiple software components.’”106 This software classification sweeps in all
types of medical devices, including smartphones, although Congress has
stated that the FDA does not have authority to do so.107
To further complicate things, in February 2011, the FDA reclassified
its Medical Device Data Systems (“MDDS”) rule from a Class III, highest
risk, to a Class I, lowest risk classification.108 This MDDS rule defines
MDDS as devices intended to transfer, store, and convert from one format to
another or display medical device data.109 Implantable medical devices fall
101.
Areta L. Kupchyk, What’s Trending with Mobile Medical Apps and
Health IT? A New FDA Regulatory Framework May Be in the Making, 6 HEALTH IT L. &
INDUSTRY REP. 1, 2 (2014); see also 21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
102.
See Mankovich, supra note 7, at 175; Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2–3.
103.
Mankovich, supra note 7, at 175; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
CYBERSECURITY FOR NETWORKED MEDICAL DEVICES CONTAINING OFF-THE-SHELF (OTS)
SOFTWARE: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2005).
104.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2–3; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2015).
105.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 104.
106.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 3; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 104.
107.
See Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 5.
108.
See 21 C.F.R. § 880.6310(b) (2016); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 104.
109.
21 C.F.R. § 880.6310(a)(1)(i)–(iv).
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within this classification.110 Under the new MDDS rule classification, the
FDA does not consider “software that is critical to keeping a patient alive,
such as blood pressure cuffs and glucose monitors, to be [a] MDDS
product[].”111 The FDA determined that the new classification to lowest risk
is because these products pose the lowest risk to the patient, and the controls
of the devices “would provide . . . reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness.”112
Under this new classification, which incorporates
implantable medical devices, “[m]anufacturers are only required to comply
with the registration and listing requirements, the Medical Device Reporting
regulation . . . and the Quality System Regulation” of the FDA.113
The FDA has numerous proposals in the works as well.114 First, the
“FDA has proposed to expand the types of . . . device[s] . . . [under the
MDDS Rule] that would be exempt from FDA enforcement.”115 The FDA
also plans “to revise its [MMA Guidance] to conform [to] the MDDS
expansion and clarify the types of mobile medical [applications] that would
be exempt from FDA enforcement as a medical device.”116 “The FDA [also]
has proposed not to enforce compliance with any regulatory controls that
apply to the MDDS;” “medical image storage device[s], [which provide]
electronic storage and retrieval functions for medical images;” and “medical
image communication device[s], [which are] device[s] that provide
electronic transfer of medical image data between medical devices,” “based
on a determination that these devices pose low risk to patient safety.”117 The
language of the proposal, however, is vague enough to incorporate
implantable medical devices such as insulin pumps.118 Lastly, the FDA
published the Health Information Technology (“HIT”) Report at the request
of Congress in April 2014, in accordance with the Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act (“FDASIA”), which proposed
another strategy based on classifying healthcare intellectual technology
products.119 The recommended categories were administrative products,
health management products, and medical devices.120 This report led to

note 104.
note 104.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id.; Gupta, supra note 22.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 3.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 3; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra

117.

Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 4; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra

118.
119.
120.

See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 104.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2, 4.
Id. at 4.
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proposed legislation based on a function-based framework when evaluating
applications and products, and it does not address medical software or have
any binding authority.121
The FDA came out with a new series of nonbinding
recommendations in October 2014, after an investigation by the Department
of Homeland Security into the cybersecurity of implantable medical devices
was made public.122 This new guidance began by recognizing “[t]he need for
effective cybersecurity to assure medical device functionality and safety [in
light of] increasing use of wireless, Internet, and network connect[ive]
devices.”123 The FDA recognized the threat stemming from failure to
maintain cybersecurity in these devices, including the possibility that
compromising medical devices could cause harm and death to patients.124
The FDA’s nonbinding recommendations [were] modeled on the [National
Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”)] Cybersecurity
Framework,” recommended by the White House, and it “encourages
manufacturers to develop controls to ensure the security of medical devices”
in the Internet of things.125 It also “encourages manufacturers to treat
[cybersecurity] as a fundamental part of the development[] process” and
“acknowledge[s] that device makers face [the] challenge[] [of] striking the
balance between . . . cybersecurity” and making sure the device itself would
remain usable.126 “The FDA also recommends that manufacturers includ[e]
certain documentation as part of the premarket submission process to ensure
implementation of appropriate cybersecurity controls.”127
That
“documentation includes a hazard analysis, a summary of [the] controls, and
a traceability matrix that ‘links actual cybersecurity . . . to the . . . risks that
were considered.’”128 The FDA guidance documents for software, however,
121.
122.

Id. at 2, 4.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR
MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2014); see also Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks:
DHS Investigates At-Risk Devices, KING & SPALDING 2 (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca102714a.pdf.
123.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
124.
Id.
125.
Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 2; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122. The Internet of
things is a term that describes all devices with the capability of connecting to the Internet,
other devices, or other networks. See Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS
Investigates At-Risk Devices, supra note 122, at 2; Perakslis, supra note 39, at 396.
126.
Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 2; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
127.
Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 2.
Id.
128.
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generally always focus on “large-scale computer-based equipment [and] not
computerized devices,” with focus on data security and not safety.129 All of
these are purely recommendations with no binding authority.130
On December 28, 2016, the FDA published its final guidance for the
Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices.131 The
guidance states repeatedly that it in no way “establishes any rights . . . and it
is not binding on [the] FDA or the public.”132 The FDA emphasizes “that
manufacturers should monitor, identify, and address cybersecurity
vulnerabilities and exploits as part of their postmarket management of [the]
medical devices.”133 In an effort to streamline this process, the FDA states
that it does not intend to enforce its own reporting requirements for device
patches.134 The FDA’s rationale is that “cybersecurity . . . updates and
patches are generally considered to be a type of device enhancement for
which the FDA does not require advance notification or reporting.”135
However, should a cybersecurity vulnerability or exploit “pose a risk to
health,” the medical device manufacturer would be required to report this to
the FDA.136 Beyond finding a risk to health, the FDA also recommends that
manufacturers use a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tool in
determining the probability of the occurrence of harm for a device, as well as
for assessing the severity of harm to the patient.137 The rest of the December
2016 guidance echoes the other FDA rules and regulations, particularly the
October guidance in terms of cybersecurity practice.138 The changes to the
patching of medical devices in this guidance are non-binding and unclear as

129.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 1; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
supra note 122.
130.
Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 2; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
131.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF
CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2016).
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Id. (quoting U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122).
136.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131. While a medical device
manufacturer would be required to report a cybersecurity vulnerability or exploit that “pose[s]
a risk to health,” it is unknown under the Guidance when the notification would occur, or if
the device manufacturer would be punished for patching the exploit before notification and
approval by the FDA. Id.
137.
Id.
138.
See id.; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
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to when reporting to the FDA would be necessary for health risk
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in medical devices.139
The recent FDA regulations do not put forth any new ideas.140 The
FDA created “a cross-agency working group [as long ago as 2013] involving
. . . the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology and the Federal Communications Commission,” which called for
recommendations and a risk-based regulatory framework but did not define
what that meant.141 In addition, the FDA also has recommended in the past
that manufacturers provide “[a] specific list of all cybersecurity risks that
were considered in the design of [the] device,” controls for the device, and a
plan for providing updates along the device lifecycle.142 The working group
also recommended that manufacturers send “[a]ppropriate documentation to
demonstrate that the device will . . . [arrive] free of malware,” include in the
device instructions what kind of anti-virus software or firewall is on the
device, if any, and that the manufacturers anticipate and include in the
instructions whether a particular type of user will put their own anti-virus
software on the device.143 This is contrary to the FDA 510(k) certification
process, which requires manufacturers to be the sole party to upgrade the
device and to send the patch to the FDA for approval before it goes into
effect.144 There are so many FDA regulations and recommendations that are
vague and contradictory to one another that something must be done to
clarify this bureaucratic mess and establish a standard for cybersecurity of
implantable medical devices.145
B.

Governmental Reclassifications, Power Shifts, and Executive Orders

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)
pervasively regulates electronic health information through its privacy and
security rules, but HIPAA focuses on data security rather than device
139.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131; U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., supra note 122.
140.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131; Fu & Blum, supra note
40, at 36; Perakslis, supra note 39, at 396.
141.
Perakslis, supra note 39, at 396.
142.
Fu & Blum, supra note 40, at 37.
143.
Id.
144.
See Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 162.
145.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131; Wirth, supra note 26, at
27–28. While the agency itself has a process of reviewing and approving upgrades, the FDA
itself recommends that manufacturers anticipate users putting on cybersecurity, which is
contradictory to establishing any sort of standard for the device and help against the FDA’s
own regulations. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131; Wirth, supra note 26, at
27–28. The agency has been so malleable on this issue that it contradicts itself. See U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 131; Wirth, supra note 26, at 27–28.
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Congress defined security under HIPAA as “physically
security.146
protecting health information stored or transmitted electronically,” thus,
failing to include cybersecurity of medical devices against hackers who want
to control the device.147 Congress passed the FDASIA, which delves into
levels of medical device classification for federal protection and addresses
which type of FDA scrutiny they each undergo.148 The FDASIA requires the
FDA to propose a strategy and recommends it on “an appropriate risk based
regulatory framework focused on functionality for Health IT.”149 In April
2014, the FDA published the HIT Report, which suggested a function-based
framework companies could refer to, but it did not address the
“multifunctional nature of medical software.”150 Overall, the FDASIA and
the HIT Report attempted to reclassify certain aspects of medical technology
and devices, but that was not a strong attempt at a solution, at least in part
because Congress designated the HIT Report, which it petitioned the FDA to
issue as having no authority.151
“As the FDA was completing the HIT Report [at the request of
Congress], a bipartisan congressional coalition introduced the Sensible
Oversight for Technology, which Advances Regulatory Efficiency Act of
2013 (“SOFTWARE Act”) . . . .”152 Just like the FDASIA, the SOFTWARE
Act is another reclassification of medical device products under three
different categories at the FDA.153 However, the FDA would only have
jurisdiction to regulate under one of the categories.154 Clinical and health
software, including software that analyzes and changes patient data, would
be exempt from regulation.155
The United States Consumer Product Safety Administration has
oversight of software vulnerabilities where the FDA does not, despite the
FDA having the oversight of the medical devices that host the software.156
However, the United States Consumer Product Safety Administration does
not cover computer security on vulnerability assessments of software.157

146.
R.L. Garrie & P.E. Paustian, mHealth Regulation, Legislation, and
Cybersecurity, in MHEALTH: TRANSFORMING HEALTHCARE 45, 46 (2014).
147.
Id.
148.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
See id. at 2, 4.
152.
Id. at 2.
153.
Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2, 4.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 3.3.
157.
Id.
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This is just proposed legislation and another contradictory attempt at
reclassification from Congress.158
The Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology
Act of 2014 (“PROTECT Act”) is another proposed law, again attempting to
reclassify medical devices within the FDA.159 The PROTECT Act was a
congressional response to the FDA’s failure to respond to questions from the
Health IT industry.160 The congressional purpose of the PROTECT Act is to
prevent FDA overregulation while protecting innovation and exempting lowrisk health software from a new tax under the Affordable Care Act.161 This
is another attempt by Congress to reclassify medical devices, further
muddying efforts to identify medical devices and implement protection at a
federally consistent level.162
The FTC is also influencing the medical device field, as the devices
use wireless frequencies available in the open air.163 The data transmitted
from these devices could be used and stolen as a result from cyberattacks,
and this crosses over into the FTC’s administrative realm.164 The FTC issued
an order in GMR Transcription Services, Inc., stating that the cybersecurity
issue of medical records on devices that they have are poorly defined.165 The
FTC then ordered GMR Transcription Services to have its security looked at
and inspected for a set number of years, in order to make sure they were
doing something with cybersecurity.166 This demonstrates another agency
recognizing the issue of poor cybersecurity and issuing compliance check-ins
to make sure that some level of cybersecurity is achieved.167
In an executive order, President Obama issued the NIST Framework
in 2013, which was designed to improve cybersecurity practices across all
critical United States sectors vulnerable to cyberattack.168 The executive
order required the “NIST, a division of the Department of Commerce, to
develop a [set] . . . of voluntary cybersecurity best practices for [United
States] critical infrastructure sectors.”169 That framework would provide an
entity with an understanding of where each critical United States sector is in
158.
See id.; Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2, 4.
159.
See Kupchyk, supra note 101, at 2.
160.
Id. at 5.
161.
Id.
162.
See id.
163.
See Alex Ruoff, supra note 37, at 20.
164.
See id.
165.
See id.
166.
Id. at 3–5.
167.
See id. at 4.
168.
Alex Ruoff, Federal Security Officials Say Cyberattacks on Health
Companies Expected to Increase, 23 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1282, 1282 (2014).
169.
Id.
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terms of vulnerability and attempt to analyze each level of security.170 The
NIST Framework analyzes the usefulness of controls to a particular device in
three separate areas of cybersecurity—confidentiality, integrity, and
availability—and sets control levels per device for risk assessment.171 If an
area is classified as high risk, the framework determines what controls need
to be implemented to try to mitigate that risk.172 This is another voluntary
measure that brings in another agency, along with another reclassification,
separated from the many that Congress and the FDA have, which makes
having any cohesive protection of implantable medical devices’
cybersecurity that much more complicated.173
Adding another layer of complexity, during the George W. Bush
administration, the Department of Homeland Security was involved in trying
to tackle the issue of cybersecurity of implantable medical devices.174 The
Bush Administration formed a private-sector group in partnership with the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human
Services, to convince the healthcare industry to conform to the Bush
Administration’s “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.”175 This group
ended up finding that nobody knows the condition of the healthcare sector’s
collective security infrastructure, since the industry is fragmented, and each
institution gauges its cybersecurity and its vulnerabilities differently.176 The
group recommended raising the bar for manufacturers, “possibly by
establishing [a] minimum-security standard[] for certain products and . . .
[even] creating a certification process for [cybersecurity].”177 Finally, the
group recommended devising a standardizing tool to help assess
vulnerabilities for manufacturers, something that is still repeatedly
mentioned over a decade later.178
In October 2014, the Department of Homeland Security revealed an
investigation of cybersecurity vulnerabilities in medical devices and hospital
equipment that may be exploitable by cyber criminals and are susceptible to
malicious hacking.179 The vulnerabilities investigated could cause severe
injury and death; they were found in implantable medical devices including

170.
See id.
171.
Caruso & Masters, supra note 56, at 32.
172.
See id.
173.
See id.; Ruoff, supra note 168, at 1282.
174.
See Colias, supra note 4, at 62.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 64.
178.
See id.
179.
Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 1.
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infusion pumps and implantable heart devices.180 The Department, however,
stated that the probe started when a deceased cybersecurity expert, Barnaby
Jack, demonstrated in 2012 that he could hack wireless communications and
remotely cause an implanted pacemaker to deliver a lethal shock to the
host.181 In response, the Department of Homeland Security said it had been
“working with . . . manufacturers to identify and repair” the issues in the
software of the implantable medical devices “that would allow . . . [hackers]
to take control of them.”182
In contrast to all these ambiguous regulations, proposals, executive
orders, legislation, and proposed legislation, the Department of Defense has a
very strict policy for all devices that the military uses.183 The “Department
of Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process
program mandates strict certification requirements for [all] . . . computer
systems” provided for the military, including hospital equipment and medical
devices of all kinds.184 In order for these devices to be sold to the
Department of Defense, they must meet a strict security certification.185 This
has caused problems, as most manufacturers are not willing or even capable
of bearing the financial cost necessary of meeting the standards due to the
size of the market.186
IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

In all, at least five agencies have indicated intent to regulate
cybersecurity in medical devices, but nothing is clear and concrete, and what
exists is overlapping, confusing, and contradictory.187 The private sector
recognizes the need for an enforceable system pursuant to which medical
devices can be tested on a baseline of cybersecurity standards through the
FDA.188 The nature of the medical industry, comprised of both private and
public entities, requires a willingness to unify to address cybersecurity at a
180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 1–2.
182.
Jai Vijayan, DHS Investigates Dozens of Medical Device Cybersecurity
Flaws,
INFORMATIONWEEK
(Oct.
23,
2014,
9:06
AM),
http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/security-and-privacy/dhs-investigates-dozens-ofmedical-device-cybersecurity-flaws-/d/d-id/1316882.
183.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 4.3.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
See Mathias Klümper & Erik Vollebregt, Navigating the New EU Rules
for Medical Device Software, 2009 REG. AFF. J. DEVICES, 83, 83; Ruoff, supra note 168;
Ruoff, supra note 37.
188.
Homeland Security Investigating Medical Device Cybersecurity, supra
note 1; Ruoff, supra note 33.
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consistent level nationwide.189 This can be achieved by combining the
strengths of the federal government—homeland security and public safety—
with the innovative ability of the private sector to tackle cybersecurity for
implantable medical devices.190 This is important, for knowledge of the
technological domain specific to implantable medical devices needs to be
coupled with the regulation if it is to be strong and not a hindrance to the
medical devices’ purpose.191 Just as the federal government and its agencies
have developed ways to detect, track, identify risks, and prevent and combat
epidemics with the help of the private sector, so too can the government, to
an extent, do the same thing to mitigate the harm that can result from the
vulnerabilities in implantable medical devices.192 Standards are useful in
creating secure products, as they can help a manufacturer ensure that all
known issues have been considered, and this is especially important in very
complex devices such as implantable medical devices.193 Part A discusses
possible federal solutions to clearing up the bureaucratic confusion among all
of the various governmental bodies.194 Part B explores various private sector
solutions, including traditional and nontraditional solutions to tackling
cybersecurity in implantable medical devices.195 This also includes some
potential private regulation.196 Some persuasive examples emanate from the
European Union (“EU”) and an international standards body, both of which
have attempted to secure implantable medical devices.197 Lastly, Part C
warns of the dangers of poorly drafted regulations in this area, highlighting
how bad regulation can both compromise the user of an implantable medical
device and harm the medical device industry.198
A.

Governmental Solutions

Governmental solutions in the United States could vary greatly. One
absolutely necessary step is for the agencies to collaborate on a set of
universal definitions.199 There are classifications that Congress, the FDA,
189.
Barnett et al., supra note 34, at 43.
190.
Id.
191.
See Perakslis, supra note 39, at 396.
192.
Id. at 397.
193.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 2.1.5.
194.
See Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates At-Risk
Devices, supra note 122, at 1; infra Section IV.A.
195.
Vijayan, supra note 182; see also Kramer et al., supra note 76, at 4; infra
Section IV.B.
196.
See Vijayan, supra note 182.
197.
Klümper & Vollebregt, supra note 187, at 83–84.
198.
See Kramer et al., supra note 76, at 4; infra Section IV.C.
199.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
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the White House, and the other agencies must clarify, with the first step
being the use of universal definitions.200 “[M]edical applications can be of
two types: [W]earable and implanted. Wearable devices are those that can
be used on [the] body surface of a human or [in] close proximity [to] the
user,” such as, a heart rate monitor, blood pressure monitor, and glucose
sensor.201 Implantable medical devices, on the other hand, “are those
[devices] that are inserted inside [the] human body,” such as, an implantable
defibrillator and insulin pump.202 Having clear, non-ambiguous definitions
used by all agencies, whether the list appears in legislation or regulations,
would help alleviate some of the confusion.
Another solution would be to expand HIPAA to give the Department
of Health and Human Services power over cybersecurity issues in this realm
and teeth to enforce the new regulations.203 The Department of Health and
Human Services Office for Civil Rights estimates that 66% of providers have
not complied with the HIPAA-mandated audit of security controls for their
electronic health records.204 Organizations generally “wait until an attack or
breach has occurred to perform an audit,” and apparently are willing to take
the risk of incurring civil monetary penalties imposed for noncompliance
with HIPAA.205 Even if organizations complied with HIPAA, most of the
HIPAA protection relies on standard methods of isolating critical data, which
is bypassed by attackers when taking over or overloading an implantable
medical device.206 A possible solution would be to give HIPAA coverage of
cybersecurity of devices and put power into the enforcement of its provisions
for cybersecurity.
The FDA has already recommended a set of regulatory
improvements.207 The October FDA Guidance included recommendations
that would help to address the cybersecurity issues if they were implemented
as requirements in a regulation on implantable medical devices.208 Starting
with the premarket submission process to the FDA, demonstrating the
existence of a hazard analysis, a summary of controls, and a traceability
matrix that links actual controls to the cybersecurity risks foreseen by the
manufacturer would ensure that devices incorporate some sort of
200.
See id.
201.
Moshaddique Al Ameen et al., Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless
Sensor Networks for Healthcare Applications, 36 J. MED. SYSTEMS 93, 93 (2012).
202.
Id.
203.
See Ruoff, supra note 37, at 20.
204.
Ruoff, supra note 168, at 1282.
205.
Id.
206.
Perakslis, supra note 39, at 395–96.
207.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122.
208.
Id.; see also Medical Devices and Cybersecurity Risks: DHS Investigates
At-Risk Devices, supra note 122, at 2.
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cybersecurity precautions.209 “Manufacturers should address cybersecurity
during the design and development of the medical device,” with a
vulnerability and management approach for the life of the device.210 Due to
the longevity of implantable medical devices, it is important that a
cybersecurity plan—from the beginning—is in place, instead of being
reactionary and doing ad hoc fixes once problems occur.211 This can be
coupled with the “software validation and risk analysis” that is already
required for certification of an implantable medical device by the FDA.212
The cybersecurity and vulnerability approach should assess threats
and vulnerabilities, mitigation strategies, risk, and accepted risk.213 It should
also balance the safeguards that the manufacturer decides to put in place, to
make them appropriate to the user and location of use, so that security
controls will not hinder access in an emergency situation.214 There should
also be features in implantable medical devices that recognize and detect
breaches, log them, and act on them during normal use, as well as have a
failsafe mode for when the device is compromised, so that the critical
functionality is still protected.215 The current language is only persuasive
and suggestively vague to consider all devices; yet, having it as a pre-market
approval requirement would force manufacturers and the FDA to take
cybersecurity into account as part of the FDA approval process.216
B.

Other Solutions

The private sector also has recommendations on ways to implement
a national cybersecurity standard.217 One is to certify third-party testers to
test security vulnerabilities in devices.218 Another is a national information
sharing system for medical device cybersecurity to detect the latest security
vulnerabilities and tackle them.219 This, coupled with a federal safe harbor
provision for reporting cybersecurity breaches of medical devices, would
allow a clearer picture of the state of cybersecurity of the devices and allow
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new cybersecurity issues to be addressed.220 “[A]ctive and real-time
surveillance and communication of emerging cyberthreats” can only help in
securing all implantable medical devices.221 While there is an inherent
perceived danger to knowing and reporting cybersecurity of devices, security
experts have long stated that secret cybersecurity protocols are commonly
reversed engineered and easily defeated.222 A better method of security is to
have a system that is completely open to critique, thus making it more secure
across the board.223 This follows “[a] fundamental tenant of cryptography . .
. known as Kerckhoffs’ principle,” which states that a system “should be
secure even if the adversary knows everything about the system except its
key.”224 By choosing a system that is in the public, the community as a
whole only strengthens the end product’s security by working on it
together.225
A Host Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (“HIDS/HIPS”)
is another means of protecting implantable medical devices.226 HIDS/HIPS,
“technologies are based on managing a known behavior of a system,” and
preventing any unknown behavior from happening or taking over.227 This
kind of system would work well in implantable medical devices because it
provides strong protection against attacks that have never occurred before.228
However, there is always the possibility of a HIDS/HIPS preventing critical
support from the device, and it can be tricked by a hacker.229 Despite this, a
HIDS/HIPS addresses some concerns for cybersecurity of implantable
medical devices and warrants further exploration of implementation in
implantable medical devices.230
There are other means to address cybersecurity concerns of
implantable medical devices outside of conventional cybersecurity
methods.231 One involves “tattooing the encryption key” to an encrypted
implantable medical device on the patient in an “invisible, UV-light-readable
ink” for emergency situations.232 Along the same vein of modifying the user
for added cybersecurity protection is one type of cybersecurity control, tested
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See id. at 2–3.
Perakslis, supra note 39, at 397.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 2.1.8.
See id.
Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 160.
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Wirth, supra note 26, at 31.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 31–32.
See Templeton, supra note 48, at § 3.1.
Id.
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in a pacemaker, that allows access in emergency situations to medical
personnel by connecting to a computer and using the patient’s heartbeat as
authorization for commands by an external system.233 This, however, defeats
the purpose of a wireless implantable medical device, and it would require
surgery to access the internal medical device, putting the patient at risk. 234
Another option is a subcutaneous push switch that would be implanted under
the skin of the patient for the purpose of reprogramming the device and
allowing access, thus, allowing emergency personnel to be able to be reset in
a failsafe mode.235 Additionally, RF-shielding wearable pouches can
accompany the patient, which would restrict the wireless communication of
the implantable medical device to millimeters and require a security token to
access.236 Lastly, a standardizing score that applies to a device that answers
in a satisfies/does not satisfy evaluation for each aspect of the device can be
used to evaluate whether or not a device meets a certain score, which would
determine whether it should be marketed.237 While a high score in this area
could be used by medical device manufacturers to promote their products as
a new type of marketing edge over competitors, it trivializes cybersecurity
and is not focused enough towards tackling specific issues.238 If this system
was coupled with suggestive FDA regulations, however, it could prove to be
a general solution.239
Lastly, the United States can look towards the EU as a guidepost for
how to approach cybersecurity in medical device software.240 In Directive
2007/47/EC, the EU imposed stricter rules on software used with medical
devices, although it only applies to software that directly controls the
device.241 The directive makes it so that all software is updated, validated,
and approved from an authoritative agency, and does not change the risk
classification of the device.242 While this echoes what the FDA already does
to an extent, the fact that it specifically covers and classifies the software of
the medical device should be taken into consideration.243 Additionally, the
EU conducted a cybersecurity “exercise involving 29 countries and 200
233.
Caruso & Masters, supra note 56, at 35.
234.
See Ransford et al., supra note 2, at 162.
235.
Templeton, supra note 48, at § 3.1.
236.
Id.
237.
Caruso & Masters, supra note 56, at 35.
238.
See id.
239.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122; Caruso & Masters, supra
note 56, at 32, 35.
240.
See Klümper & Vollebregt, supra note 187, at 83.
241.
Id. at 83.
242.
Id. at 85–86.
243.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 122; Klümper & Vollebregt,
supra note 187, at 84–85.
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agencies deal[ing] with attack scenarios against critical infrastructure[s],”
which included hospitals and hacking into medical devices.244 As the EU
Commission Vice President stated, “[t]he sophistication and volume of
cyberattacks are increasing every day. . . . They cannot be countered if
individual states work alone or just a handful of them act together.”245
Outside of the EU, international standards bodies, such as the Association for
the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation, have formed working groups
and issued standards on medical device security that include manufacturers
and regulators.246 Regardless of whether the United States follows the EU or
an international standardizing body, international harmonization of
cybersecurity is almost inevitable due to the nature of the Internet.247
C.

Dangers with Governmental Regulation

There are dangers with increased regulations that must be
considered.248 Regulations can become burdensome to technological
advancement, with Congress—or any executive administrative body—failing
to take into account the concerns of the healthcare industry and the
knowledge of how to make a device that would not harm a patient by
running slowly when implementing the regulations.249 The industry itself
must understand the capital and operating costs of implementing a
cybersecurity system and factor that in, or else face potential inept and
burdensome regulations.250
The FDA Guidance also recommends that manufacturers consider
implementing things like authentication protocols, automatic timers to
terminate connections with a device after a period of time, placing physical
locks on the devices, and making stronger passwords to the devices.251 It
also recommends a layered user authentication procedure and restriction of
updates, allowing users to download and update their own software and
244.
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Infrastructure
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31,
2014),
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247.
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See Robert Mittman & Mary Cain, The Future of the Internet in

Healthcare:
A Five-Year Forecast, in THE INTERNET AND HEALTH
COMMUNICATION: EXPERIENCES AND EXPECTATIONS 47, 55 (Ronald E. Rice &
James E. Katz eds., 2001).
249.
250.
251.
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firmware from the manufacturer.252 These recommendations, however, have
already been considered to be dangerous by medical device manufacturers
and have been proven to be harmful in locking out medical personnel in an
emergency to a patient.253 Many good cybersecurity requirements, in fact,
conflict with the need for emergency access to a device.254 Additionally,
requiring implantable medical devices to incorporate certain software can
have a major impact on the battery life of the device, reducing the longevity
of the device and causing other potential issues.255 This carries over into the
plain fact that there are different levels of severity of vulnerabilities in
implantable medical devices.256 For example, a cardiac defibrillator can kill
its user, while a non-actuating glucose sensor cannot do lethal damage on its
own.257 This danger must be taken into consideration when making any sort
of regulations for implantable medical devices.258
Another regulatory concern is that there are usually compromises
that specifically exclude certain areas from needing to be secured in making
any regulation.259 One example is “the NERC-CIP cybersecurity standard
for the North American bulk power system,” which specifically excludes
non-routable protocols and narrowly defines devices considered critical
assets bound by the regulatory standards.260 Organizations typically do the
minimum to meet regulatory compliance, which means excluding some
areas, which would highlight weak areas for attackers to gain access.261 Due
to this practice, numerous people in the medical industry and the government
are concerned that if standards are written and enforced, they may actually
undermine the purpose of trying to protect the user of the implantable
medical device.262
Finally, of course, increased regulation of certain medical devices
can lead to an increase in the cost of certification and testing of the devices
themselves.263 An example is in the aviation industry, “where over 50% of
the resources required to develop new, safety critical systems” are used in
252.
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just certifying the system.264 For medical devices and cybersecurity, much of
the hardware and software are still incapable of being reliant due to the need
for more advanced and integrated technology, as current widely used
techniques and protocols are inappropriate for the confined space of an
implantable medical device.265 The right balance needs to be found in
regulation to establish security without creating expensive and complicated
standards that are contradictory in nature.266 Legislation and regulation can
facilitate increasing cybersecurity through base guidelines for implantable
medical devices, but they can also harm patients if they fail to take into
account industry knowledge and dangers.267
V.

CONCLUSION

Hackers have turned from hacking businesses and governments for
fame and fortune to covert organized cybercrime, which is estimated to be
exceeding the illegal drug trafficking trade.268 It is dangerously naïve for the
federal government and medical device manufacturers to fail to understand
that “many individuals . . . are highly intelligent, skilled, and motivated” to
find and exploit weaknesses in medical devices.269 These devices were “‘not
designed to withstand terrorist attacks. . . . ‘Permitting control of a
component in a human body without authentication seems grossly negligent,
and should raise the ire of the FDA.’”270 Former Secretary of Defense, Leon
Panetta, was correct in stating that an organized attack focused on
vulnerabilities of implantable medical devices “could be a cyber Pearl
Harbor, an attack that would cause physical destruction and the loss of
life.”271
The problem facing implantable medical device manufacturers is
complex, requiring a balance of usability, performance, and safety, while
taking into consideration the cybersecurity threats of a growing digitally
connected world.272 Without a standardized baseline for specifications, the
interconnectivity of every medical device will negate some security features
of others and create opportunities for attacks.273 The “healthcare industry
needs to . . . [become] involved in [the current] legislative process [on
264.
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implantable medical devices] or risk the imposition of . . . regulations” that
can harm the product through unintended consequences and hinder the
technological growth of implantable medical devices.274
The threat of cyberattacks is a clear and present danger, and it is time
to focus on ways to protect the user from a technology that can be altered
remotely to be a weapon instead of a significant life-changing tool.275 It is
up to key players—the “[p]roviders, manufacturers, security experts, industry
organiz[ers], [and the government] . . . to work together to . . . protect [the]
integrated healthcare” industry that is becoming more connected with the
Internet every day.276
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